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

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VOL. XXVI.

EUCKEN'S THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

THE
LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

BY

RUDOLF EUCKEN

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN JENA

TRANSLATED BY

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

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PREFACE

In the present volume philosophy is not regarded as a known quantity, and no attempt is made to impart it to the individual by a comparative survey of its different departments; but it is treated as a problem—the problem that it in reality continually becomes in the course of the centuries. The book represents a particular view of the nature of philosophy, and undertakes to show that it must be conceived in this way if it is to be equal to the demands which are made upon it by the life of mankind, and particularly by the present situation. By tracing out as simply and clearly as possible a few of the leading lines on which the age-long work of the human spirit has proceeded, it is shown that our spiritual life is not built up in peace and security on a given foundation, but that doubt and

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conflict extend right down to the foundation, and that no progress of our inner life is possible without a reversal of our first impressions. If philosophy thus appears intimately bound up with all the striving of humanity and the necessity for spiritual self-preservation, then the re-emergence of a philosophy of life and existence becomes an urgent requirement in the complication and confusion of the present situation, and in the struggle which we have to wage to-day for a spiritual centre for our civilisation and a perception of the meaning and value of life. It is because this struggle concerns not merely the learned, but every man who does not despair of attaining to inner independence and true fulness of life, that it is hoped this book will appeal to a wider circle of readers, especially those who share the author's strong and painful conviction of the inadequacy and indeed the emptiness of modern civilisation, in spite of all its outer ostentation.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

JENA, *May* 1908.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE BY THE AUTHOR

It may render the present volume easier to understand if the author endeavours to sketch in a few words what he aims at accomplishing.

My efforts have been inspired by the strong feeling that the present spiritual situation is highly unsatisfactory, and in particular that there is a sharp opposition which divides mankind and depresses the level of life. The greatness of our age lies in work, in the subjection and shaping of the world of objects to human ends: this work has gained more and more brilliant triumphs, and has altered the whole of our existence. But these triumphs have not been accompanied by a corresponding growth in the content of life and the soul of man. Work directs our efforts towards

external ends, and thus brings into play only a part, and indeed a more and more insignificant part, of our faculties. Hence all technical achievements do not preserve us from inner emptiness: work overwhelms our soul and makes us to a continually increasing extent a mere means and instrument of its restless activity. In opposition to this a counter-movement has lately arisen; man tears himself away from work, and opposes to it his own subjective condition; he seeks happiness more especially by treating life as an art, by cultivating refined and pleasurable emotions, by shaking off the burden of matter and the objective world. But the æstheticism which aims at transforming the whole of existence into pleasure and enjoyment provides it with no high aims and no real content: it makes life a mere play on the surface of things, which may be attractive and delightful for a certain time, but which in the end is bound to produce weariness and repulsion. Hence it becomes a matter of importance

to rise above the opposition between soulless work and empty subjectivism; this, however, cannot possibly be accomplished from the outside, but requires the strenuous exertion and deepening of life itself. To help towards this end is the special task of philosophy, which is thus seen to be indispensable to humanity, for it is philosophy which can best co-ordinate life into a whole, investigate the specific character of the whole so formed, press forward from the outer appearance to the inner depths, weigh the significance of each element in the universe, and try to ascertain the meaning of the whole. But any such thorough investigation of life must make it evident that human life—in a large measure, at any rate—falls within a wider concept of Nature, and displays a close kinship with the animal world. It is equally evident, however, that the possibilities of human life are by no means entirely exhausted in the life of Nature, but that with it a new stage of reality arises, which we call spiritual. This stage does not

merely exhibit particular new qualities, but also involves an entirely new kind of existence: psychical life, which, in the stages below the human, forms a mere appendage and serves only to promote physical self-preservation, here first reaches independence, gives rise to entirely new realities and values, and forms a realm which is co-ordinated into a whole by internal connections. This whole cannot possibly be set down as a merely human product; it must spring from the universe and thence be communicated to man. In appropriating it he appears as a being who has a share in a cosmic movement and is called upon to further it. But the spiritual life is no mere possession to be enjoyed by man. His average existence usually forms a turbid medley in which nature is strong and spirituality weak. Hence the object to be aimed at is first to build up in opposition to this average life a realm of genuine spirituality by means of united work, and then to raise humanity up to it. This

transforms the whole of our existence into a problem and a task; at every point life must be raised to an essentially higher level, a reversal of its previous course must be accomplished; our view of the world and the kind of life we lead must be given a specific shape; humanity as a whole has here a common work to carry out. From this starting-point a new idealism is developed, a philosophy which may be termed activism. This activism differs both from the older speculation and from modern Pragmatism. From the former it is distinguished by its repudiation of intellectualism, by its grounding of knowledge on life, and by its constant return to the content of life as the fundamental and controlling fact. From Pragmatism it is differentiated by the fact that it does not make the welfare of the mere man, whether as an individual or in society, its leading aim, but sees in man the emergence of something superhuman, divine, and eternal, and makes this the sure guiding star of its

efforts; by this means it raises them above the contingency of the individual and the vicissitudes of time, and gives to man's life a worthy content.

But where endeavour is thus concentrated chiefly on the content and connections of life, the consideration of the general movement of history will acquire great significance. For the spiritual life does not lie ready to hand in the consciousness of individuals; it reveals to us its depths and its goals only through manifold experiences and hard struggles; these experiences and struggles, with the development of spiritual life which they have brought about, form the heart and core of the movement of history. Hence history, when regarded from the philosophical point of view, leads us to consider the height of spiritual life which has been already attained; not only so, but with regard to the different leading problems of philosophy, the process of tracing out the fate they have met with in the course of the centuries is an excellent

means of taking bearings and of seeing both what in them is permanently necessary, and what in this connection the present requires from the thinker. This attention to history is not meant to alienate us from the present, but, by increasing our philosophical insight, it should reveal to us a wider and richer present than that of the mere moment. This is the justification for the attempt made in this volume to fix our position with regard to the present tasks of philosophy by means of an historical survey.

RUDOLF EUCKEN.

JENA.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

It is my pleasant duty to thank the friends who have helped me in various ways. The translation owes much to my discussions with Mr G. G. Berry, whose keen insight has cleared up many a difficulty. I am also much indebted to Mr W. R. Boyce Gibson for generously allowing me to see in manuscript the concluding portion of his forthcoming translation of Prof. Eucken's *Lebensanschauungen*, and for giving me the benefit in other ways of his intimate knowledge of Prof. Eucken's philosophy. To Prof. L. P. Jacks I owe the correct interpretation of the passage from Hegel quoted on p. 54. The translation in the "English and Foreign Philosophical Library" does not seem to bring out the real meaning, but it was unfortunately too late to

alter it. Finally, I am greatly indebted to Prof. Eucken himself for courteously giving me information on a considerable number of doubtful points. For any errors that there may be, I, of course, am solely responsible.

F. L. POGSON.

OXFORD, *December* 1908.

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THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT

INTRODUCTION

That philosophy is not only full of problems, but that philosophy itself as a whole is and remains a problem is shown by the varied estimation in which it has been held and the disputed place which it occupies in the life of mankind. On the one hand it is called the queen of the sciences, and a life dedicated to it seems the acme of human existence; minds of the highest rank have laboured to serve it, and it has often intervened with great effect to modify the whole condition of humanity. This modifying influence, moreover, has appeared in a great variety of ramifications.

At one time, as in the case of Plato, philosophy has wrested pure ideals from the dark tangle of everyday life and has held them up as sure guiding stars to action. At another time, as in the case of Aristotle, it has sought to grasp the fulness of reality in a unified whole and to penetrate the whole of life as an organizing influence. At still another time, as in the later ages of antiquity, it has been a support and finally a consolation amid the cares and troubles of life. In modern times again it has acted as an influence in liberating men's minds and as a torch of advancing culture. Moreover, it has in addition carried out a vigorous examination of the traditional condition of life and has sought to enlighten men in the most thoroughgoing way as to the limits of their powers. No great spiritual achievement has seemed possible without the help and co-operation of philosophy; whenever it has been wanting life has lost in spontaneity, in freedom of movement, in depth. Religion especially has often enough experienced this

to its grave injury. When we follow this line of thought philosophy appears as an indispensable and most important part of the spiritual possessions of humanity.

But on the other hand every survey of human experience shows that at all times philosophy has had its zealous opponents, who have declared that it was superfluous and indeed have rejected it as harmful. This is the case with the specialist, who believes that the work of knowledge is completely defined when the world has been divided up among the different scientific disciplines; with the practical man who regards brooding and reflection as a hindrance to keenness of action; and, finally, with the believer in positive religion, who thinks that philosophy undermines the security of faith and fills men with proud self-confidence. But more dangerous than any attack from without is the fact that philosophy is uncertain of itself, that its work is dislocated, that it is divided into different schools, each one of which, in order to maintain itself, thinks

it necessary to refute all the others. This conflict threatens to remain unsettled and without result; it seems in the course of the centuries to grow rather than to diminish. For whether the Sophists were in the right with their subjectivism, or Socrates with his doctrine of concepts, whether happiness in life is to be sought by the way of the Stoa or by that of Epicurus, is still an open question. Of course the individual actors have withdrawn from the stage, but their ideas have remained and passionately continue the fight, like the spirits on the Catalaunian Fields. From this standpoint it remains incomprehensible how philosophy can have gained a deep influence over thought and life; but if this influence must be accepted as an indisputable fact, we are confronted by a riddle which necessarily impels us to take our bearings both as to the task and the position of philosophy.

It is true that an attempt has been made to get rid of the above contradiction by means of a conception of philosophy which would make

it acceptable to all: the only question is whether, in such a case, everything is not lost which lends it independence and value. In earlier times as well as at the present day it has often been held up as the sole aim of philosophy to co-ordinate the work of the different sciences and to blend their results into a unified picture: the more investigation becomes specialized, it is said, the more necessary is a special discipline which should concern itself with any unity that may be left; in surveying and discussing the presuppositions, the methods, and the results of the individual sciences, philosophy has an important task to which no objection can be raised. No doubt there is a task for philosophy here, but every attempt to gain a more exact conception of it gives rise to complications and difference of opinion. How are we to conceive of this surveying and co-ordinating activity? If it is bound to take the sciences as they come, if it has no right of revision, if it can venture on no further

development, then to be sure it has escaped all danger, but at the same time it has lost all significance. For if it is thus limited it becomes merely a registering of the results of the particular sciences, an encyclopædia which is not a genuine science, though a generous use of language might give it the name. In particular it is hard to see how a mere encyclopædia could have exerted upon thought and life those deeply disturbing and fruitfully elevating influences which the examples of Plato and Kant are enough to show have actually proceeded from it. And what if the individual sciences do not harmonize without demur, if bitter conflicts arise, if, for example, one department of science contends for the exclusive operation of mechanical causality, but another craves at least some shred of freedom therefrom? Shall philosophy quietly suffer such a contradiction to remain and be ready to submit to it? According to the above conception it would not have the slightest remedy.

On the other hand one who desiderates for philosophy a separate domain of activity may perhaps be inclined to think that it carries out a synthesis of the manifold in accordance with the particular nature of the contemplating subject; that it is not so much a science governed by strict rules as an unfettered art, and that it therefore remains inseparably bound up with the nature of the individual. According to this conception, philosophy would offer an incalculable variety of pictures of the world, some of which would quickly fade, while to others their inherent spiritual power would give the capacity to subjugate men's minds and to last for thousands of years. This view seems to be favoured by the fact that the history of philosophy shows us a great abundance of figures. There is no doubt that this conception contains a certain amount of truth; the subjective element is particularly important in philosophy, for a man's philosophy can least of all be separated from the whole of his personality. But on the other hand

the influence which philosophy has exercised throughout history remains unexplained. For how could subjective pictures of that kind cause such passionate excitement and stir, or give rise to so much love and hate? Besides this, philosophy does not merely offer an unlimited number of individual pictures, but it also shows persistent types which seem to embody the fundamental tendencies of human existence and effort. Hellenism especially has given rise to an abundance of types to which humanity has remained faithful as it has gone on its way, and which are continually producing new effects. In spite of all the progress of knowledge, Platonism and Aristotelianism, Stoicism and Epicureanism still maintain their position. Besides, it would be incomprehensible how philosophy as a purely individual and subjective reflection of reality could affect the contents of thought and alter the conditions of life, or how it could be for humanity a source of freedom, of security, and of rejuvenation. Philosophy has been often enough a com-

pelling force which has transformed the whole of the work of the spirit. Whence this compulsion if it rests purely on the caprice of the individual?

It is true that an attempt has been made to avoid the danger of such a relapse into pure subjectivity by regarding philosophy as the representative of necessities of thought which have not been sufficiently emphasized in everyday life and in the other sciences. By unfolding and fully developing these necessities philosophy has the right and the duty of transcending its starting-point and reorganizing its representation of reality. It thus acquires compelling force and is bound, in particular, to set itself the task of radically removing all the contradictions which appear in our world of thought. This seems to lift its task above the risk of pure subjectivity and to make it a matter which concerns the whole of humanity. But this conception, too, contains more complications than are apparent at first sight. The experience of history shows

that there is no unanimity as to the exact nature of that which is to count as a necessity of thought. Great thinkers have absolutely contradicted one another on this subject: Hegel, for example, saw in contradictions a power favourable to the production and promotion of spiritual life, while to Herbart, on the contrary, they seemed absolutely intolerable. Does not, then, the search for necessities of thought bring us back to the very subjectivity beyond which it was to carry us? And we may be doubtful of the right of a thinking which rests purely upon itself to impose its demands on the totality of things. Thinking, in its immediateness, is something which goes on in man: if things are to conform to thought, does there not arise a merely human interpretation of reality which may be quite foreign to reality itself? But the strongest motive in the pursuit of truth is the desire to get beyond the small and narrow circle of the merely human and to gain full participation in the life of things themselves, in the breadth and

truth of the universe. It is, above all, this inner expansion and liberation, this carrying of man beyond himself, which makes the work of great thinkers valuable and helpful to us; a merely human truth is a contradiction in terms, is no truth at all. If we cannot thus be sure of some sort of inner connection with the universe in our thinking, if we cannot found our thinking on a wider and deeper life, then philosophy does not exist in the sense in which it was understood at the height of its activity, and in which it has, as a matter of fact, influenced mankind.

We are thus thrown back from thought on to life—life as it co-ordinates itself from within to some sort of unified whole, directs its powers to particular ends, and adjusts itself to the totality of its environment. We need only examine the individual thinkers more exactly as regards the inner texture of their work and the aims which have actuated them, to become aware that, behind what stands before us as fully accomplished, there lies a particular

shaping of life, and that here is the point of division which separates thinkers and drives them to do battle with one another. Only because it was founded in such a life has thought attained a finished form as well as a constraining necessity; only from this starting-point has it gained the power of taking reality up into itself and striving after inner illumination. The products of thinking have varied very largely for the reason that, corresponding to the connection with life which is the foundation of thought, the work of knowledge has been from the first conceived differently. The failure to recognize this connection between thought and life is mostly to blame for the fact that the strife of the philosophers with one another has turned out to be so unedifying and so fruitless. The contest always ran the risk of moving in a circle, because it never got back to the point where in reality the division lies, and because it treated as the main thing what was the effect of deeper causes. This connection of thought with life enables us also

to understand that in the case of philosophy the work of knowledge is so closely connected with the nature of the personality.

But this connection of thought with life does not seem to lead us out of our complications to a secure standpoint. The danger again arises of a wide separation and division of mankind into separate circles. For, after all, different types of life do develop and range themselves side by side and put forth equal claims. Who is to decide to which of them belongs the higher right and leadership, and which, therefore, may produce a general picture of reality that should be reckoned as definitive? Besides, this gives no explanation how a movement which arises in man could go beyond him, bring him into connection with the great world, and put him in possession of its meaning. And without this there is no knowledge of truth in the sense in which philosophy strives to attain it.

All these discussions come in the end to this, that the existence of philosophy is bound

up with definite conditions which are by no means perfectly obvious, and which no mere acuteness or reflection can bring to light, but as to whose existence or non-existence only experience can decide. If thought is to have a root and a basis in life, and if at the same time it is to have a constraining power and a character of universality, there is only one possibility. There must appear within reach of man a life which can rise above divisions and can counteract them, a life, further, which can develop out of its own movement comprehensive connections and, indeed, can show itself active in moulding the world. Finally, it must be a life which not only touches and interprets what it lays hold of from the outside, but shapes it from within and admits it to its own depths. Only if man is able in this way to share in a universal life and thereby outgrow the limits of his particular nature, can his thinking advance from a mere cognition of things to a true knowledge. Thus there results the possibility and, indeed, the neces-

sity of a new way of looking at the world in contrast to that practised by the individual sciences.

The question then is whether we have evidence of a life of this kind, which shapes our world and places us in a different fundamental relationship to reality. We believe that we can confidently answer this question in the affirmative. For we only need to gain a keener apprehension of what is called spiritual life, and to set it in sharper relief against the environment in which human existence involves it, to become aware that it offers the very thing which we desire and seek. Spiritual life is, above all, the formation of a coherent system in life. In it not merely the potentialities of the subject are aroused and heightened, but confronting the subject there arises a field, and indeed a whole kingdom, of an objective nature. Subject and object are comprehended in a self-contained activity and assist each other's further development. Nothing short of such a comprehension of the two sides

can supply life with contents and values which, with all their inwardness, possess an indubitable superiority over all merely human powers and opinions. It is in this way that whole provinces such as science and art, jurisprudence and morality, grow up and develop their own contents, their own motives, their own laws. These provinces, however, strive towards unity and finally coalesce in a unified world. In fact, they belong on the subjective side from the very beginning to such a unified whole, and only in connection with it can they solve their own problem. Thus we find that within man there is something which goes beyond him; he himself must become something different, and his whole life assumes the form of a problem when a unified world thus makes its appearance in his life and distinguishes itself from that which is merely human.

But what is the significance of this new life in relation to the whole of reality? This can only be estimated by comparing it with that

from which it distinguishes itself and which it strives to transcend. In the first place, the realm of nature surrounds us all and penetrates deep into the human soul. Here we see reality dissected into purely individual elements. Life is resolved into the relations of these elements; it passes in purely individual processes, and does not get beyond mere matter-of-fact. For there exists here no life of the whole, which should comprehend the diversity, take it up into itself and thence draw profit. But the amount of psychical life which exists here has not yet reached the stage at which it might be called an individual life. For in the realm of nature psychical life does not attain any independence; it remains a mere concomitant phenomenon. It does not stand out as an end in itself, but forms a mere means and instrument for the preservation of living beings in the hard struggle for existence. But the great change that ensues when spiritual life comes upon the scene is that now the inner life becomes independent and begins to prepare

for itself a world of its own. This change, with its introduction of an essentially new kind of life, and its construction of a world from within, with its own particular contents, values, and order, can never be the work of man by himself. It is only to be understood as a movement of the whole of reality itself, which surrounds man, takes hold of him, and drives him on. Thus the movement towards spiritual life appears as a movement of reality towards an independent conscious existence. A depth of the world is revealed which before was hidden, and this gives rise to a complete transformation which must produce an essentially new view of reality. But this new life, by the mere fact of its having constructed a state of civilization which exists side by side with what is purely natural, has proved its power to make its way in opposition to pre-existing forces. The achievement of civilization, when at its height, in producing essentially new objects and essentially new human characters, can have been made possible

only by the force of an independent spiritual life, seeking to unfold itself.

With the recognition of this movement there is a change in the whole representation of our spiritual work. It is no longer accessory to the main body of reality, and it is not a private concern of man by himself, but in it we recognize a portion of a world-movement, of which mankind is the servant. From this standpoint, that work can claim superiority both over isolated individuals and over all mere subjectivism.

But what is true of spiritual work generally applies also to philosophy. Man does not, out of his own inner consciousness and possibly quite at random, put a particular complexion on the world, but his philosophy can only possess truth and power so far as the life of the world comes to clear consciousness in it and reveals its own depth. The co-ordination of the manifold, which philosophy undertakes, cannot be imposed upon reality from the outside, but must come from within it and conduce

to its unfolding. The task of philosophy now is to enhance and thus to foster that co-ordination in the work of thought. In opposition to the circumstances of humanity it will have to be the champion and enforcer of the necessities of the spiritual life, and bring home clearly to man the connections of that life. From this point of view it is quite comprehensible how, throughout the course of history, philosophy was bound to accompany the life and the struggles of humanity, and how it could lift them to a higher level. It was able to do this because it was not an opinion of man by himself, but because it was a work and a demand of the spiritual life. It is only as a philosophy of spiritual life in this sense that philosophy can attain to independence and maintain the position assigned to it by its friends. And from this point of view its work can be seen to be a connected task which is common to the whole of humanity.

But at the same time, this conception explains why philosophy is exposed to so much

uncertainty and strife. For spiritual life is not something that is ready-made for us, but is a difficult problem—in fact, the problem of problems. Certainly our being must be somehow grounded in it if we are to make an effort after it, but as far as our consciousness and activity are concerned, we must first win it and make it our own: only thus can it gain a clear shape and a definite content. But this further opening up takes place in the individual not so much through reflection or imagination as through the labour of the whole and as the work of history. What first makes history in the distinctively human sense possible, is the fact that here a revelation of spiritual life gets started and gains ground as the development of a new stage of reality. But the testimony of experience shows that the course of this historical movement is by no means sure and simple. In the first place, spiritual life has no domain of its own in the human sphere and no independent starting-point, but it develops out of our life in

nature and society and cannot dispense with it. In doing so it does not appear from the beginning as a whole, but starts from separate points and gradually extends to larger connections, which again may diverge from one another. And its progress through history is not orderly and sure, but resembles rather a groping and seeking. It makes a step forward, but encounters insurmountable obstacles and is often driven back a long way; new starting points are tried, but they lead to a similar result. The life is often split into opposites, and then again the impulse towards reconciliation gains the upper hand: much drops out of sight, only to come up again later and exercise new influence, and so the whole becomes more and more complicated and involved. In particular a permanent complication proceeds from the relation of the spiritual life to man. Spiritual life stands in need of the feelings and faculties of man, and so far as it gains these it raises him above that which is merely human. But at the same time this merely human

element persists and is always ready to drag down the spiritual life to its own level. It does this especially when no great spiritual tension and no powerful spiritual creative effort exercises a counteracting influence. At such times it almost appears as if this merely human element looked upon the spiritual life as an enemy, and would like to take vengeance on it for its troublesome interference. Nothing contributes more to impress a particular character on human history than the fact that spiritual life has to develop in the unsuitable and indeed hostile medium of human existence. But if spiritual life has often been dragged down to the level of the merely human, it has not submitted for any length of time to this degradation. It has always escaped again, and, however much it might be disintegrated, it has always made a fresh effort to regain its unity; in fact, throughout all the mistakes and passions of men it has made substantial progress in self-realization. It has been able to liberate life and thought from the tyranny

of the mere passing moment, and by separating the temporal from the eternal, the human from the spiritual, to gather up the results of thousands of years, so as to be taken in at one view. It has been able to reawaken what to all external appearance had perished, and to hold fast everything that it recognized as valuable in a present which is above time and includes time. Philosophy in particular, just as spiritual life generally, takes its stand on this time-including present. History, however, appears on this view not as a kingdom of pure reason, but as a scene where a certain amount of reason wins through in the teeth of enormous resistance.

From this point of view the movement of history, with its elevation of spiritual life above the position and caprice of mere man, gains a special significance for philosophy, and in fact becomes an introduction to a philosophy of the spiritual life. For, in revealing all that has been unfolded of independent spiritual life, it shows what possibilities our life contains of

being raised to a higher inward level, and also what oppositions arise in this connection and have to be overcome in some way or other. It goes on to exhibit the conditions and the demands of spiritual creative effort, and the presuppositions and environment from which special kinds of spiritual life have sprung. It shows the dominating facts both within and as opposed to the spiritual life, and also the directions in which the movement progresses. It can further operate to free our work from all that is casual and temporary, and to bring it into line with the necessary course of spiritual life so far as it has been revealed in the history of the world. Our efforts will not only acquire thereby more breadth and freedom, but may also gain a stronger and securer position through the recognition of the great guiding lines of the general movement of history. Naturally all this can only take place according to the capacity of the individual life on which the task is laid of gaining an inner mastery over the materials provided by history. For

without such individual exertion history cannot impart or teach anything: the contents of history must first be awakened and revivified by our own work before they can be of any significance or use to our own life. If we thus address ourselves to the spiritual content, the revivifying of the general movement of history takes the form of a comparative survey of the spiritual possessions which we have hitherto acquired, and a summons to develop and secure these possessions against the influences and accidents of the moment. We need not waste any time in proving that the present, with its sharp oppositions, its violent cleavage, and ominous levelling down of life, and its want of any ruling aim, stands in particularly urgent need of being supplemented and developed in the way we have sketched. Historical study must press on with particular insistence to fresh philosophical work, to a creative activity which will transform philosophy by clearly proving the untenability of the present spiritual state and the necessity

of a new type of culture. But in this respect the spiritual requirements which are involved, not so much in the time as in the general position in world history, are bound to set philosophy definite tasks and point it in definite directions.

A treatment of history like this, which combines the tracing out of the rise and growth of spiritual life within the sphere of humanity with the search for a standpoint for philosophical work, can be undertaken in different ways. We desire to undertake it in such a way as to emphasize some of the leading lines of development, to exhibit the problems which there await us, and to show the movements, experiences, and revelations of life which have resulted from them. It may seem that outwardly we are giving ourselves up entirely to history, but our aim is always directed towards philosophy. What history has brought us is not reckoned as merely past, but we try to make it present to us as living, and at the same time to gain from it points of support

both for the guidance of spiritual life and for philosophy. In these leading lines we shall find common features, in fact an inner connection will be evident through all the diversity; but a more exact estimation of this is to be made at the end. We thus arrange our sections so that we progress gradually from general sketches to a more definite content, and so allow the character and the demands of the whole to become continually more apparent. Let us then treat in succession the problems of unity and multiplicity, of rest and movement, of the outer and the inner worlds, and finally the problem of truth and the problem of happiness. As far as material is concerned, let us limit our investigation to tracing out the movement from the rise of Greek civilization to the present day. This is not merely because it lies nearest to us externally, but also because no other historical complex contains so much spiritual movement or has produced such an abundance of life and, amid violent metamorphoses, has passed through so

many experiences. But this is the point, above all, for philosophical contemplation. If we go through history in this way we do not lose ourselves in an incalculable vastness, but, with all the abundance of material, we are all the time at home. It is a kind of introspection, not so much of the individual as of the whole, which we are here striving after, and introspection is to-day, as at all times, the best approach to philosophy.

CHAPTER I

Unity and Multiplicity

Nature, as it lies open to our view, displays a mere juxtaposition of elements, with no inner connection. On the natural level life does not get beyond the stage of mere correlations. But on the other hand, wherever spiritual life makes itself felt we find the desire to surmount the stage of mere juxtaposition, to establish an inner connection, and, in fact, to systematize the whole of life. All the main directions in which our spiritual work finds its outlet involve the effort to overcome an opposition and the demand for some sort of unification. Thus the struggle for truth seeks to overcome the separation between men and things, between subject and object, between

thought and existence. With the good, in the narrower sense of the word, it is a case of getting free from the pettiness of the ego, breaking through the original narrowness, and attaining inner solidarity. Beauty too seeks to overcome an opposition in endeavouring to make the external conform completely to its own internal standards. But just as spiritual life exercises a unifying influence in an external environment, so too, in itself, it strives to assume the form of a coherent whole and gives rise to an inner solidarity of work. It is a matter not for the individual man, but for the whole race; it strives to attain not merely individual truths but a realm of truth, which envelops and holds together the individuals, and which, indeed, lays claim to a validity of its own, independent of mankind. It is very much the same with the good and the beautiful; however much controversy and dissension may prevail in this connection, even the controversy would be incomprehensible without the belief in a

common truth and without the impelling power of this truth.

But though the striving for unity is an incontestable and fundamental impulse of all spiritual life, it yet involves a difficult problem, which cannot be attacked by the individual but only by the age-long toil of humanity. For the question is, how the unification can be attained, and what form the whole must assume in order to take up the diversity into itself and overcome the oppositions. Many different attempts and much unrest will meet the eyes of him who makes a spiritual pilgrimage through the centuries. In accordance with our plan we begin with the life of the Greeks.

From the very beginning the philosophy of the Greeks shows the impulse towards unity. Their first thinkers, the sages of Ionia, turn at once to the search for a single fundamental substance, and the Pythagoreans co-ordinate the wealth of phenomena into a coherent universe, a cosmos. Even the exclusiveness

of a unitary being finds early defenders in the Eleatics, and they do not shrink from reducing multiplicity to mere appearance. But Greek life clings too closely to the rich diversity of reality to be able to give it up completely: hence the problem assumes the form of discovering a definite relation between unity and multiplicity, a firm co-ordination of the diversity of things. Its solution is reached in close connection with movements that take place in the general life of the time, in contact of the work of thought with the state of political and social development. As usually happens, the beginnings of this development show us individuals in strict subjection, in complete dependence on the order and custom of the community, under the yoke of authority and tradition, which is not yet felt as oppressive. But gradually the individual gains in power, in freedom of movement, in independence; he begins to inquire into the right and reason of the systems in which he finds himself; he holds himself continually more

aloof from them, and feels that he is personally responsible for his own life. But then the danger at once arises that the subject may break up all systems, make himself the measure of all things, and, as a logical consequence, recognize the validity of no ends except those that further his own well-being. This gives rise to the most dangerous crisis, and life appears likely to suffer a complete dissolution. The Sophists with their subjectivism make this very evident. In such a convulsion nothing can be of any assistance except man's own spiritual work: it is this alone which can attempt to build up from within the coherent system which the visible world no longer affords, and what it here undertook for the first time is in reality a problem of a lasting nature which our own day too must face. With the Greeks it was pre-eminently philosophy which took upon itself this problem. A solution was sought by affirming the existence of a world of thought raised above all human circumstances

and opinions and firmly established over against them. Plato's doctrine of Ideas brings the power of genius to the execution of this task, and for him the constituents of that world more nearly acquire the character of forms endowed with fulness of life. These forms with all their diversity unite to form a whole; the work of this whole, moreover, is to give movement and elevation to human existence; it supplies it with a deeper foundation and the power of counteracting the distraction from which it previously suffered. On the basis of scientific work there thus arises an artistic ordering of life which brings about a peculiar combination of unity and multiplicity. The thought of the One takes precedence, but the Many are not in the least sacrificed, though each part must seek its place and its task within the whole in order to carry out its special work in this position. But it cannot do this without recognizing limits and overcoming the crude impulses of nature, and thus it is ennobled and, in fact, spiritualized by the whole. Thus life

is organized from top to bottom, marked off into stages, made symmetrical and harmonious, and everything which is merely natural is brought under the dominion of the spirit.

A movement of this kind affects human endeavour in all directions and gives it a peculiar character. On this view thought is not a critical sifting and analysing, a pressing forward to the most minute elements, but it is rather a comprehensive survey of the diversity of things, and a disentangling of the fundamental structure of the universe from the chaos which it presents at first sight. Its main movement is from the whole to the parts, and it is especially the task of philosophical knowledge to put everything that exists and everything that happens in its proper place, and to understand it from what it does for the whole. And the psychic life of man has also a general work to perform, which includes its individual parts and stages. It is of special importance in the human community to counteract the isolation of in-

dividuals, with their caprice and selfishness. The thought arises of a state whose structure is based on knowledge and seeks to enforce its own realization. An essentially elevating effect is expected from the direction of the whole towards spiritual goods and from the division and organization of work by a gradation of classes. Even the severest consequences, such as the extraordinary communism of the higher classes, are not shirked if they seem to be necessary in order to strike at the root of egoism. But all this surrender to the whole does not mean any complete sacrifice of the individuals, for in this arrangement they satisfy their own nature as well, and thereby attain to complete happiness.

Aristotle's scheme of life is closely related to Plato's, but still the modifications which he introduced are significant. Less importance is attached to the part played by art, and the power of co-ordination which results from taking the point of view of art is less emphasized, though it is not entirely neglected.

But, on the other hand, the classifying and organizing power of thought is given the widest scope, and it is especially the conception of the unfolding of life, of existence becoming fully active, that provides the guiding lines for thought. It is here in particular that human activity displays a systematic character: the world, both in general and in detail, is regarded under the governing conception of an articulated whole, an organic unity of life. Aristotle is particularly successful in enforcing the idea that in the case of an organic living being a large number of organs and functions is subordinated to a comprehensive unity of life, and that it is only from this point of view, by help of the idea of an end, that they can be understood. This conception of an organism is finally transferred to the whole universe; this too forms a complete and rounded unity which tolerates nothing "episodic."[1] Still more than in the case of

[1] *Cf.* Aristotle, Met. 1090[b] 19, οὐκ ἔοικε δ' ἡ φύσις ἐπεισοδιώδης οὖσα ἐκ τῶν φαινομένων ὥσπερ μοχθηρὰ τραγωδία.

Plato we thus find one fundamental conviction extending over all departments. Thinking becomes the logical organization of the whole of reality, and, while prepared to recognize all particularity, it never allows the individual to become separated from the whole. Simple and fundamental thoughts govern all departments, and though they may appear to be disparate they are still kept together by the bond of analogy. Psychic life, too, is required to develop every faculty, but there must be an activity of the whole which includes all particular activities and measures them by its own standards. The superiority of the whole acquires particular force and vividness when we come to the idea of the state. Just as each member can only live and work in connection with the whole organism, man can only be fully man in the community. And thus it can be maintained that the state is prior to the individual. But at the same time the utmost differentiation is desired within the state, and the

heart and soul of every man is called upon to co-operate.

The combined work of both thinkers has held up to life a stable and coherent system, and satisfied in a characteristic way the desire for unity. Unification is attained by the alliance of clear thought with the creative activity of art. The main achievement of this philosophy is its vigorous and thorough organization of the whole range of existence; it leaves nothing outside but takes up everything from the greatest to the least, gives it definite shape, and quickens and ennobles it. Man here displays his capacity of forming a whole in thought, retaining within this whole a rich diversity of elements, and making it a centre from which to bring the whole range of reality into an inwardly coherent system. The endeavour to attain unity in this manner has persisted throughout the whole course of history; it has often entered upon new spheres of activity with rejuvenated powers, and seems to be indispensable for the spiritual appro-

priation of the breadth and fulness of existence. But as a leading synthesis of life, this philosophy had presuppositions which met with a continually increasing opposition. Such a synthesis not only needs pre-eminent spiritual power to carry it out, but it also presupposes as objectively existing a tendency on the part of things towards union, an inner harmony of reality, which the further movement of life made continually more uncertain. In the first place, this synthesis of life did not retain its leading position in the following centuries. When the separation between philosophy and the particular sciences becomes wider, and the former comes to be regarded predominantly as wisdom in the conduct of life, we no longer find simple fundamental thoughts exercising control over the whole range of reality. Individuals are still less inclined to submit to the constraint which is commended by Plato and Aristotle. As the break-up of the old systematizations of life becomes increasingly apparent, men are more and more concerned

to ensure that the individual shall stand firm on his own basis and be independent of all environment. Philosophy is particularly successful in this aim when it occupies man with the thought of the Universe, and promises him victory over every obstacle if he realizes strongly the presence of the Universal Reason. The complete emancipation of the individual finds its classical expression particularly in the doctrine of the Stoics: it is here that there arises the conception of a personality superior to the world, and participation in the universal thought lends dignity and value to human existence. Another result is that all men enter into an invisible connection, they become conscious of an inner relationship, a solidarity embracing all that is human.

But if men are thrown on their own resources to grasp and realize the universal thought, it is only heroic individuals of original force who will succeed. But such men are scarce at all times, and this solution became especially unsatisfactory in propor-

tion as the approaching break-up of the ancient world increased the feeling of insecurity, of weakness, and of need. The perplexities of life finally appear too great for man to meet out of his own resources. This gives rise to a continually increasing craving after religion, and finally to a movement in the direction of religion. Hence the endeavour after unity now takes on a religious rather than an artistic character. Unity is now sought not so much by producing an all-embracing co-ordination of the diversity of things, as by recourse to an existence which is raised above all multiplicity and forms its ground. But although with the Greeks multiplicity was never degraded to mere appearance, as it was with the Indians, and though for this reason the Greeks never embraced an exclusive monotheism, yet they came more and more to attach significance to that which is individual only so far as it gives expression to the unity of the universe. This gives to life a powerful stimulus and

impetus, but it involves the loss of the organizing influence which was exercised by the older creative activity. It was Plotinus in particular who gave a philosophical shape to the new tendency, and in this connection philosophy takes a quite new direction. It was formerly the function of religion to minister to the happiness and especially the tranquillity of man; it was a mere means to his well-being; but now the centre of gravity is transferred from individuals to the universe, and it is only from the universe that the individual receives life and being. We find here a single life which sustains and pervades the whole range of reality and exhibits it as its own development. All the diversity of things is dependent on this unitary life, and everything tends to return to it. Many metaphors are employed in the attempt to show how the One can give rise to the rich diversity of the world without losing itself anywhere or striving to transcend itself. It resembles a light which sends forth its rays

far and wide without diminishing its own brightness; it is like the fountain from which all things proceed but which itself continues to flow inexhaustibly; or it resembles the root of a tree which shoots up above the ground, but which is not merged into its own unfolding. In these modes of connection the core of spiritual life and also of philosophy consists entirely in the search for unity and the apprehension of it. All the different domains of life and philosophy are only particular ways of reaching unity. But since the final unity lies beyond all special forms and all concepts, it follows that thought, even when its powers are strained to the utmost, is no longer equal to the claim which is made upon it. It is only immediate apprehension which can put us in possession of this unity. Thought passes into a formless feeling, a subjective mood which cannot be expressed in words, in which it desires nothing but unity. By this process thought brings about its own destruction as pure thought, but this violent

convulsion results in feeling becoming independent, and there arises a new type of psychical experience which is both self-contained and self-sufficing.

In the detailed carrying out of this tendency life is either shaped on the model of a hierarchy or it receives a mystical turn. The former scheme leaves the diversity of things, but introduces a fixed order into it by recognizing throughout a continuous chain of life. For Spiritual Life proceeds from the original unity as the first stage, and on this there depend the further stages of Soul and of Nature. Each in its place receives life from the order of being immediately above it, and conveys it from itself to that which is below it. Through a connection of this kind, even that which might seem to be imperfect as far as itself is concerned gains a certain value. It is only through a misapprehension of this connection that anyone can imagine that he has discovered evil in the world, since what seems to be evil is in reality only a lesser good. This concep-

tion of gradation and the downward communication of life was destined to attain to great influence in the domain of Christianity.

Mysticism, on the contrary, puts the individual into immediate relationship with the infinite life, and aspires to steep him in this life to such an extent that it becomes his own. By getting rid of everything that makes for separation and distinction, by casting off the chains of what men call happiness, and by freeing himself from all the narrowness and insufficiency of the mere unit, the mystic believes that in extinction itself he gains an incomparably higher life and genuine blessedness. It is here that we first recognize clearly the power which the thought of a total surrender of the ego and of absorption into an infinite life can exercise over the human soul. The fact that man can completely renounce the merely human and can give up the whole wealth of reality without thereby falling into the void, seems to assure him of his capacity for rising superior to the world,

and to bring him into close connection with the ultimate depths of the universe. Hence he seems to himself to be nowhere greater than in such complete surrender of his separateness. But the danger of this movement, as well as its greatness, consists just in this concentration of life on one point. It is, of course, this concentration which has given rise to the thought of a purely internal world, and the recognition of the immediate presence of infinite life in the individual soul has revealed a refuge which is open at all times. But at the same time the stripping off of all particularity forces life to give up all detailed content and all penetration and organization of reality. But even when this loss is recognized, this mode of thought remains an indispensable element in all development of independent spirituality. It not only persists throughout the middle ages, but comes into prominence in modern times in new shapes, and shows that it is still powerful even at the present day. If we give up the immediate presence

of infinite being in the soul, the life of the soul must inevitably and immediately lose in depth and spontaneity.

The relation of Christianity to the problem of unity and multiplicity is by no means simple. Different, and in fact opposite, tendencies are engaged in conflict against one another, and though this may give rise to much confusion and error, it also produces much movement and progress in life. The mere fact that Christianity is distinctively and characteristically an ethical religion, has diverse tendencies. Morality has its end in action, and therefore demands both self-activity and self-sufficiency on the part of the individual; but religion gains power only where man is conscious of his weakness and seeks help from higher powers. The ethical element prevails chiefly in the conception of God, which is essentially different from that of the Greek world. For Greek thought the divine is closely bound up and intimately united with the totality of the

world; and though, later on, it was regarded as raised above all sensible existence, it never detaches itself from the world as an independent power, and does not take up an independent stand over against it. Hence its activity seems to be not so much a free action as a process of nature, which is only raised to the spiritual level. It is represented as a flowing out, a shining forth, a going forth, etc.: in every case as something which happens from necessity.

Christianity, on the contrary, in close connection with later Judaism, regards God as a Spirituality who transcends the world and is self-existing and self-sufficing. He is thought of as free in His action, and His self-manifestation is regarded as spirit coming into touch with spirit. There is no doubt that, especially in popular thought, this may give rise to the danger of degrading God to the level of human ideas and interests, the danger of anthropomorphism. But however far this may have spread, it is not the whole of the

matter. All the mistakes that have been made ought not to prevent us from recognizing that it was in Christianity that the movement towards a self-existent and active Spirituality was first carried out on any large scale, and that it was religion, in the ethical form which it assumes in Christianity, that first led to the recognition of such a Being. To the change in the conception of the divine Being there corresponds a new relation of man to Him. The Greek sought to draw near to the Deity on the heights of philosophy, by pushing knowledge to its utmost limits. He sought complete union with the Divine; but when this is attained, life does not return to its starting-point to make something newer and higher out of it. But this is what takes place in Christianity, because the relation to the Deity opens up new depths of life in the individual, and makes him, even in his particularity, an object of the divine love and care. The individual, who is accustomed to be treated with such indifference by nature and society, gains

an infinite worth from such a relationship, and ventures to regard himself as an end in himself, but at the same time he finds that he has a task which takes precedence of any general extension of his activity. This holds good for all men without distinction: it is not measured and limited by any outward results that have been achieved, but depends on the general nature and bent of the soul, on the active moral force which it shows. This forms a great contrast to Greek thought, which could not make union with the transcendental unity a matter of philosophical knowledge without encountering great differences between one man and another, and finding that only a few were called to the full knowledge of God. The problem of recruiting all men for the spiritual task is one which, in the province of civilization to which we belong, first gained recognition by the agency of Christianity, and, though the task contains enormous complexities, in particular, the danger lest spiritual work should be subordinated to the power of the

merely human, once having been recognized and acknowledged it can never again be put into the background. The fact, too, that in Christian thought, which is determined by ethical considerations, the Greek ideal of justice gives way to the ideal of love, tends also to the exaltation of the individual in general and of each separate individual in particular. If, on the one hand, outward achievements decided the place of the individual in the whole, that which was mean and feeble could never receive any sort of recognition. But on the other hand it does gain a certain value if every man finds that the task he has to face is independent of external conditions, and if infinite love embraces all, the least as well as the greatest, in an equal degree.

This all leads to a considerable increase in the significance of the individual and his decisions. At the same time the coherence of things and the connection of the individual with it is not surrendered, but rather there is a general tendency to increase this also.

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Christianity does not exhaust the relationship to the Deity in single points of connection and isolated achievements, but desires that this relationship should lead to an entire change of soul; and it is for this very reason that the individual cannot force himself to take the decisive step, but must await the coming of a new life from a source of power and grace which is above him. A kingdom of God must reveal itself to him, and must even inspire the desire to enter it. Great world events must happen in order that a change may take place at one point, or, as Hegel expresses it in his own language, "the very fact that the opposition is implicitly done away with constitutes the condition, the presupposition, the possibility of the subject's ability to do away with it actually."[1] Withal, it is an important fact that the coherent system with which the individual

[1] Hegel, *Werke*, 2e Aufl. xii. 277. Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion*, translated by E. B. Spiers and J. B. Sanderson, iii. 67.

comes into connection does not remain purely of an invisible kind but strives to embody itself in a visible form, not only in its later stages but from the very beginning; and that there is an early and persistent tendency to form a church. This brought in its train an inevitable dependency not merely on divine truth but also on human conditions. The more firmly the visible order was established, and the closer it linked the invisible order to itself, the greater was the loss which the freedom of the individual was bound to undergo; every diminution of freedom, however, endangered the ethical character of Christianity.

Thus Christianity contained difficult contradictions, just like every other spiritual movement which has had a great part to play on the stage of humanity. These contradictions needed imperatively to be reconciled in some way or other, but the manner of reconciliation was principally determined by the nature of the period within which it had to be accom-

plished. It was the time at which the definitive consolidation of Christianity was established, the last epoch of antiquity, a period when the will to live was greatly weakened, when men were becoming uncertain of themselves, and all the old connections were broken up. The old epoch was at an end, and a new one had not yet dawned. Hence men's first desire was to reach a safe harbour of refuge: they wished to be thoroughly assured of deliverance, and to be relieved as far as possible from all private responsibility. The wish was all the stronger owing to the fact that men's minds had been so overawed by gloomy experiences that the thought of eternal life became for them, above all else, a dread of eternal punishment. This drove them to submit willingly to a superior authority, and also led to truth being put in as popular a form as possible. In this difficult situation Christianity did indeed become a refuge for mankind; but it could not become so without suffering the consequences of this position and

being driven in a very problematical direction. The religious aspect now pushed the ethical into the background, and immediately developed a strong tendency towards the visible and sensuous. Hence it came about that the Church as a visible order absorbed Christianity more and more into itself, that it was thought to have at its disposal the treasure of divine grace, and was raised to a position of incontestable authority over the individual. At the same time the idea of organization—and of an organization which is both stable and palpable—becomes the centre of spiritual life and spiritual work. However much complexity and difficulty this tendency has brought with it, we must not fail to recognize its grandeur. Nowhere else in the whole course of history has the attempt been made to bring the whole of mankind into close connection with one another on the ground of common convictions, and thus to bind them together not by external constraint but by inner communion. Nothing in the human shape is left

outside the spiritual order, or excluded from its influence. But at the same time the spiritual order is drawn down deep into that which is human, and thereby strongly influenced; its special shape is essentially determined by the needs of man, or by the stimulus which seems necessary in order to set him in motion. The final result is that a unique compromise is concluded between the spiritual and the merely human, which leaves to the former its essential superiority, though in detail the spiritual is largely overborne by the human. No one contributed more to establish this compromise than Augustine, a man who united a fervent desire for a world-enveloping spiritual life with the deepest feeling for the needs and weaknesses of men.

The idea of organization was first carried into effect in a complete form in the middle ages. It determined not only the relationship of the individual to society, but also the relations between the different departments of life. The community in its religious aspect appears

as the Church, and by it the individual is provided with a firm support, direction for conduct, gentler or sterner constraint to definite tasks. Thus a certain level of life is attained, a certain amount of spiritual activity is widely distributed, and to some extent the masses are brought under discipline. But at the same time the limits of achievement are unmistakable. Such a system of subordination and solidarity inevitably involves a serious loss of independence, and if independence is lost the inward life is bound to suffer injury. We cannot place the chief end of man in the performance of certain exercises and tasks, in the fulfilment of his religious, *i.e.* his ecclesiastical "duties," without reducing the experiences of his soul to a position of secondary importance, and letting outward acts repress inward disposition. The centre of gravity of life is removed more and more from the soul of the individual, and the latter is treated as a mere appendage of the gigantic ecclesiastical system. It is a natural development of this position

that the Church becomes not only the exclusive custodian of truth, but also the keeper of the moral conscience of humanity. Her ministers decide what each man has to hold for truth, and what is the good he has to strive after. She believes that she has the power of conferring eternal salvation on them, or of condemning them to eternal misery. The more this conviction prevails and becomes a part of life, though the spontaneity of life in its particular manifestations is dried up, the more must the greatness of man consist in willing submission, and the more must his piety acquire the character of a blind devotion. But all the smaller is the place left for independent conviction and disposition, for erect and self-active personalities. Thus the latest papal Syllabus actually required men not only to receive the decisions of the Church obediently, but to hold these decisions as their own beliefs. If the independence of the personality is violated in this way, acts as well as belief will acquire a predominantly passive character. Hence it is

again consistent with these medieval modes of thought when the latest Encyclical reproaches the Modernists for thinking too highly of the active virtues. The result is that the individual is degraded, and obedience and endurance become the highest virtues in his life.

The medieval tendency towards organization affected also the life of culture, and it was Scholasticism in particular which gave philosophical expression to this tendency. The rigour of the older thought, which involves the exclusive concentration of life on religion and allows all diversity to be absorbed in unity, is here moderated. The other departments of life are accorded some rights; they are taken up into a general scheme in a way that resembles the Greek synthesis of life, especially as carried out by Aristotle. The artistic and the religious struggle for unity are to be fused into a comprehensive totality of life within which their differences are reconciled. The idea of gradation seems

to render this possible by handing over the direction of the whole to religion, but guaranteeing a certain independence to the other departments which fall within the sphere of the universal reason and the secular life. This inclusion of all interests certainly sets men a great and imperative problem, but the solution here offered is much too external to be felt as satisfactory beyond the middle ages. This scheme of subordination leaves the other departments of life no real independence and no spontaneity of creative effort. But this is not the only unsatisfactory feature, for it is also found that the spiritual life is wanting in inner unity, since religion, on the one hand, with its elevation above the world, and an essentially earthly culture on the other, with its joyous reconstitution of the world, pull in precisely opposite directions, so that only an extremely external conception of the problem and extreme superficiality in the mode of attacking it could bring them into immediate union.

This attempt to solve the problem of unity is, as a whole, magnificent and in its way unique. But the influence which it exercised on mankind was considerably modified through Mysticism, and it involves a presupposition which is open to dispute. It demands men who are either senile or else spiritually immature: it cannot satisfy men who are grown up and conscious of their powers. But ever since the close of the middle ages humanity has been striving to attain its majority, and it is just this endeavour which ushers in a new epoch and gives it a distinctive character. A growing feeling of power requires a life that is independent and spontaneous, and it cannot have it unless individuals are called upon to exercise their powers in the freest way. This caused authority to be felt as an oppressive burden, and the medieval synthesis was proved to be too narrow for the wealth of life that was struggling upwards. Hence a breach with the old order became inevitable, and life took a course which was directly opposed to

that which it had previously followed. The leading tendency had hitherto been from multiplicity towards unity, from an unorganized to an organized life, but now the movement is directed towards multiplicity, towards the apprehension and elaboration of all that is specific and individual. Freedom from every tie, complete emancipation, now becomes the main aim, and a demand to which everything must give way. At the beginning there was no intention of shaking off all the traditional connections and making the individual rely entirely on his own powers: the intention was rather that, at such and such a particular point, the whole should be more immediately apprehended, made to live more intensely, and wrought out into a distinctive form. But gradually these connections sank in importance, and the individual freed himself more and more from all ties. Hence any co-ordination of life could only come from the individual himself, and must never be inconsistent with his freedom. The complications

which arise from this position we shall have to deal with immediately.

The old philosophy, which was deeply rooted, and occupied a hallowed place in the beliefs of mankind, might regard this striving for freedom as a mere movement of opposition, as a bold revolt and a piece of defiant presumption. Such reproaches have not yet been finally silenced. But that this striving after freedom was in reality something more, that it was the result of a spiritual necessity, is proved by the enormous enrichment and development of life to which it has given rise, and the enormous range of actuality which it has opened up. If the unfolding of the powers of the individual were nothing more than a movement of negation and contradiction, this victory of individuality could never have been the source of the amount of life and creative effort to which, as a matter of fact, it has given rise. That the change extends beyond all merely human ideas into the fundamental texture of life itself, is proved,

among other things, by the transformation of the inner life as compared with the middle ages. The middle ages were by no means wanting in inner life, but it was an inner life of a rather weak and passive kind; man felt himself untrammelled by the world in the silent ebb and flow of immediate personal experience. The modern period, on the contrary, develops an inner life of an active kind which insists on making its power felt, subjecting the world and making it conform to its own demands. Whatever may be the problems involved, it cannot hide the truth which this movement brought into prominence, viz., that complete spontaneity is essential to genuine spiritual life, and that this spontaneity requires both freedom and self-activity. But we cannot have these latter without the recognition of the special character of each particular part, the recognition of individuality. Where such movements arise and make themselves felt, life is bound to be essentially changed.

In justification of the new movement this also may be alleged, viz., that the great civilized nations have imported into it each its own specific character and have accentuated this character by its further progress. Nothing distinguishes one from another more than the special direction in which they seek and demand deliverance for humanity. In art and in the general tone of life, the Italians, the first modern men, occupy the earliest place. The French continue the same tendency and carry it further into the ramifications of existence, and their leading spirits set an example to the individual of defiant independence of the world and also of society. The English build up political and economic life from the individual as the starting-point, and cherish the hope that it will thus be raised to an infinitely higher level. The Germans represent the movement towards freedom in the domain of religion, and they carry it down into the furthest depths of the soul. When their classical literature reaches

its highest point they finally develop the idea of a world-enveloping Personality, which is grounded in itself and controlled by its own laws. This is an idea which must form the rallying point for every attempt to overcome the opposition between unity and multiplicity, between order and freedom.

The new movement shows that it is superior to all individual caprice, and is spiritually productive by its characteristic shaping of all the departments and relations of life, and the essential changes which it makes in the representation of the world and the existence of man. The older science consisted chiefly in a general survey of the multiplicity of things, in which they were regarded as forming parts of a great structure. Modern science, however, breaks up the initial impression which we experience of a totality, and seeks to get down to the ultimate elements and the smallest forces, to ascertain their laws, and by their help to reconstruct the world. This tracing of particular lines of connection gives us not

only a clearer insight into reality, but also an incomparably greater control over things. Without the analytical methods practised by modern science, the modern technical applications of it would never have arisen. But just as modern science introduces more detail and exactitude into its representation of reality, and places the motive power of things in the elements, so, too, its own position is strikingly differentiated from that of medieval science. The Scholastic system, which made metaphysics supreme over the whole range of reality, is shattered. The individual sciences take up their task independently, and furnish us with characteristic views of the world, while at the same time they get closer and closer to things and keep near their real nature. Not only the individual sciences, however, but also whole departments of life diverge further and further from one another, and at the same time break away from the control of religion and the Church. Law and Morality, Art and Science, become independent spheres of life

which encompass man on all sides with particular truths and set him particular problems. This makes life incomparably broader, richer, and more varied, but is likely at the same time to expose it to varying and, indeed, intersecting movements. It takes from life, without hope of return, its old restful and self-contained character.

It has been so often depicted before that we do not feel it incumbent on us to show how human society takes on an entirely different form when work falls predominantly on the shoulders of the individual, how political and economic life is driven into new channels, and how the individualizing of existence penetrates even into social intercourse and everyday customs. That which now gives charm and attractiveness to work is, in general, the fact that its product embodies and illustrates individual character, which is only thereby fully realized.

The position of man within reality is also affected by the movement of modern life, and

a fresh foundation must be sought for his greatness. Aristotle declared that the difference between man and the animals was that the latter cannot go beyond individual impressions and individual stimulations, while man, in virtue of his power of thought, can form universals and let his action be determined by them. Later thought differentiates the lower from the higher stage by the distinction that the former is bound hand and foot to the order of nature, while life at the latter stage rises to independent thought and self-decision. Reason, which raises us above the purely natural order, does not take its direction from any external source, but is able to choose its own path. Thus freedom becomes the distinguishing mark of man; he is "the first freedman of Creation" (Herder). Of course, the conception of freedom is by no means uniform, and often covers both a higher and a lower kind, *e.g.* the freedom of Locke is different from the freedom of Kant. But everywhere that freedom forms the leading

conception of value it is taken as proof of a Reason indwelling in man. Freedom, too, need not reduce the demands on conduct, but may increase them if an invisible world is present in the soul as an awakening and constraining force. Thus the Reformation has greatly increased the task of morality by laying the chief problem of religion immediately on the soul of the individual and demanding its transformation. And Kant, by deepening the idea of duty, has brought the whole of life under an inner subjection, and has thus made it not more easy but more difficult. In connection with men like these, who approached the subject with all the deep earnestness of souls anxiously concerned for the truth of life and spiritual self-preservation, who dare speak of libertinism?

This movement as a whole gave to philosophy a new form and new aims, and, as far as philosophy is in line with the new movement, it exhibits a common character throughout all the differences between individual

philosophers. Descartes is the first in whose philosophy this common character is clearly discerned. A strong craving after truth makes him feel the existing condition of knowledge to be absolutely unsatisfactory, and, in particular, to be involved in unbearable confusion. The first result is a radical doubt, but within this doubt there persists unchanged the endeavour to attain some fixed point, such as the fulcrum which Archimedes desired. Such a point is finally found in the thinking subject, in the conscious ego, and this leads to a complete change of direction in the work of philosophy. Hitherto it had proceeded from the world to man, from the whole to the element, from the macrocosm to the microcosm: after a truth had been apprehended in the macrocosm it was applied to the microcosm. But now the microcosm steps into the first place, the movement advances from man to the world, which becomes a difficult problem instead of a ready-made datum. The truth about the world is ascertained only after it

has first been taken to pieces by scientific analysis and then reconstructed in accordance with the laws of our thinking. Only that can be admitted to be true which presents itself to our thought as clear and distinct. It is owing to this tendency to start with the subject that the English thinkers make psychology the foundation of all knowledge. To follow up the growth of the individual life, and to ascertain the laws and tendencies which govern it, becomes the central task of knowledge and determines all its contents and range. All the spiritual achievements, all the morality and law, the religion and art, which form an integral part of human existence, are to be developed from the soul of the individual, and owe to this source their characteristic forms. What was formerly looked upon as a cosmic process, for example, the causal connection between events, now becomes something experienced by man, and, indeed, produced by him, and thus acquires quite a different significance. About the same time Leibniz draws

up a magnificent scheme of the world in which each individual existence is regarded as a monad, as a metaphysical point. As such, it gains an endless life, and develops this life purely out of its own resources without having any relations, or being bound up, with anything external to itself. While the monad thus assumes the form of a world, reality itself is transformed into a world of worlds. But at the same time Leibniz' hearty recognition of individuality enables him to assign to each of these sub-worlds a unique significance.

Kant, too, continues this movement of modern life, and the whole of his philosophy is pervaded by the attempt to transfer the centre of gravity from the object to the subject. The theoretical reason frees man from the oppression of an alien world, for it shows that the subject itself constitutes its own world in accordance with laws that are indwelling in itself. "The understanding does not derive its laws from nature, but prescribes them to nature." Hence the theory of

knowledge takes precedence of metaphysics, and destroys the latter in the old sense in which metaphysics believed that it could apprehend a transcendental existence. The practical reason frees the acting personality from all external constraint and leaves it to impose its laws on itself, but, at the same time, in the building up of a new moral order enables it to penetrate to the ultimate depths of reality. Personality here becomes the channel through which a higher world is revealed, and nowhere else is it more clearly seen that freedom, while it destroys old ties, introduces new ones in their place, and claims to be essentially the setting free of a more real and spontaneous life. Hence the new philosophy exhibits a large number of results which often contradict one another if taken as they stand. But we need only institute a general comparison with the older method to become aware that the diversity rests on a common foundation, and that it is not a confused divergence, but a struggle to

carry out a common fundamental tendency. We thus discern here with absolute clearness the close connection between the form which philosophy assumes and the general movement of human life.

Anyone who is ready to deny that there is any truth in such a movement as this, with its thorough-going transformation of reality, must have a very low opinion of the forces which have been, and are, at work in the world. The man who undertook to prove that this movement was nothing more than a product of human self-will would find that the logical development of his principles made it very difficult for him to escape absolute scepticism. But to acknowledge some truth in a movement which forms part of the world's history does not mean that we regard it as raised above all dangers and aberrations. In particular, we may expect that here, as usual, the relation of man to the spiritual life may give rise to the most perplexing difficulties. That which, on the high level of the spiritual life, has an in-

contestable right, and is capable of producing the most fruitful results, may be dragged down by man in his natural state to the level of his general mental outlook and interests, and thus be most mischievously distorted. Such a man may claim for himself, just as he is, what belongs to him only as a member of a spiritual order; he may believe that he can accomplish from his own resources what is possible for him only in connection with a visible or invisible system, and this is bound to give rise to a great deal of error and obstruction. For the tragedy of the human situation is just this, its greatest danger is the perversion of its best (*corruptio optimi pessima*). Hence in modern life also doubt may finally become so strong that it reaches right down to the foundations, and drives life and thought into new directions.

The modern scheme of life arose in opposition to the medieval, and is in direct contradiction to the latter both as regards its estimate of

man and the general feeling for life which pervades it. The medieval system, as we saw, presupposes the spiritual minority of man, the modern system his majority. In the former man appears as possessed of no great spiritual enterprise, and as partaking to a certain extent in spiritual life only through superior power; but the modern system presupposes men of spiritual power, bent on high aims, for otherwise individuals could never become pillars of the spiritual life. But now the question arises, whether this picture is verified by experience, whether real life does not lag far behind, and whether all the complications which we have just indicated are not thereby reintroduced. Such complications may be allowed to rest so long as the old coherent systematizations of life, the world of religion, or the world of a universal reason, in the sense of the Enlightenment, are still vividly present to men, and point them in a common direction. But the more these fade into insignificance, and the more man is thrown upon himself, the greater

is the danger that spiritual life may dwindle and finally disappear entirely.

The problem is most easily grasped when we consider the question as to how any systematic coherence can be introduced into life on the new basis. The more we surrender all control of the manifold by a superior Whole, the more are we thrown back upon the capacity of the individual elements to accomplish the same result by means of free association. Experience shows that this is not such an easy matter, that on the one hand we may have mere colourless co-existence, or on the other a condition of mutual hostility. And the surrender of an inner connection may easily lead to a diminution of spiritual achievement. This is seen in all the ramifications of the spiritual life, and first of all in the case of science itself. We saw how the break-up of the medieval structure raised the individual branches of science to a position of independence, made them specific starting-points for investigation, and revealed the treasures of

the universe with incomparably greater fulness and exactitude. At first a reaction towards unity persisted as a relic of earlier religious and philosophical systematizations. After its disappearance the individual sciences had only their own necessities to consider, and went their own ways, which soon diverged. The next step is a specialization which has eyes for nothing except what lies in the direction of its own goal, and which, though it accumulates a wealth of information, never really succeeds in penetrating and mastering its material. Or again, where more general tendencies come into prominence, they easily succumb to the influence of special departments of science, and this brings them into a position of sharp opposition to one another. Hence the various branches of science which deal with nature and spirit develop fundamentally different methods and standards of value, and, even within any one of the great departments, the various movements and tendencies are often widely divergent. Still more dangerous is the

cleavage which takes place in life itself, the attitude of hostility which whole departments of life assume towards one another. We have already become so accustomed to look upon religion and culture as opponents that we hardly feel any longer how abnormal this strained relationship is, and how foreign to other epochs. Further, there exists at the present day among men of average culture an opposition between their beliefs about the world and their beliefs about the moral values of life, which is often concealed, but in reality is very sharp. In the world they recognize an exclusively mechanical causality; in human life they defend moral values and the idea of freedom. The same individuals and parties who, in their view of the world, greet every negation with shouts of joy and put as low an estimate upon man as possible, in the political and social domain glorify the greatness and dignity of man, as if this did not depend upon inner connections and require that reality should have deeper foundations than those

offered by the mere co-existences of experience. Thus we live to-day not only alongside one another in separate worlds, whose wide divergence is concealed only by language, but one and the same man lives in different worlds. In view of such a state of spiritual anarchy, how could common ideals arise and by their superior power win the minds of men?

The problems which arise from the relationship between the individual and society are no less difficult. When the modern movement towards freedom laid the burden of life mainly on the shoulders of individuals, it presupposed that they were thoroughly efficient and willing to do their best. It also relied upon the free association of individuals, and the mutual contact and intermingling between different circles in the life of society, to produce a sufficient degree of solidarity among humanity. Much has certainly been attained which earlier epochs did not possess, but the modern liberation of energies has given rise to strong oppositions and passions, and has conferred enormous

power on the party system. It has often tended to promote the unbridled letting loose of frenzied selfishness, and has placed at the service of the latter all the means which a highly developed civilization has at its disposal.

But this leads us to the decisive point as to how the individual presents himself to us on the new basis when we consider him in his own private nature. In the higher strata of modern culture, wherever conceptions such as personality and individuality have been fully recognized, it has only been by those who have held fast to and reinforced invisible connections, and have resolutely maintained the reality of an inner world. For we are only justified in setting a high value upon personality if we believe that it reveals to us a new kind of process—in fact, a new world. The development of individuality can only be made the chief object of human endeavour if existence as human beings means that men have great tasks to carry out, and contradictions to overcome, as the condition of realizing the highest

capacities of their own nature. Life only acquired greatness and spiritual independence because man had to seek to enter into relations with the whole universe, to come to terms with it, and to maintain his own position in face of it. The main body of mankind has become less and less conscious of these inner connections, and, at the same time, man has become a mere item in a world which comes before him as something given and incapable of development from the spiritual point of view, and which surrounds and hems him in on all sides. Hardly any room is left for the conception of personality, and we do not see how individuality can maintain its value if it is nothing more than a particular fragment of nature. But if the conceptions maintain themselves, claim to be valued as highly as before, and make good their claim, it is impossible to guard against a luxurious upgrowth of hollow talk and a deep-reaching insincerity in life. In the absence of any counteracting influence, there is an increasing danger that our

life may lose its sure foundation and finally find itself adrift in the void, leaving us to affirm conclusions while denying their premises. In fact, when this tendency prevails, the human soul can no longer remain a unity in itself, but is bound to be transformed into a medley of co-existing and interpenetrating psychical processes. If these are not worked over and transformed by a superior unity, they will come to have a merely sensational connection with one another, and man will finally become a mere bundle of sensations, feelings, and impulses. But, all the same, the superior rights of personality and the dignity and greatness of humanity are proclaimed and trumpeted forth.

Thus experience shows that the mere striving after freedom cannot ensure that life shall retain a spiritual character. The break-up of all inner connections has led to superficiality and the dissipation of energy. In addition, the course of the movement in modern life has revealed that the complications

are much greater, and the resistance much more strenuous than was anticipated at the beginning, when men were filled with joyful confidence. And a further fact has become evident, viz., that it is not only at particular points that civilization does not correspond to the demands of the spiritual life, but that civilization as a whole is in many ways in conflict with these demands. We feel with increasing distress the wide interval between the varied and important work to be done at the circumference of life and the complete emptiness at the centre. When we take an inside view of life, we find that a life of mere bustling routine preponderates, that men struggle and boast and strive to outdo one another, that unlimited ambition and vanity are characteristic of individuals, that they are always running to and fro and pressing forward, or feverishly exerting all their powers. But throughout it all we come upon nothing that gives any real value to life, and nothing spiritually elevating. Hence we do not find

any meaning or value in life, but in the end a single huge show in which culture is reduced to a burlesque. Anyone who thinks it all over and reflects upon the difference between the enormous labour that has been expended and the accompanying gain to the essentials of life, must either be driven to complete negation and despair, or must seek new ways of guaranteeing a value to life and liberating man from the sway of the pettily human. But this will force men to resume the quest for inner connections.

But the objection will be raised that the endeavour to attain to such connections is no novelty, for the whole of the nineteenth century was taken up with it. This is certainly the case; but should we find ourselves at the present day in such a state of unrest and insecurity, as actually exists, if the co-ordinations which have been attempted had been satisfactory? In German speculation philosophy itself, with buoyant courage, undertook to understand the whole of reality as the

unfolding of a single all-embracing spiritual process. Hegel, in particular, makes all philosophy to be the search for unity, and at the same time gives a symmetrical form to the whole of existence. But however powerful have been the influences which this attempt has exercised, and still exercises, it has not met with universal recognition, not only because in the meantime there took place the well-known movement of life towards the visible world, but also because man was treated in the Hegelian system too much as a purely intellectual being, and the spiritual life was not given any sufficient content. On a broader basis a counteracting influence to prevent the threatened dissipation of the energies of life was exercised by the thought of social evolution, the carrying out of which was especially distinctive of the nineteenth century. It makes full use of the connection of the individual with the sequence and co-existence of things, and shows what is the value of this connection, how the work of men through

long generations still continues to influence present conditions, and, further, how the existence of men in society produces a spiritual atmosphere, a *milieu*, which leaves every individual enveloped and moulded by superior power. But if, from this point of view, he appears as a mere member of an extensive system, the question arises as to whether he can come into intimate relationship with this system, and take it up as a whole into his character and disposition, or whether he feels himself at the mercy of mere blind fact. In the first case, the problem arises how history and society are to attain to an inner connection which can win the allegiance of the soul of the individual, if no sort of inner world is presupposed. In the second case, where the mere fact of dependence is the final conclusion that is reached, we cannot see why man should welcome as a good this dependence, which is often very burdensome and oppressive; why he should make it part of his character, and sacrifice his

own well-being to that of a world which consists of merely co-existing parts. Hence the matter remains in some obscurity, and only the constant interpenetration of the two conceptions, as, for example, in the case of Comte, the founder of Positivism, can in any degree conceal the fact that, by this path, the goal is unattainable. In reality, what has kept modern men together to the greatest extent is work, work in the modern sense. This has as its characteristic feature, in comparison with earlier periods, a greater detachment from the subjective basis and a greater independence of the individual, the formation of great complexes which develop their own laws and motive forces, and which combine and unite with one another the achievements of individuals. The efforts of the individual can only succeed on condition that he gains an entrance into these systems, and does his work in the particular position which is assigned to him. This exercises an extraordinary power in overcoming the self-will of individuals and

directing their actions towards a common end. But, whatever has been accomplished in this respect by such a co-ordination, it unites men only with regard to their outward actions, and does not produce a spiritual unity. Wherever it is a question of character and convictions, all combination and co-operation in work cannot prevent a wide divergence, a rampant selfishness, an inward isolation of the individual. In fact, if work is raised to a position of exclusive control, it finally brings with it the danger that life may become merely mechanical. The craving after more soul and more love in human existence has to remain unsatisfied. Hence, as a general rule, the modern movement after some sort of connection is too external, and does not go back to the spiritual foundations; we are conscious of a great gap with nothing to fill it.

Such a situation naturally enables us to understand how the older method, and, in particular, the medieval ecclesiastical system,

can again make itself more powerfully felt, how it can make use of the perplexities of modern life to recommend its own system of truth, and how it can win the allegiance of many vacillating souls. As a matter of fact, it acquires a certain power because, in the midst of a progressive disintegration, it presents a stable and coherent system, and offers a support to which one can cling. If that disintegration is not in the end checked from within, then a serious danger of a relapse might arise; the imperative need of some support or other might for a time thrust out of sight all other considerations. But what men are able to win temporarily does not necessarily become a power that is spiritually productive; and even if the old system is taken up again, it could never regain its old power of conviction. For this rested for the most part on the fact that the spiritual life which was offered by this system was on a level with the general world-movement. But, meanwhile, changes of the most far-reaching

character have taken place. Of course, men may make artificial attempts to reverse the course of progress, or to explain it away, but these attempts can never have the immediacy and inner necessity which were characteristic of the medieval systematization in its own age, and which belong to a great achievement in the history of the world. Hence no help can be expected from this quarter.

If men were mere products of history, as this view makes them, if, as such, they were bound to the pre-existing situation, and both their life and their work were essentially controlled by what has previously been accomplished, it is impossible to see how to avoid the perplexities which we have set forth, or how we should overcome the opposition between a unity which crushes out all freedom and a multiplicity which breaks up all coherence. But we are not mere products of history; in virtue of our spiritual nature we are able to transcend our past, and this power we are able to make use of and cultivate.

Fortified by this, we are not left defenceless, and need not accept whatever history offers us as an undifferentiated whole; we possess a spontaneity which we can oppose to everything that is merely given; we can separate in what is offered to us that which is spiritually necessary from that which has been shaped by human agency; we can emphasize the requirements for the maintenance of spiritual life which have been revealed by the experience of history, and we can inquire what direction is pointed out for our own work by these requirements.

In our brief survey of history it was clearly seen that, in the case of the problem of unity and multiplicity, the movement of life has not followed a single line, but that the tendency towards multiplicity, which is characteristic of modern times, is in opposition to the tendency towards unity, which was predominant in antiquity. A critical estimate of the whole shows us that it is not a question of a mere sequence of tendencies, but that two poles are

indicated, between which the spiritual life is necessarily compelled to move. If spiritual life is to be possible, we must have on the one hand an inner connection, a creative activity proceeding from the whole: such life can never be produced by a mere juxtaposition; it must be acquired and maintained by some power above the separate elements. On the other hand, as we saw, the spiritual life must have spontaneity, independence, and pure inwardness, if it is to exist at all; it must be lived for its own sake and cannot be imparted or transferred from without. It does not persist in the condition which it has once reached, but begins to ebb if it is not continually renewed. If, then, it is incontestable that such immediacy and spontaneity can arise only in the soul of the individual, and from this source must animate all the connections which are subsequently formed, then a contradiction arises which at first sight is insoluble. Life arises for us only at an individual point, and yet, as spiritual life, it

must at the same time be a creative activity proceeding from the whole. If this contradiction is to be resolved, we must make an essential change in the view which we took at first sight, and deepen our conception of reality so as to see at the individual point more than an isolated event. We must recognize the presence there of a universal process, and a totality of spiritual life must be the basis of our own existence. To be sure, this world-process is not immediately our own possession: we have first to grasp it and work it out; but it never could have come into our field of vision at all and become an object of our efforts if our nature did not originally participate in it. If our inner existence is not somehow grounded in the infinity of the whole, all co-ordination of life must be impressed upon us from without, and this will inevitably crush all independence. But this again will necessarily cause, sooner or later, a reaction in favour of setting free the individual elements, and will engender a desire

to break up the connection. On this view, mankind would be driven to and fro, without hope of rescue, between blind subjection to authority and a spiritual anarchy of individual elements, and would be worn out by the contest, were it not that there is a point of vantage from which it is possible to make some headway against the antithesis in question, though it does not here simply disappear, and at which we are able to protect ourselves from the unhappy condition just described.

The average man, whose spirituality is sluggish, will always have great difficulty in getting beyond the stage of wavering between these two opposite positions. According as the feeling of weakness and isolation, or the feeling of power and independence, gains the upper hand, he will incline first in the one direction and then in the other. But this makes it all the more an indispensable task for the work of the spirit to develop a life which rises above that opposition and all the spiritual poverty of the average man, and

thereby to bring into as sharp relief as possible a genuine spiritual culture as compared with the superficiality and pretence of a culture which is merely human. This cannot well take place unless we seek also to establish a particular organization, a co-ordination of mankind with this object in view. The medieval Church became too narrow for this purpose, not only because it bound up the spiritual world much too firmly with a visible order, but also because it made religion the sole representative of that independent spiritual life. It thus gave life a character that was too one-sidedly religious, and transformed to too great an extent the spiritual into the ecclesiastical. But when once the fundamental thought of a combination of forces, under the idea of a spiritual life superior to the average, has won a footing in history, it cannot again disappear; it will stir up and move humanity until it is revived in some form or other. Only then can we attack the problem of bringing into relief from the dull

average of attainment a heart and core of genuine spirituality throughout the whole range of existence, and of working from this starting-point to strengthen and elevate life. The constant presupposition is, that a spiritual life which is a unified whole is at work in the depths of our soul; it is only when it does this that main lines of effort can be developed out of it, that truths of the soul can be elaborated, and that the way can be prepared for an inner solidarity of the soul.

If this is impossible without the constant co-operation of philosophy, then philosophy itself must receive a new form from the new connections, and must develop new methods. Its first task is to provide a new starting-point for its own work. It can no longer take its stand on the external world, as the ancients did, since the general movement of life and thought has tended more and more to make that world itself a problem, and to refer men back to life as the only thing which is immediately present to them. But if this life is

understood as the mere activity of a unit which is cut off from the world, it can never get beyond its limited and separated sphere, and never attain to a truth that is universally valid. It will thus inevitably lapse into a state of complete isolation. Hence it is important to show that there is a world which lies within life itself, and to advance from the psychological treatment of it to the noological. The latter does not deal with the states and experiences of the individual unit, but with the upgrowth of the spiritual life, and looks at it in a way that rises above the separation of individual and society, but at the same time affords us a characteristic view of the whole of reality.

If we thus start from the spiritual life as a unified whole, and strive to reach some systematization of life in work, we need not be afraid that humanity will sink to a condition of rigid uniformity: ample provision has here been made for movement and variety. For, in the first place, spiritual life as a whole will always need to be recognized and appropriated

by men, and in doing so different minds will inevitably take different paths. It will only be with great difficulty that this divergence will ever cease in the course of history, or even diminish. But we have to struggle incessantly, not only to realize the spiritual life as a whole, but also to give form to its details. For, as we shall have to show later with more detail, the spiritual life does not reveal its depths to man all at once, but he can only advance gradually into it by coming to terms with the existing condition of the world and his own soul. Various stages may have to be traversed and important decisions will have to be taken. In this matter one and the same answer cannot be expected from all. For the individual may take up his position here or there according to his nature and experience; in fact whole periods may adopt different positions according to the impressions they have received and the tasks they have to perform. In particular, one epoch may be filled with the consciousness of the inner

greatness of the spiritual life, another may feel deeply how human existence fails to reach this height of attainment; the one may therefore be a period of affirmation, the other a period of negation. Great tension may be the consequence, and much strife among men, but if we once make sure only of the idea of an independent spiritual life, we shall have made it possible to bring counteracting influences to bear against the disintegration, and in fact to understand the different movements as all co-operating in a common work. The only essential is that the matter should never be regarded as settled and done with. Let it never be forgotten that to us men there is not offered any ready-made relationship between unity and multiplicity, but that we have to co-operate with the forces at work in the world, and laboriously strive to reach some sort of reconciliation of the antithesis.

CHAPTER II

Change and Persistence

Time and Eternity

The relation between change and persistence, between time and eternity, is exceedingly complicated and confused in human life. No phase of this relationship is satisfying; we are driven from one to another; a reconciliation seems to be indispensable, but we do not see how to attain it.

In the first place, man stands completely immersed in the stream of time; his whole existence is in a state of constant change, and in the external world he finds everywhere the more change the more closely he scrutinizes things. Meanwhile, the current of his own life flows on without resting; in comparison with

the endlessness of time, the existence of the individual appears as a fleeting moment. But this transience and insignificance of his life is felt by man both as a grief and a grievance, and hence it comes to be one of the leading motives of his work to escape somehow from the destroying power of time. He experiences that longing for eternity which Plato depicted in glowing colours. The individual feels that he must soon retire from the scene, and hence he seeks to leave behind him some signs that he has lived. Great kings set up memorials of their deeds and inscribe their names on walls of rock. But if we go beyond the individual, we find that the building up of a civilization requires, as it were, the accumulation and storing up of achievements. The present must maintain its hold on the past in order to be able to continue the building-up process; our task is to establish a foundation for life in face of all change of circumstances and all caprice of individuals. Institutions and customs, which are declared to be un-

changeable and which are revered as inviolable, are particularly dominant at the beginnings of civilization. Religion especially, by connecting life with a sacred order, exercises an influence in favour of persistence and keeps change at arm's length as an outrage against God.

But if we take our stand within time we cannot well overcome the power of time. The stream of time undermines and destroys the mightiest and most skilfully constructed works; from the largest whole to the smallest parts it brings everything into flux. Not only individuals, but whole nations and civilizations decay; the various religions themselves, the guardians of eternal truth, succumb to time and survive only as memories. The craving for eternity would have to be torn from our soul if our life belonged entirely to the immediate present, if it could not transcend it and press forward to a new reality, which stands in a different relation to the question of time and eternity. But such a reality can reveal itself, if at all, only as the result of

spiritual work, and this work necessarily involves both thought and philosophy. Now it would appear that nothing is more characteristic of thought than the power to look at things out of relation to time under the form of eternity.

Greek philosophy devoted special attention to this problem. It waged vigorous war against the flux of phenomena, and hence produced a characteristic type of life. Change in things is recognized throughout a wide range, but is degraded by the main tendency of thought to a lower level, and kept at a distance from the heart and core of spiritual work. This was not done purely in the interests of philosophical knowledge, which bade men seek beneath all change a persistent fundamental substance or unchangeable elements. Life, too, demanded some sure and certain support, which should be a spiritual rallying-point from which it could go forth to enrich itself. It was thought that life could not gain this support except by turning

from the restless activity of man to the universe, which, in its ultimate nature, was considered to be unchangeable. In grasping and contemplating the order of the universe and its eternal grace, man seemed to find something worth living for and to be raised above the cares and troubles of everyday life. On this view, knowledge seems to be the only path by which man's life can be raised to the level of that which is eternal; the superiority of knowledge over action was thus fully guaranteed. But the next thing was to ascertain more accurately what it was in the universe which could be reckoned as persistent. The answer given by Plato gained the widest acceptance and has exercised the deepest influence on mankind. Plato sees in the conceptions which thought uses a certain amount of fixity in contrast with an opinion which continually varies. On a closer view, this fixed element is determined as the form or shape. The co-ordination of these forms into a great synthetic structure gives rise to

a realm of unchangeable truth and reality. This realm must be raised above the world which envelops us, in order to preserve its independence and purity, but it exercises a formative influence over the world and gives its efforts a fixed goal and an impulse towards higher things. Knowledge is here raised to a position of control over the whole of life, for it is knowledge alone which is able to reveal to us this transcendental world and keep it abidingly present.

Aristotle brings form back into the world of experience, but leaves it its immutability, and by his vigorous development of the antithesis of matter the total picture of the world and life is rounded off with still greater completeness. This reconciliation between change and persistence, between time and eternity, which was reached when Greek thought was at its highest level, has moulded the whole of life in a specific way, and still retains the influence which it has exercised for thousands of years. Form has received the fullest recog-

nition as a phenomenon which pervades the whole world, and it becomes the central point of spiritual work. The world appears on this view as dominated by the opposition of matter and form. The latter is the absolutely unchangeable element, so that to seek something which is persistent simply means to throw the forms into clear relief. Matter, on the other hand, exists in a state of flux, not subject to rule. In the process of life form takes hold of matter and shapes it to its own ends, but matter always tends to escape from these ties and always has to be conquered anew. Hence the world is in a state of constant movement, but in its ultimate nature it remains unaltered: rest retains an unassailable superiority over change. And even where change extends beyond the individual, as with the fates of nations or the motions of the heavenly bodies, Aristotle does not by any means believe that there is no persistence. The conception of fixed rhythms in movement is developed, perhaps, in connection with the Babylonian astronomy.

Just as day and night, summer and winter, follow one another in eternal recurrence, so also there are rhythmical periods in the world as a whole and in the fates of men. Movement does not go on endlessly, but only up to a certain point, whose position is fixed, then it turns back to the beginning and starts a new series. Hence everything is both old and new at the same time; in the incessant ebb and flow of phenomena, in the endless succession of periods, the world as a whole remains the same. The work of knowledge corresponds to this conception of reality. Its task is not so much to follow the changes in the coherent systems which have been formed within life as to construct a general picture out of the confused mass of first impressions, to bring the flux of things to a stand. Its procedure is not genetic, but descriptive and classificatory. The strong point of this philosophy lies in discovering fixed types or forming them, to a certain extent after the manner of plastic art. It is certainly in connection with

this that we are especially indebted to the work of the Greeks for the fixation of sharply outlined types of thought and life, which seem likely to remain a permanent heritage of humanity.

The search for something which is persistent is not confined to the universe generally, but extends to the details of human existence. The kind of political life which prevails seems to be determined above all by the nature of the political constitution. The form of the state seems to be that which preserves the systematic coherence of the whole in opposition to the constantly changing series of individuals, and it is this in particular which has led to the high estimation, and frequent over-estimation, in which constitutional forms are held. Thus a tendency arises to construct an ideal and to hold this up as the permanent standard by which any change in political relations is to be judged.

But the impulse to find something that is persistent is seen with particular clearness in

the way in which the life of the soul is shaped. The ultimate basis of life is here always taken for granted; in the full development of this human activity has an important task assigned it, but at the same time an impassable goal. When this goal is reached, activity ceases to be a mere striving, and is transformed into a state of rest in itself, into an activity fully satisfied by its own exertion and self-expression. The best example of this is artistic contemplation, which is full of exalted pleasure without striving to attain to anything beyond itself. It seems that here the opposition is entirely overcome, since the activity itself acquires a sort of persistence. If, in accordance with this, happiness is sought not in effort but in possession, this possession is no state of slothful rest, but an incessant activity. Hence the chief problem of life is life itself, as the complete unfolding and effective co-ordination of its own nature: as the poet says, the important thing is to become what one is. The conception of form has a far-reaching

power in this connection also, for everywhere that there is any diversity manifest in the domain of life, it is to be brought into a fixed relation either of gradation or of equilibrium. The general result is a life which is self-existent and established on its own foundations, and which is exempt from restlessness and haste only because it is incessantly active.

No one would wish to maintain at the present day that this scheme, which was drawn up by the philosophers, really controlled the life of the average Greek. Very possibly it was by way of contrast to this average that its features were outlined with so much sharpness. But in the spiritual life and in the work of that unique nation philosophy does not occupy a position of isolation. And the creative activity which found expression in art shows more persistence than in modern times; certain types endure for centuries without crushing the individuality of their creators. The technical work of the Greeks, too, has more stability; there is less alteration

in its methods and instruments than has become the rule in the latest period. Hence their life has throughout a more restful character than modern life; it is laden with fewer unsolved problems and sharp contradictions. It is not so much a restless striving after an ever-receding goal, a hoping and waiting for a better future, as a co-ordination and strengthening of its own powers; it draws its satisfaction from the complete mastery of its own existence in the present.

This ideal of life, with its reconciliation of rest and activity, has always possessed an attraction for later periods, but all its nobility and greatness cannot conceal the presuppositions on which it rests, and which became untenable in the following ages. It demands a vigorous nature; it demands a considerable activity which takes pleasure in its own exercise: it demands, in fact, faith in the rationality of the human soul and the whole of reality in their fundamental nature. Form, too, can only maintain its position of leader-

ship where it possesses an inner life— we might say, a soul. And the whole scheme underwent considerable modifications towards the close of antiquity. After the loss of political freedom and the cessation of spiritual creation, activity loses its old value, and what is offered in its stead cannot fully make up for the loss. Difficult problems and contradictions arise within human existence and in the condition of the world: in particular, the old harmony between the spiritual and the sensible threatens to turn into a sharp opposition. Among men the pettiness and meaninglessness of everyday routine is ever more keenly felt. The thought that a similar round of tasks may go on for ever, may easily make it appear that all our trouble and work is fruitless, and may become terribly oppressive. Finally, when creative power is at a low ebb, form no longer preserves the soul and the content which are necessary to the furtherance of life.

Hence old ideals decayed, and yet no new ones arose out of the chaos of the times. Was

it to be wondered at that, in such a situation, wherever all faith in life had not disappeared, there arose a strong desire for some truth or other which should be untouched by the changes of time, and for complete peace in the possession of such a truth? The important point is to find something eternal, which leaves behind it the whole domain of becoming, and reveals to men a new life. Such an eternal element, however, is not to be found in the world, but only above it, and hence the endeavour to attain to it acquires a religious character. The endeavour to reach persistence, as we saw it in art, in which the fixed element is sought within the activity, gives way to a religious endeavour which is inclined to bring the two into opposition. Rest in the eternal, free from all the haste and toil of life, now becomes the supreme goal. When spiritual life is at its highest level, as in the case of Plotinus, this rest is certainly not represented as a cessation of all action, but action here lies entirely within the soul; it comes to be a

constant and persistent contemplation of the one eternal existence. On this view there is no room for any change or any diversity. Finally there remains as the ultimate fact of life, only a single and fundamental emotional tone, a quiet resting and free moving in eternal existence. But this leads to the threshold of a new epoch.

Christianity could not summon mankind to a complete change of heart, and could not preach the necessity of a new condition of things, without making a breach with the finality of the old Greek view. It was just the rise of Christianity which made clear the fundamental presupposition on which the old system rested, and which was now seen to be untenable. The Greek solution of the problem stands and falls with the conviction that this world of ours is everything which it can possibly be, that it is in a normal condition which does not need any alteration and does not demand our interference. Only on such a view could the contemplation of the universe

furnish the chief content of life, and a content which is not only completely satisfactory but also productive of happiness. Christianity, on the contrary, holds the opposite belief, that the world is full of grave disorders, that it has fallen away from a standard which it ought to maintain, and which it really did maintain at the beginning, and that it is important to regain the lost height of attainment by an entirely new departure, for which a fresh bestowal of divine love and power on humanity is necessary. At the same time, the world as a whole acquires an essentially new aspect: great deeds now become the essence of all that happens, they make an ethical drama out of the whole. In this the salvation of mankind and, indeed, of the whole universe, is the question at issue and is the subject of the greatest vicissitudes. The seriousness of this drama forbids all repetition: the thought of a rhythm of events, and of an ebb and flow in the history of the world, can in such a connection be regarded only as a frivolity. At the same

time the most significant modification occurs in the relation between time and eternity. Greek speculation at its highest level admitted, of course, that all that happens in time rests on an eternal order, but the temporal and the eternal remain clearly separated from one another; eternity does not intervene in the changes of time. But this is just what happens according to the beliefs of Christianity; it is this conviction more than anything else that gives this religion its distinctive character. But the entry of the eternal into time must very considerably increase the importance of all that happens in time; temporal happenings thus gain a value for the deepest ground and the ultimate fate of reality. The building-up of a kingdom of God within human life is closely connected with this fact. When the old and the new worlds come into collision, nothing produces a wider separation between the leading thinkers on both sides, such as Plotinus and Augustine, than the fact that the former reduces time to a mere simili-

tude of eternity and does not call for any sort of historical progress in human life, while with Augustine the building-up of a religious community, an ecclesiastical order, is the central point which controls all his thought. It is when the formation and development of this religious order lays a great task upon men and calls for decision on their part that they first acquire a history in any true sense of the word. But the task which is laid upon them is a permanent one. For although, after the victory of Christianity, the movement proceeds on more peaceful lines, there is always the demand for the further expansion and development of the Christian life. In this connection Christianity has from the beginning set up a high goal in its representation of the kingdom of God, when men shall be perfect in love and purity. This goal is far in advance of anything which experience shows to have ever been attained, and it has consequently implanted a deep longing in the human soul, and has continually lifted the thoughts of men

beyond the present and the present order to a future anticipated in faith and hope.

But the soul of the individual takes its full share in the inner movement of life and in the shaping which it receives in the course of history; in fact, it is in the individual soul that the most immediate and deepest changes take place. For, henceforth, the main task of life can no longer be to make completely intelligible and hold fast a nature which after all is already present to us. For the intensifying of the ethical demand, which insists that men must be renewed and purified, makes everything which is achieved by merely natural powers seem inadequate, and requires a radical renewal. It is thus that a history of the soul first arises and becomes the heart and core of all life. The great oppositions of existence here come into immediate collision, and keep the life of man, which oscillates from one to the other, in a state of constant tension.

Hence there is much more movement and change in Christianity than in the world of

ancient thought. But, on the other hand, there are many influences which co-operate to preserve and strengthen the effort after persistence. When God is conceived of as entirely above the world and as a personal Being, and especially after victory has been won in the outer world, the rest in God which is longed for when life is at its highest level has a more fervent and intimate character, and the desire to be completely free from the restless and ignoble routine of the world becomes still more pressing. The appearance of the eternal in time could then be easily understood as allowing men, even in this life, to give an eternal setting to their thoughts and feelings, and to free them from every element of time. This line of thought has established itself and maintains a permanent position in particular in the Greek Church, and, more than anywhere else, in Greek monasticism.

But, as a general rule, what contributed most to the attainment of persistence was the conviction that the truth which decides the

salvation of the soul was not obtained by merely human power, and could not be so obtained in the future, but that it came to us as a communication from God, as a supernatural revelation, and, as such, tolerates no change. The course of history makes the Church the guardian of this unchangeable truth. The more the Church detaches itself from its secular environment, and the greater the separation between divine and human, supernatural and natural, the higher is the inviolable divine truth raised above the changes of human life and above the whole sphere of human work.

A further support was given to the tendency towards persistence by the conditions of the closing period of antiquity, with its disinclination for any independent action and any private responsibility, along with the dangers attaching to both. When it made any effort, it experienced not so much a pleasurable exercise of power as a paralysing uncertainty as to the success of its endeavours. Hence it was bound to seek for happiness not so much in endeavour

as in possession, and it wanted its possession to be absolutely certain and unassailable. A possession of this kind, however, seemed to be nowhere offered except by religion in its ecclesiastical form.

Just as this tendency towards persistence made itself more widely felt in the middle ages in the sphere of religion, so now it conquered all the ramifications of life. In spite of their increasing power, the new nations were not yet in a position to produce a culture of their own, and were compelled to depend on that which was handed down to them. It was not to be wondered at that this culture was thought to be final perfection and met with unconditional veneration. Hence Aristotle came to be regarded as the supreme example of human knowledge, with whom men would not dare to break, and the attainable was everywhere supposed to have been already attained in the past. There was only one task left for men to carry out,

to guard faithfully that which had been won, and to transmit it conscientiously to later generations.

This mode of thought usually looked at the life of its own age and the state of its environment in the light of the past, and this past might be either classical antiquity or the beginnings of Christianity. The past, with its culminations of attainment, was that which lay next to man's soul, and it hung like a veil between the man and his own period. There was something fresh to do only in so far as the various authorities on which men relied had to be reconciled with one another. This was the problem which Scholasticism took up and solved in a very capable manner within the limits of possibility. Thus life here, with all its externally directed industry—and this is by no means lacking—yet possesses in its inmost heart a deep tranquillity and security. It is usually exempt from agitating soul-conflicts and corroding doubts. In the exceptions where these do occur they are usually thought

of as something monstrous and are condemned with the utmost severity.

This restful tone attains its maximum in mysticism. The latter develops a wonderful tenderness and intimacy, in direct contrast with the hardness and roughness of its environment. It strives to free human life more and more from every element of time, to make man younger every day, and to transport him entirely into a "permanent present." The man for whom time becomes as eternity and eternity as time, seems to escape all pain and to be brought into a state of pure bliss. In order to prepare a secure lodging for such peace within the soul, the inner consciousness is here first separated from all external activity, as a pure internality of the soul, and while this immersion of life in itself does not prevent a joyous activity toward the world, this latter has no value except as an expression of character. The close connection between God and the world which mysticism stands for, may reduce both the visible world and time to

an illusion and a dream, a morning-glow which disappears at the rising of the sun. But this may easily lead to the thought that the world and time, as expressions of eternal being, gain a closer connection and a greater significance. These are valuable seed-thoughts which may lead to a more inward comprehension of the world and also to a doctrine of development. We cannot fail to recognize that this is a doctrine which has arisen from religious speculation.

This predominance of the idea of persistence sets definite limits to the action as well as the thought of the middle ages. Where the condition of things, with all its incompleteness and all its misery, was thought to be the dispensation of a higher will, it could not be the task of man to strive to make essential alterations in it, or to transform reality as far as possible into a kingdom of reason. And the misery was the more easily endured because all earthly life was thought to be only a transitory passage to a better state of existence,

to man's true "home." Hence any effort to improve things was limited to mitigating to the best of men's ability the need which existed in individual cases: no attempt was made to trace back the misery to its source and to abolish it totally by a general transformation of existing circumstances. We find no effort and no movement from whole to whole. But just as the condition of mankind was accepted as essentially unchangeable, so the great external world was thought of as being once for all established and fixed by superior creative power. In particular, we never meet with the thought that organic forms may be subject to change; nature is conceived of as the faithful tenant of the form which the Creator has stamped upon things.

Hence the thought of persistence had a secure predominance and determined the kind of life that was lived. To emphasize the persistent element in things, and to connect human action with it, seemed to be in the main the chief aim of spiritual work. The

artistic and the religious solutions agreed together on this point and reinforced each other.

The older kind of life certainly had great advantages. To life it gave an inner equilibrium and to man the consciousness of being encompassed by assured truth. It thus guaranteed a restfulness incomparably greater than was given to later periods. But it rested on a presupposition with the overthrow of which the whole became untenable, the presupposition that in those achievements of the past, on which it relied, the highest conceivable limit had been reached and absolute truth attained. If essentially new tasks arose and essentially new powers were developed, if far-reaching changes took place in the fundamentals of life and in the general view of reality, there was bound to be opposition to the finality of earlier views. This opposition could not be smoothed over by a friendly agreement, but led to a complete breach with the old way of life. For as soon as the con-

viction gained ground that tradition did not exhaust the fulness of life, that it left many problems untouched, the solution of which was possible and, in fact, absolutely necessary, as soon as, in a word, the incompleteness and the inadequacy of the old way was put beyond doubt, its claim to be final and complete was bound to seem an intolerable presumption, which must be contested with the greatest vigour in the interests of truth. It seemed wrong that the achievements of a particular age should be stereotyped and made the standard for all ages. Such an attempt might lead to the reproach that the temporal usurps the rights of the eternal, and the human the rights of the divine, in a way which can no longer be tolerated. But the decision of the resulting conflict depends on the question whether the modern period has, or has not, really given rise to a new life of an independent spiritual character. If it has done so, if it has unfolded new forces in the region that lies beyond all human opinion, and made

something essentially new out of life and reality, if there is a culture which is specifically modern, and if there is a specifically spiritual type of the modern man, then the foundation is overthrown on which the medieval doctrine of persistence rested, and the maintenance of life on medieval lines becomes impossible.

But when the new life first arose, it was not by any means the intention of those who introduced it to bring in something new and different. They believed rather that what they introduced would only free the old life from the disfigurement to which it had been subjected, and would restore it to its original condition. Thus the Renaissance and the Reformation were not consciously, as they were actually, the originators of a new life, but the restorers of an old one. They did not want something new, they wanted the old and nothing but the old. It was in the seventeenth century, with the advance of the Enlightenment, that the new became fully con-

scious of its own nature: old and new became clearly separated, and it was inevitable that a middle period (*medium ævum*) should be interpolated between the two, and hence the name "middle ages." Thus was invented the usual division of history, subject to all the defects which are inseparable from divisions of this kind, but nevertheless an unavoidable necessity. But at the same time it was recognized that human existence is in motion. The modern period could not enforce its own right to exist without breaking with the traditional doctrine of persistence.

It is not for us to consider now how the idea of movement has made its way more and more into the different departments of life, and how everything which stood in opposition to it, and finally even organic forms, have been brought under its category. At present we are concerned only with the general nature of life and work. And here the most significant feature is the change in the fundamental presupposition, as compared with earlier schemes of life,

a change which becomes continually more evident. To the Greeks the world presented itself, in spite of all the movement that goes on, as a ready-made and rounded-off whole, and on their view there was no necessity for any essential alteration. Christianity, on the other hand, which estimated things from the moral point of view, found the world full of error and guilt, and indeed burdened with a pervading contradiction, a contradiction so grave that its solution could not be expected from any movement on the part of the world itself, but only from some supra-mundane power. The main stream of modern thought does not acknowledge any such dualism: it is inclined to connect the divine with the world and to merge the one completely in the other in a monistic system of thought. But if in this it approached the ancient view, there is the essential difference that now the world is not thought of as a finished product but as in a state of becoming, and that it calls upon man to act on his own

account to a far greater extent than did the earlier schemes of life. Philosophical thought thus understands the world as the whole of being, which strives to attain its highest level by its own movement. The double conviction that the world, as we have it, is extremely imperfect, and that it is making sure and certain progress towards perfection, changes the whole tone of life and the nature of work in important particulars, as compared with earlier periods. If it was formerly the task of science to distinguish and emphasize permanent forms in the transitory series of sensible phenomena, and to show that the perfect form is the directing power and final goal of movement, we now find that the significance of time for the production of reality meets with full recognition. The important point is to make the existing state of things completely intelligible by following its evolution from the very beginning, and thus win for man more power over things. For the man who begins by understanding the evolution of things is able to

intervene in their formation, and can direct them to human ends. When knowledge therefore ceases to be a contemplation of reality, and becomes a re-creation, it comes into closer connection with life and increases its activity. Science is the leader in the movement towards subjecting the world to the human spirit.

The new life does not accept any part of the existing condition of things as absolutely unchangeable. Even in the case of the most difficult problems it holds out the hope of a better future. One task is no sooner finished than another comes into sight; everywhere we see the capacity for increase, unlimited possibilities are disclosed. In the first place, man in his own nature appears capable of progress, and not bound down to a fixed endowment of nature. For nothing appears more characteristic of a reasonable being than an indwelling of infinite life and effort. Hence no definite limit is set to its powers, but they seem to be able to grow and to keep on growing. And

further, both political and economic life seem to be capable of progress to an unlimited extent. This progress seems to take two directions: firstly, the getting rid of all irrationality from human affairs, as far as possible, and the progressive transformation of our existence into a kingdom of reason, and, secondly, the effort to ensure as far as possible to all individual members of the community a share in material as well as in spiritual goods. And since spiritual work in all its ramifications is in a state of movement, the idea of progress determines to a continually increasing extent the general character of life. Since movement continually breaks down more and more all the goals which lie ahead of it, and fashions them afresh according to its changing needs, movement itself, gathering force as it goes, comes more and more to be the chief content of life. Finally it will have nothing beyond itself; the increase of power becomes the supreme ideal, which is bound to come into violent collision with the old ideal of giving

form to things. As Hegel says, "becoming is the truth of being."

Movement cannot win control over life in this way, or even claim to control it, without overcoming the irregularity which had hitherto clung to it and subjected it to severe reproach. It must show that it possesses in itself stability and coherence, and is moving in a fixed direction. Movement fulfils these conditions when it becomes evolution. For the conception of evolution makes all the different phases into steps in one progressive movement, in which one part is connected with another, and all contribute to one general result. But this conception of evolution can extend over the whole of reality and shape it in a single mould. It is precisely the thinkers generally regarded as the leading representatives of modern thought who have given a particularly impressive exposition of the idea of evolution conceived cosmically. It is thus with Leibniz and his innumerable monads, all of them moving with slowly but surely increasing

rapidity, the summation of whose progress amounts to an unceasing advance of reason. It is so with Hegel, according to whom the movement of the universe progresses by means of a constant succession of contradictions, which arise and are overcome. Every individual thing, according to its particular nature, must plunge into the stream of becoming, but it is permanently preserved in that stream as an element in the universal. But the whole conception of movement in the modern sense has been most powerfully expressed by the poet:

"In the currents of Life, in Action's storm,
I wander and I wave,
Everywhere I be!
Birth and the grave,
An infinite sea,
A web ever growing,
A life ever glowing,
Thus at Time's whizzing loom I spin,
And weave the living vesture that God is mantled in."[1]

Such changes give rise to a new relation between time and eternity, and at the same

[1] *Faust*, Sc. I. Sir T. Martin's translation.

time alter the value assigned to the present. But a closer view soon shows that the modern period does not speak with one voice on the subject, that the idea of evolution is itself evolved, and has passed through three chief phases. The first phase owes its origin to religion, and especially to religious speculation, as it begins with Augustine and is continued by philosophical mysticism. Just as the world in its diversity is conceived of as a representation, an unfolding of the divine unity, so the course of time is an unfolding of eternal being. Time cannot thus become an expression of eternity without itself gaining in significance, and being co-ordinated to a greater degree into a continuous whole. Here everything that happens in time gains its content and value from eternity, and hence remains directed beyond its immediate existence towards eternity. In mysticism, too, the soul of man, though it participates in the work of the world, retains a profound peace untouched by the confusion of the world. The next phase

has both an artistic and a speculative aspect. It brings the eternal more and more into the world as we know it, and there finally merges it completely. The movement of reality is conceived of as the unfolding of an all-embracing being, which thereby first attains to complete realization. Goethe has given the most impressive exposition of the artistic aspect, and Hegel of the philosophical. On this view life is not referred beyond itself to a transcendental being, but every individual manifestation stands within the life of a whole and is controlled by it. In this way life can gain depth in itself, and in the stream of time can grasp that which is above time. As Goethe said, the moment can become a representative of eternity. The final phase of the doctrine of evolution is when it reaches the level of natural science and Positivism. In this phase everything which makes any claim to eternity is placed entirely behind the process of life, and this vital process is regarded as consisting almost entirely of the movement and displacement of the elements.

Then everything that takes place happens in a single plane, and is entirely exhausted in being what it is; it has in no way to represent or to serve anything that exists behind itself. Hence there can be no question as to its having any sort of meaning. In this view life falls asunder completely into a mere juxtaposition of individual processes and a succession of moments, which may to a certain extent be summed up but do not form an inwardly connected system.

These phases do not merely follow one another. The second in particular maintains its position alongside the third, but the main tendency of the movement is to concentrate itself more and more upon the sphere of immediate existence and to reject all persistence with ever greater vigour. At the same time there is outlined with increasing sharpness a particular type of life which fully develops the opposition between the old and the new way of life. On the earlier view, the highest aim was to live one's life from the side of eternity,

and to retain in life the presence of something eternal. But now the aim is to bind up life as closely as possible with the stream of time and the changing moment. Formerly, unchangeable ideals were held up for the guidance of action. Every enterprise had to be measured by these ideals and to conform to them, but now they are felt as intolerably narrow and oppressive; equal rights and the fullest freedom are demanded for everything which aspires and struggles upwards. Thus life is subject to incessant change; but the more it changes and the less it marks time and stagnates, the higher it seems to stand. Such mobility gives it immeasurably more freedom and fulness, freshness, and intimacy. And the individual departments of life are subject to similar changes. Education undergoes an essential change in that man is not now required to be educated for an ideal which transcends time, but for the needs of his own period. Legislation has no longer to enforce uniform demands, but must correspond to the existing situation

and unreservedly follow its changes. In such a connection the conception of modernity gains a peculiar significance and power of attraction. If life is to be a success, the chief requisite seems to be, not to cling tenaciously to the old but to seize the fleeting and transitory moment, to make the most out of it, and to adapt one's life continually to it. It is only if we do so that it seems to become entirely our own life and to attain to what in this connection can be called truth. Thus we get rid of all rigidity; values become fluid, and the stream of things carries off everything in its course.

But what we thus desire for ourselves we must also grant to other periods; we cannot understand them from our point of view, we must try to understand them from their own; we cannot measure them by an absolute standard, but by that which they set themselves to attain. Hence our historical judgments are only relative, and man develops the faculty of placing himself completely at

the point of view of all past systems, of reconstructing them and re-living them. Life thus gains an inmeasurable breadth and unlimited elasticity; whatsoever moves mankind seems also to belong to us.

But all the advantages which result from such mobility of life, such flexibility and adaptability on the part of the human spirit, have a reverse side, which may not necessarily affect the individual but spiritual work as a whole. All spiritual work needs co-ordination of the diversity of things, and control of our first impressions. It is impossible if the stream of phenomena carries man hither and thither like a plaything; it needs a fixed standpoint, and can only find it in opposition to the disintegration which we have described. Hence, in spite of the mobility of life, the creative efforts of the modern period have been eagerly directed from the beginning towards finding some sort of fixed point, from which the realm of movement might be understood and controlled. The only question is whether the

modern period has found such a fixed point and turned it to account, whether it could find it at all in the circle of life which it marked off.

There are two ways in particular in which the modern period has sought to meet the advance of movement by something that is fixed: firstly, from the standpoint of philosophy, and, secondly, from the standpoint of natural science. Thought in the one case and natural law in the other, both of which are themselves exempt from all change, seemed to promise a sure support for the whole of life.

Modern philosophy begins when Descartes turns from the overthrow of all tradition and the uncertainty of the existence of the external world, to the thinking ego as the Archimedean point, the existence of which no one can doubt. But when Descartes carries out his method in detail, it appears that it is not so much the individual point as thought itself which is to lead the investigator to certainty. What is clear and distinct for thought may be regarded

by us as truth. But thought could not recognize anything as clear and distinct if it were merely an empty vessel or a mass that yielded to every stimulus. For this purpose it must possess a fixed original endowment, and this endowment was thought to consist of indwelling truths, the so-called innate ideas (*ideæ innatæ*). Only with such an endowment could it oppose the stream of phenomena, and undertake to reshape the previous condition of things according to its own requirements. It was not only thinkers like Spinoza and Leibniz who defended such eternal truths with complete confidence. Kant was really defending them in another form when he maintained that all experience and all change necessarily presuppose a persistent intellectual structure of the mind. The whole of the Enlightenment also presupposes them when it endeavours to test everything that is handed down to it as to its reasonableness, and, if it cannot stand this test, to reject it or transform it. Through such a challenge to prove its

rights before a timeless reason, the whole of life is vigorously shaken up, sifted, and renewed; a culture which rests on a basis of reason advances in cheerful confidence to oppose the culture resting on history which had till then held the field. Thought thus becomes the measure of all things and the fixed point in the transitory series of phenomena. The conception of the nature and function of thought has undergone many changes in the course of the centuries, but it is a characteristic of the whole of modern culture that it assigns to thought that stablishing and regulating function for which it looked first to the universe and later on to the Deity. The struggle of thought to appropriate the whole range of reality and to bring it under its own laws is the chief movement of modern times.

But although much has been accomplished in the struggle, the result has not been an absolute victory. The carrying out of the undertaking was met by difficulties both from within and from without: from within, because

the foundation of thought itself gave rise to grave doubts and difference of opinion; from without, because the immeasurable extent of the field of history offered an obstinate resistance to being enveloped and controlled by thought, and rejected more and more decisively all such attempts. Who is the vehicle of thought, where does it arise, and where is its centre of activity? Descartes and the Enlightenment had no scruples in making the individual the vehicle of thought, thus presupposing an essential equality of reason in all individuals. If this presupposition is contested, and it soon was, then the universal validity of truth, and truth itself, is overthrown. Kant met such doubts by the assumption of an intellectual structure of the human mind anterior to all difference of individuals, which comes to light in great products—above all, in the construction of scientific experience and the development of the moral law. But doubts may easily arise as to whether these products are to be relied on, and are capable

of only one interpretation, and these doubts will then extend to the common structure of the mind. When Hegel finally raised thought to the position of an all-embracing and all-moving cosmic power, he thereby surrendered all connection with the immediate life of the soul, and attributed to the mind of man a complete absoluteness which was bound to meet with the strongest opposition, especially in the nineteenth century, with its growing knowledge of the strict and narrow limits within which man is confined. Hence we are met by the dilemma that thought is either closely bound up with man and is involved in all the uncertainty and fragmentariness which cling to human existence, or else that it casts loose from the connection with man, overstrains its own powers, and, emulating the bold flight of Icarus, finally plunges into the void.

Still more comprehensible than this inner perplexity is the resistance offered by historical life to the claim to control it made by a thought that transcends time. This opposi-

tion is met with at an early period, and the advance of historical modes of thought strengthens it. The experience of history shows with continually increasing clearness that the differences and changes of the periods not only extend to the inner depths of the soul but also affect the shaping of thought, that, at the most, certain elementary forms are of universal occurrence, which however are of no importance for the content of life. Hegel made a magnificent attempt to construct a world out of the forms themselves, and to bring into this structure the whole of historical reality. But not only do the living contents and the individuality of the historical structures fade away in Hegel's philosophy of history, but there also arises the strongest contradiction between history and the necessary demands of thought. Thought cannot take a general view of history without detaching itself from it and treating it as already closed. But this does away with the possibility of all further movement, and history is inwardly destroyed. But

if history preserves the right of unlimited progress, then thought, from the point of view of history, will be seen to be merely the expression of a particular time, "time grasped in thought." But then one period has the same right as another, and this does away with the possibility of thought being able to co-ordinate and illuminate history. If the first alternative leads to an intolerable fixity, the second leads to a no less intolerable relativity. For the great majority of mankind the movement of history has broken through the scheme imposed upon it, has gained a victory over timeless thought, and has vindicated the rights of relativity. Thought has thus been unable to make good its claim to raise life of itself to the level of that which is fixed and eternal.

But still less successful is the attempt to do so from the side of nature, with the help of the conception of law. Modern investigation has transferred the persistent quality of nature from composite structures to the

elements and their modes of action—natural laws are nothing else. This transference is no doubt a fact of the highest importance, but it does not mean that persistence is surrendered, only that it is carried further back. But even if these laws of nature could be simply transferred to the spiritual life, they would not solve our problem. For although the course of events may follow simple fundamental forms, this does not give life any inner coherence, and does not direct the diversity of things to common ends. The reign of law would still leave us defenceless against the changing currents of life. We may all think in accordance with the same logic, and yet, under the influence of different interests and apperception - masses, reach fundamentally different results. Using the same forms of thought we may reach more and more widely divergent conclusions.

Hence we are convinced that the element of fixity, which the modern period on its own ground opposes to movement, is either itself

involved in conflict and movement, or else, so far as it is incontestable, does not satisfy the demands of the spiritual life and does not guarantee us the necessary support for our struggles and aspirations. The general result then is that the movement which emerges in the modern period does not find in it any sufficient counterpoise, that it is therefore bound to advance further and further with elemental force, and to destroy everything that still offers resistance. The same result is further promoted by the rapid acceleration of life on its external side—an acceleration which the latest period has carried out, and will carry out to a continually increasing extent, by quickening the means of intercourse, facilitating the communication of ideas, massing men in large aggregates, etc. Hence it is quite conceivable that within the movement itself the more uncompromising forms are more and more displacing the milder; that all the persistent elements offered by the older conceptions tend to be slurred over and lost,

and, in particular, that persistent basis which the genuine theory of evolution supplied by its conception of a universal life gradually unfolding itself. Life becomes more and more an incessant change, a constant letting go and beginning again, a following of every fresh attraction, a floating away with the stream of things. If it is thus transferred entirely into the immediate present, as we saw, if it is freed from all the pressure of the past, and gains an agility and capacity for change which were formerly unknown, then it flatters itself that, with this movement towards modernity, it has attained the summit of the ages.

But here, too, the rule is verified that the external victory, the complete permeation of the world by life-forces, is usually the beginning of a counter-movement, that the very exclusiveness of success sets limits, and that what is outwardly still advancing in triumph, may thus be felt inwardly as inadequate and even intolerable. The turn of the tide first becomes noticeable in a sudden revulsion of

vital feeling, which completely alters the value ascribed to change. At first it seemed that the setting of life in motion, the stimulus to the powers, the continual production of fresh images, the opening up of ever fresh aims, the unbounded possibilities, were all pure gain; life seemed to be made individual in a higher degree, and man to be brought incomparably nearer to himself. The individual may still retain this estimate so far as, concerned only with his own welfare, he throws himself into the stream of life and seeks to advance on his way. But, as a thinking being, he cannot help reflecting on the whole, and asking the question, in all this excitement and strain, in all this toil and work, what is gained for the whole? And if he does not covertly bring in other bodies of thought to make up the deficiency, he cannot fail to recognize the inner emptiness and meaninglessness of this life, the break-up of all connections. Hitherto men had seen only one side of movement, the inexhaustible wealth of novelties to which

it gave rise: they had not seen the other side, their equally rapid disappearance, and the unsubstantiality of the inner life that results from such coming and going. A life of nothing but change cannot look forward to the future with any joy or certainty, for where there are no persistent aims, the future, as regards its spiritual character, is hid in deep obscurity, and we cannot tell whether to-morrow may not bring a complete revolution. Such a life has no fixed past, and therefore no history, for the constant change places things perpetually in a different light; it is bound to make our past character and actions seem as if they did not belong to us, our own selves dissolve into a kaleidoscopic succession of pictures. And least of all has such a life any genuine present; a present which is spiritual in its nature. For mere time is not sufficient for such a present; the time must also be filled with a content such as only persistent and co-ordinating aims can give it. But the absolute movement which we have

described resolves life into smaller and smaller pieces, indeed into separate moments; every attempt to grasp the present results in nothing better than mere opinion, the shadow of a present. Hence, as a general rule, if this life does not experience any sort of counteracting influence, it threatens in spite of all its activity to become a mere hankering after life, a half-life or phantom-life. We may add a fact which has been too often described to detain us now, viz., that the breaking-up of all connections inevitably hinders the inner elaboration of impressions and experiences, drives life and effort more and more to the surface, and makes them to a continually increasing extent defenceless and dependent on externals. There is the further fact that the different movements in the different departments easily come into conflict and find themselves at cross purposes, not only as between different men but also within the individual himself. If this is really the case, it can be easily understood how men grow tired and weary of all the rush and

bustle, which is so confused and yet in the end so empty, how this feeling of weariness spreads and produces a longing for more persistence, more peace and repose in life. It is a remarkable feature of the present day that the old mysticism is regaining its power of attraction, and that the Indian religions, which release men from the cares and troubles of time, are gaining many adherents also in the West. Is not this to be connected with the change in vital feeling which we have described?

Now, such a change does not prove much in itself; it may, after all, be merely a part of the irregular ebb and flow to which mere movement reduces life. It can only be of use in so far as it enables us to take a more unprejudiced view of the whole problem, and free ourselves from the one-sidedness of our previous estimate. And this is in fact what usually happens in human life. Movements emerge, seize upon men's minds, and carry them irresistibly away. Men perceive only

the results of these movements, their progress, their general direction; they do not see their limitations, their presuppositions, the problems and, may be, the contradictions which emerge on a closer view. Hence they are proof against all attack, and no demonstration of their deficiencies and faults can affect them. No amount of sober reflection is of avail against the condition of intoxication with which they fill mankind. But in the end some limitation is felt, and then the movement's power of attraction quickly disappears. All the problems which it involved now stand out clearly, and the next step is to underestimate, and in fact to treat unfairly, what was so long overestimated. We are experiencing to-day just such a reversal of opinion with regard to the attempt to reduce life to mere movement. It is a change which is first felt in the higher strata of the intellectual atmosphere, and not among the great majority of people who lag behind any movement and believe that something has come

into existence when it has at last attracted their notice. We are becoming more and more clearly aware of the presupposition on which alone this belief in movement could take upon itself the guidance of the whole of life. The presupposition is that movement is a sure and constant ascent, that it can, out of its own resources, overcome all the obstacles which it meets with or produces out of itself: on this view it can never give rise to complications against which it is defenceless. In so far as this widens out to a general view of the world and history, it involves the demand not only that our reality shall be rational in its ultimate nature, but also that man shall be able to make himself absolutely certain of it. Rationalism and optimism are here indispensable. But optimism has not only aroused many misgivings when looked at from without: from within, also, it very easily appears superficial and untrue. We see clearly before our eyes the hard and pitiless struggle for existence both in nature and among men,

the constraint and insecurity of spiritual life in the world in which we live, but, above all, the insufficiency of man for the spiritual tasks on which the value of his existence depends, the wide interval between genuine spiritual culture and what men like to call culture. If we take a general view, human existence seems to be a grave contradiction. And, when we come to the more detailed shaping of existence, we begin to doubt the presupposition which underlies the interpretation of history as an evolution that becomes more and more rational, viz., the presupposition that movement starts from a fixed point and makes sure progress towards its goal, that any doubt which may arise only concerns details and cannot call in question movement as a whole. For the present state of opinion, with its complete uncertainty as to the final aims of man and the meaning of his existence, is sufficient proof that doubt does extend to the whole, and that the whole, if it is to have any influence upon us, requires on our part a continuous act of

recognition and appropriation. But if this is the case, then evolution cannot be the last word: action and decision must come before evolution. And at the same time we clearly see what difficulties lie in the relation between action and evolution, and how easily evolution can come into collision with the fundamental conception of history. Where evolution prevails, the order of the whole prescribes what is to be done at each point, and the direction to be followed: there is no choice and no freedom of decision. But without these there can be no history in the specifically human sense. To talk of historical evolution is, properly speaking, an absurdity. Where there is evolution there is no real history, and where there is history there is no evolution. For if we are to have history, the individual must have freedom of decision, but this is excluded by evolution.

But, above all, the very attempt to deny it only demonstrates with greater clearness and cogency the old truth that there can be no

real spiritual life unless it is raised above time, that otherwise the true is subordinated and sacrificed to mere opinion, the good to mere utility, and, generally, all independent spirituality to the trivial round of merely human activities. Man, too, in the end cannot tolerate such distortion of the spiritual life, for it deprives everything which distinguishes him from nature of its end and meaning, and condemns his life to absolute emptiness. Emptiness, however, is more difficult to bear than pain. Hence the craving after happiness drives us continually to renew our demand for a truth which transcends time, and forces spiritual work, and philosophy in particular, to seek ways of securing it.

When faith in the power of modern movement thus disappears, and a craving after some fixed content of life is re-awakened, the medieval system of the Roman Catholic Church may seem likely to solve our difficulties and may summon mankind to return to its fold. We found that this was the case when

we were considering the problem of finding connections in life. But such a return could only satisfy a few tired and faltering souls, for whom the visible and tangible is at the same time the spiritually certain: it is not capable of satisfying the demands of the spiritual life. Medieval thought rested on the presupposition and conviction that the height of human achievement in every sphere had been already reached, that there could be nothing essentially new. But this presupposition has been obviously refuted by the whole course of the modern period, with its fundamental transformation of human existence. The man who, to avoid flatly contradicting the evidence of his senses, would perhaps be willing to recognize movement outside of religion, and only wished to deny its existence inside, would by this means divide human life into two contrary species, and would assign our efforts to fundamentally different motives and feelings. He would produce an inner discord in the soul, which is

fatal to the vigorous conduct of life, and absolutely foreign to the middle ages, which extended the tendency to persistence over the whole of life. Thus at that time religion could be regarded as in its whole extent exempt from all change only because men unhesitatingly accepted it, just as it was, as an undivided whole, because they had no insight into its gradual growth and the conditions of this growth. Only thus could it be entirely separated from the human sphere and regarded as a pure revelation of God. But now the scientific study of history has brought this department also under its sway, and proved how it was shaped in detail, very gradually at first, and under the strong influences of human needs, interests, and ideas. It is to confuse the human and the divine, and to do the divine a grave injustice, if for that system, which has in great part been recognized as human and temporal, a veneration is demanded which is the due of the divine and the eternal alone. Hence we

cannot solve our present perplexities by a return to the middle ages.

But what is true of the middle ages applies to all the epochs and achievements of the past. They may help us on our way if we have an independence of our own to oppose to them, and if we can thus transmute them into our own life, but they are quite incapable of compensating us for the loss of independence. We are very fond to-day of evading the urgent problems of the present by seizing upon some culminating point of the past, by according to it unconditional veneration and absolute devotion, and then using it as a basis from which to supplement and consolidate the present. In doing so we usually emphasize the points of contact and minimize the differences, but we forget that the present situation sets us problems which are far too specific and far too pressing to admit of being solved or even essentially advanced by such indirect means. This recourse to history, which is evident to-day in

all departments of spiritual work, yields at the best only a substitute for a real life of our own. A substitute is certainly better than nothing, but it produces the illusion that we possess the real thing when we are inwardly poor, and it threatens to limit our life to half truths, and indeed untruths.

There is only one way left to overcome our present perplexities: humanity must go on with its independent work, it must use its own powers to bring about a new situation. The demand for a new type of life and a new type of culture becomes more and more insistent; as the present crisis owes its origin to the whole of life, so it can be overcome only by a further development of the whole. The work of philosophy can only be helpful in this connection in so far as it takes its place in such a general movement, receives a stimulus from it, and exercises a return influence over it. But within the whole, its first task is to get rid of the illusion of finality, to open up the way for wider possibilities,

and to restart the movement which intrinsic causes have brought to a standstill. But this task lent a particular value to a survey of universal history, as in general, so also in particular in connection with the problem of persistence and change: it has given us a wider view, it has revealed the most diverse relations and demands which our existence involves, it can use the experience gained in the general movement of history to point out to our own work more definite lines of attack.

The general movement of history has not steadily followed one line with regard to our problem, but has swung completely round. The striving after persistence was predominant at first, and established its position more and more firmly in the course of time, until its own activity came to a complete standstill. When the modern period began, movement gained the ascendancy and transformed all standards and values. But the experience of mankind left no doubt that the exclusive, or even the partial predominance of movement

gravely endangers the spiritual character of life: thus a reconciliation of the two tendencies becomes an urgent requirement. But this reconciliation is impossible, as is sufficiently shown by the study of history, if both meet on the same plane and are brought into immediate contact. For then rest relegates movement to an entirely secondary position, and condemns life to stagnation, or else movement makes itself master of the whole sphere and tends towards the break-up of all fixity. It is impossible to escape this dilemma unless a division and inner expansion of reality takes place, which brings rest and movement not into an oppositional but into a complementary relationship. This is, however, hardly attainable otherwise than by a sharper separation between spiritual life and human existence. Spiritual life needs to be clearly thrown into relief against human conditions in order to preserve its independence and transcendence of time, which are indispensable to its substance. In such a separation, to be sure, this substance

must not entirely disappear from the ken of man: it must somehow be a part of his own nature, and it must gradually work itself out from the indeterminateness of its beginning and allow us to take full possession of it, if this separation is to give rise to a particular kind of life. It would not be of much help to us if we could only open up the depths of our being with difficulty, and get a glimpse of them as in a dream; we must be able to place ourselves immediately in them and share in their contents if our life is to undergo differentiation, gain thereby an inner breadth, and at the same time overcome the opposition between persistence and movement. But here movement is also indispensable, for the appropriation of these depths needs much hard work and toil, which is subject to the conditions of time, and can only advance very gradually. But a movement of this kind has a fixed goal and a history. It is directed towards a spiritual substance and serves to promote the unfolding of a persistent truth: it cannot be a

mere succession of periods of time; it becomes a gradual movement away from time, and a progressive construction of a present which transcends time. When history is of this kind, our study of it need not helplessly follow the succession of periods, but can distinguish in the contents of history what belongs to the mere temporal situation from that which is eternal in its nature and can exercise a permanent influence. Such a study of history may lead to a deliverance from mere history, and to the revelation of a present which transcends time.

But such a treatment of history cannot arise and make its way unless we grant that the world and human existence contain greater depths than are evident at first sight. The contradiction, that a truth which transcends time appears and plays a part in this world, which is in a state of becoming, can only be resolved if this world has an eternal order behind it, and, along with everything in it which is spiritual in its nature, serves to pro-

mote the unfolding of this order. If such depths are present in our world, in human creative efforts also we can distinguish a spiritual substance from everything which is merely temporal, and the apprehension of this substance enables us to overcome mere time. Then, particularly in the case of all that is great, we can recognize through the veil of time a life and work which transcends the world and is valuable for all ages. Hardly anyone at the present day will profess his adherence to the doctrines which such a personality as Plato formulated, or the practical proposals which he made. But if, in spite of this, we hold Plato in the highest honour, and treat him as a living and powerful influence among us at present, we only do so because we recognize a creative power and a particular shaping of life, which may be called Platonic, and which was embodied in time in Plato's doctrines and proposals, but was by no means exhausted in them. The same is true also of general movements of historical life. In many

ways we are out of sympathy not only with the ideas and dogmas of early Christianity, but also with the contemporary feelings and tone, but this does not in the least degree exclude the possibility that the revelation of spiritual life accomplished by it should preserve an indestructible freshness of youth and remain an ever-changing problem to the ages. Only, our life must not be lived on one plane in which temporal and eternal, merely human and spiritual, meet indiscriminately, but rather there must be an inner gradation in it, which takes place in virtue of the independence of the spiritual life—a gradation which distinguishes as well as re-unites spiritual substance and the human appropriation of it. As, in order to be fully possessed by man, this substance must first be acquired, a movement will arise here which, however, will not appear as an aimless journey to an infinite distance, but as a striving of life to return to itself, to raise and consummate its existence.

This new way of treating history, this

esoteric way, as it might be called, produces a radical change of view, which is also seen in connection with the problem of persistence and movement. Here, too, the earlier periods must not be regarded as a dead past, but as something which remains bound to us by a community of work, and co-operates with us towards the up-building of a present which transcends time. Ancient thought could make such a point of the persistent only because it regarded the condition of the world as normal and needing no essential change, and because it believed that life was to be satisfied solely and entirely by its own efforts in raising itself to the status of a perfect work of art. Later experience has shown that this conclusion was premature, and that, in particular, human life contains far too many complications and contradictions to form at once a harmonious whole. But, however much these facts compel us to go beyond anything which the ancients attained or attempted, they do not invalidate the main motive of these en-

deavours. Faith in the ultimate rationality of reality is the permanent basis of all spiritual life and effort: otherwise it immediately loses its support and is bound to collapse. Equally indestructible is the thought that life has to seek satisfaction not in the attainment of any external good but in its own unfolding and activity. Although the exact nature of the activity may have to be differently conceived, and the goal may recede to a far greater distance, the fundamental thought is indispensable if life is to be completely independent and really self-sufficient.

Christianity destroyed this restful optimism, and threw mankind into a state of great agitation, by revealing grave disorders in the state of the world and life. The deepest root of these disorders was found in the ethical situation, and the struggle against such perversions was made the cardinal point of life. It has often laid these disorders too directly to the charge of the individual; it has applied ethical considerations too directly to the whole

breadth of the universe; it has not developed its own power of affirmation to its utmost capacity, and, under the influence of periods of exhaustion, it has been too ready to dictate its own permanent form. But whatever changes may be necessary in the traditional order, the great revolution remains irreversible which delivered life from the sway of all merely natural processes, made a real history possible, and, by the opposition of affirmation and negation, stirred life to its foundations. The peaceful and even course of human existence is thus destroyed for ever: the new problems which are raised can never again disappear.

We saw how the modern period began by giving complete recognition to movement, but we also saw this exaggerated to such an extent that movement was to produce all the contents of life. This attempt was bound to miscarry, but such a failure must not make us forget for a moment that it was this feature in life which first brought into prominence not only the

incompleteness of human existence but also its capacity for progress, and thus gave an immense impulse to our efforts. This has brought about a new situation: we may perhaps struggle and rise above it, but we cannot simply treat it as if it had never existed.

All these different facts call for recognition at the present day, and prevent all immediate recurrence to one particular period. If they are to be reconciled with one another, not by a superficial compromise, but by coming to an understanding with one another, we must considerably extend the frame-work of our life and re-shape the vital process. It is obvious that this is impossible without the vigorous co-operation of philosophy, without the help which it can give by opening up the way and sketching the country to be traversed. The perplexities of life necessarily drive us back to philosophy and set it new problems.

But philosophy will hardly be able to help in this work if, in dealing with these questions,

it does not make use of the experiences of the general movement of history and gain therefrom definiteness of direction. Above all, it must seek for itself some fixed standpoint, and the experience of history has shown that it can hope to find this standpoint not in a being beyond the process of life but only in that process itself. This process again it cannot understand as the evolution of a unit confronting the world: it must lay hold of the life of the world in the very process itself. Such a world-life, however, cannot be reached by a freely ranging thought, but only by a self-centred spirituality, which partakes of the essence of things and moulds reality. Such a spirituality rises above the activities of the individual faculties, and also shows in great detail the task which thought has to accomplish and the direction it has to take. Hence philosophy cannot turn immediately to the universe; it must first strive to deepen life by introspection, and then try to discover connections in life, and root itself firmly in them. It

is only after such a strengthening process that it is equal to dealing with the world around us. Since, however, these connections in life are not immediately apparent to us, but are only revealed by means of work and struggle with resisting influences, it follows that we are involved in movement of all kinds, and need have no fear of relapsing into a permanent state of dull inactivity. But if in our search we are encompassed by spiritual connections and guided by spiritual necessities, if the spiritual life itself affords a firm foundation which is at the same time the highest goal of human endeavour, and if in this way what is a certain fact becomes at the same time a difficult task, then life, with all its movement, will not lose itself in uncertainty; however much it may appear to be struggling towards an uncertain and distant goal, it remains in the end occupied with itself and anchored in its own being. But if philosophy sets itself the task of giving a scientific form to its fundamental vision, and deducing a corresponding line of

conduct, it is then equal to dealing with the opposition between rest and movement; it can then reconcile the eternal and the temporal, and can use them both to raise life to a higher level.

CHAPTER III.

The Outer World and the Inner World.

Nothing drives man to philosophy with more urgency than a contradiction which arises within himself and makes him uncertain as to his own life and nature. We first find that we are sentient beings and form part of a visible world, from which we receive a constant series of impressions and which makes continual demands on us. But, at the same time, introspection teaches us that we have no direct experience of external things, but only of our own subjective states, and that therefore what confronts us as an external reality must be evolved from within. Hence two realms arise which cannot be directly co-

ordinated, and each strives to subordinate the other to itself, and indeed, as far as possible, to absorb it. The sensible world treats the life of the soul as a by-product, a mere reflection and shadow; the psychical world, on the other hand, is inclined to degrade the sensible to a mere appearance which is purely subjective. According as we decide in favour of one or the other, our whole view of life will be completely altered: different goods will attract us, different aims will control us, and this may easily be exaggerated to the antinomy that what from the one point of view seems valuable and indispensable is from the other perverse and reprehensible. The one regards the increase of material happiness as the supreme good, the other looks upon it as hindering our efforts to attain the right goal: to the one, absorption in the inner world is the acme of life; to the other, it is a lapse into the vague and the vacuous. Where are we now to find out what we are and what we are not? This is a problem which can never be postponed

and handed over to the future. The urgency with which it calls for our decision is no less than our certainty that we are alive to-day, and wish to-day to attain satisfaction. Now our immediate impressions bring us to an irreconcilable opposition: we must therefore get beyond them, and what can be of any assistance to us except philosophy?

In reality philosophy has taken up the problem from the beginning, and all the more because the form which philosophy assumes depends very largely on the solution of this problem. But it is in the modern period that philosophy has devoted special attention to the subject. For the Enlightenment, with its violent separation between inner and outer, between what is conscious and what is extended, cleared the situation and sharpened the contrast. This made a definite solution a matter of urgency, and men sought to find it by making the problem the main subject of investigation and comparing the different solutions that were possible. It was easy to

take in these possibilities at a glance, and their number has not increased. The two worlds seem to be fundamentally different as regards their contents, and yet in real life inseparably bound up with one another. Which, then, is to take precedence, the maintenance of the specific character of each or their connection with one another? Where the first alternative is chosen the result is dualism. If, on the other hand, we emphasize the connection of the two, we must press on to a unity which transcends the opposition. There are thus three different ways of reaching a solution. The first regards the material world as the only reality, and attempts to derive all psychical life from it. On the second view, the psychical is the only world that exists, and contains the material world in it. The third strives to attain a unity embracing both sides, which are regarded as the unfolding, the expression, the manifestation of the unity. Hence, beside dualism we find materialism, spiritualism, and monism in the narrower sense

of the word. By removing the core of reality from one centre to another, each of these attempts places many things in a clearer light and co-ordinates much that is otherwise left incoherent. But each also meets with peculiar obstacles and must, in some way or other, try to overcome them. An enormous amount of effort is expended in doing so, but the struggle still goes on with varying success, and the adherents of each view show a continually recurrent capacity for believing that they can finally refute their opponents.

Dualism, with its separation between the material and the psychical worlds, is particularly calculated to display the specific character of each. It may boast of the clearness and definiteness of its conceptions, but it is flatly contradicted by a craving after unity, the existence of which is shown by our immediate perception of the close connection between body and soul; by art, which joins the material and the psychical in intimate union, and uses the one to enhance the other, and by

thought, which insists on the ultimate unity of the universe. In favour of materialism we have our immediate impressions and the stubbornness of the sensible world; its apparent simplicity and avoidance of all metaphysics: and the incontestable dependence of all psychical processes on physical conditions. But what has especially promoted its influence among men is the fact that, in the conflict of opinion, it is thought to furnish the sharpest weapon against the oppression of obsolete systems, against tyranny, illusion, and superstition. Materialism, however, is contradicted by the incommensurability of what proceeds from the soul, of the unity and inwardness of psychical life, with what takes place in the domain of matter and motion, and by the building up of a specifically spiritual life in the sphere of history and society. The fact that the external world recedes into the background and that its existence becomes uncertain as the result of epistemological reflection, is also opposed to materialism. From this point of

view it is impossible to hide from ourselves that nature, as we see it, does not come to us from the outside as a ready-made fact, but that it starts from our own thinking, and, under the influence of our intellectual organization, takes on the shape in which it lies before us. In fact, the failure to recognize that we do not find the world but mould it and build it up from ourselves as centres, threatens to reduce materialism to a pre-scientific opinion. Spiritualism pursues the opposite course. It asserts the primacy of psychical experience and enforces its assertion, and it shows much energy in the logical working out of its fundamental conception. But it cannot succeed in making clear the specific character of the sensational element which contrasts with the purely inward experience of the soul. Even if the division is transferred to the soul itself, it is not thereby overcome, but, rather, is likely to become still more intolerable.

Monism seems to be the theory most consistent with our knowledge that neither series

can be reduced to the other, but that, at the same time, they require some sort of connection; for monism makes them different but parallel sides of a single more essential process. This provides for the unity and also preserves the difference; perfect equilibrium seems to have been reached of valuation and attunement. The only pity is that a keener examination soon shows that the opposition is only hidden and put in the background but not overcome. The parallelism between the two sides, which it is sought to reach, can never be attained. As soon as we pursue the fundamental conception somewhat further, we find that one side comes into prominence and relegates the other to a secondary position. We cannot study the historical forms of monism without becoming aware that they have approached, and finally passed over into, materialism or spiritualism, if indeed the two conceptions have not clashed and crossed in the same thinker. This was the case above all with Spinoza, whose Ethics starts from an

unmistakably materialistic basis and reaches spiritualistic conclusions. Thus monism sinks back into the very confusion which it aimed at avoiding.

We thus see that a twofold opposition pervades the whole problem: we dispute as to whether there is unity or multiplicity, and we dispute as to where the unity is to be found. The one problem involves the other, and the dispute separates men further and further instead of bringing them together. How often has one theory "refuted" the other! But the conquered and apparently annihilated theory has always risen up again with renewed power. Have all the "refutations" of materialism prevented it from being the most widely prevalent view at the present day, and in fact feeling itself master of the situation? Does not the fruitlessness of these learned disputes indicate that the discussions do not carry back the matter to the point of divergence—that this, rather, lies further back? Another indication pointing to the same

conclusion is the fact that each separate school has claimed a triumph over its special obstacles solely because it has had special views on what was of primary and what of secondary importance, because its general view involved a definite system of values. Hence its thought depended on the position it took up towards reality, and this, again, on the work, impressions, and experiences of the different individuals, and, in fact, of whole nations and periods. In the end it is the view which is taken of the whole of life which lays down the lines for thought and determines its direction.

Thus the problem is transferred from thought to life and assumes a new aspect. For if we ask whether life is to take up its position outside or inside and conform itself accordingly, it does not behove us to interpret an existing process, but first to call the process into being. For our life is not given us as a whole without our co-operation, but presents itself at first as a juxtaposition and succession of individual processes: the binding into a

whole is the work of the thinking and active spirit; it is an attempt, a venture, which must always justify itself. But, in the last resort, such justification is possible, not by any outward achievement, but only if the attempted solution co-ordinates all diversity and binds it into a single and unified life. This necessarily raises the whole of life to a higher level, and enables us to make completely our own the life which otherwise only streams past us. It is only such a synthesis, too, which can overcome the indeterminateness of the initial situation and give life a definite character.

There are different ways of carrying out this synthesis which our problem demands. In the first place, the world of the senses, which holds us so firmly in its embrace, which links us imperiously to itself by the obligation of waging a perpetual struggle for existence, may become the real scene of life. If so, all the peculiar powers of the human soul will rank merely as means and instruments to bring ourselves into closer relations with

the sensible world, to appropriate it more fully, to gain more profit from it than is possible at the stage of merely animal existence. But, on the other hand, the life of humanity in history and society has risen above the level of the senses: a non-sensuous life has appeared and continually develops richer and richer ramifications. Where the synthesis of the whole seeks its controlling centre in the new life, the sensible world will have to be subordinated and can only gain any value so far as it promotes the unfolding of this other life. This is the source of the main opposition—the opposition between a naturalistic and an idealistic basis for life and culture. But the relation between idealism and naturalism can assume two forms, and this gives rise to a further division. The new life which idealism stands for while rising superior to the sensible world may do one of two things. It may yet seek to preserve friendly relations and a close connection with the sensible world, or else it may stand out in sharp relief against

it, and venture on absolutely independent paths of its own. The former species of idealism may be called immanent, the latter supernatural. Hence the struggle centres principally round these three types, naturalism, immanent idealism, and supernatural idealism. Dualism, in the sense that there are two developments of life which run alongside without affecting one another, and only come into external contact, is excluded by the craving of life after unity; and this also excludes monism in the sense that there is a total life embracing two series running parallel courses in complete independence. The nearest approach to monism is made by immanent idealism, with its endeavour to reconcile the two worlds; while supernatural idealism, which strives, on the contrary, to hold the two worlds as far as possible apart, is most closely related to dualism. History, to be sure, and in particular the present day, shows a large amount of dualism in so far as men, and indeed whole periods, often distribute their efforts along

different lines, and incline here to a naturalistic and there to an idealistic mode of thought. But this is an error which men commit; it does not yield a new type of life, and need only occupy our attention incidentally.

Hence the spiritual struggle goes on between the leading types which we have described. But the course of the struggle is not what we might expect: it does not start from universal principles and from them go on to details, but there arise concrete syntheses of an absolutely individual nature. These syntheses have, of course, universal questions and answers behind them, in fact they radiate a world-philosophy; but above all they are characteristic facts in the life of the world, and it is from their individuality and actuality of achievement that they derive their power and significance. For it is only because they do not merely pore and brood over the conception of reality but vigorously set themselves to produce something real, that they can raise the level of our existence, open up depths

and powers in the spiritual life which before were hid, and help us to experiences which are of lasting value. It is also to be expected that, so far as there is any systematic connection in historical life, the later forms of this life should take up and make use of the experiences of the earlier, and that thus the experience of the world should be welded into a unified whole and a general level of spiritual evolution attained. Anyone who takes a general view of the whole process can see what particular form the different syntheses have given to the relation between the inner and the outer worlds, and what answer to the main problem has been involved in the construction of the synthesis; he can see what obstacles they met with and how they came to terms with them, what complications they fell into, and what further steps they were thus compelled to take; finally, he can see how the overthrow of one synthesis helped the rise of another, and how the whole process led to a continual enlargement of the circle of life. A

study of this kind is primarily historical in its nature, but it need not consist entirely in the unrolling of a succession of processes. For if the attempt is successful to decide, in what has been accomplished, between that which has grown out of special presuppositions and surroundings and that which reveals a permanent capacity, and perhaps also permanent limitations, of the spiritual life, then co-existence may take the place of succession; a present which transcends time may stand out in relief from the course of the ages, and seek to maintain its hold on all the real life which the different epochs have contributed.

The peculiar position which the modern period takes up towards our problem makes it a matter of urgency to survey the whole of history in the way we have described, and emphasize what is of permanent value. The traditional systematizations of life gave idealism an undoubted ascendency; for them it ranked as an incontestable and indeed self-evident truth. But now, in opposition to this

devotion to an invisible world, naturalism has more and more emphasized the importance of the visible world, and is thus pressing idealism further and further into the background. In addition, the onward movement of culture has shown the existence of much confusion within idealism itself, and it has been weakened by the fact that the new methods of studying history, with their keener criticism, have discovered much variation and inconsistency in the traditional idealistic forms of life which were formerly accepted without hesitation as homogeneous. But, in spite of everything, there are many obstacles in the way of naturalism. For idealism has cut its way too deeply into our convictions, efforts, and conceptions, to be likely to succumb at once to a bold assault. But, all the same, we have fallen into a state of great uncertainty; the existence of the invisible world has become doubtful and the visible world does not satisfy us. Such a state of uncertainty as to the direction which life ought to take must inevitably cripple its

power and joyousness. It is certain that the crisis can only be overcome by an actual further development of life; and it is equally certain that this development cannot come down from heaven to us, but must be set in motion by ourselves. For this purpose we cannot dispense with the active help of philosophy in clearing the way, taking bearings, and acting as pioneer. And if the immediate duty of philosophy in this connection is to free us from the contingency of the moment and to bring before us human experience in its utmost possible range, it will undoubtedly be a valuable contribution to this end if we carry out a critical scrutiny of the great syntheses of historical life, with their revelations and experiences.

We naturally begin our journey through history with the solution which our problem received when Greek life was at its culmination. Let us not forget for a moment that the average life of the time did not attain this height, but was in many ways sharply opposed

to it. This culminating period, however, welded life into an artistic whole, which in a pre-eminent degree embodies for us the system of immanent idealism. Here the artistic element is, above all, plastic in its nature: as regards its spiritual content, life is a transformation of reality into a whole endowed with soul, and therefore well ordered and clearly graded. This process of transformation has two opposite sources—on the one hand, spiritual activity, and, on the other, nature as perceived by the senses; but the two streams converge and unite to form a comprehensive vital process which finds its full satisfaction in itself. Here the spiritual is certainly the controlling element: it is the source of all movement, it revivifies and imposes form on the sensible. The latter, with its formlessness, may seem at first the exact antithesis of the spiritual, but to a deeper study it soon reveals itself as something which expects and struggles towards the ordering and quickening influence of spirit.

In this way both can meet as elements in a harmonious life, and the one can help the development of the other. For even the higher element, which imposes form on the lower, is not perfect and complete without the help of the other: it is only by the subjugation of matter that it attains the full measure of its own power, development, and perfection. This type of life gives both spiritual life and nature, to use these abbreviated expressions, a characteristic form and task, as it thus establishes a friendly co-operation between the two. The spiritual, however much it is raised above the sensible, does not sever itself from the one reality which embraces them both: it does not form for itself an inner life which neglects the world, but it finds its task in uniting and revivifying this world and raising it to a higher level. Hence in its inmost nature it is an incessant working and creating, virile power and joyous activity; its fundamental impulse thus seems to be towards the undeviating pursuit of the true and the

good. At the same time, however, the sensible, because of its close connection with the spiritual, remains indispensable at all its stages. Whatever stimulus to the senses life offers is recognized and retained; only it must fit in and subordinate itself to the whole; it must occupy a definite place and be bound by definite limits; but at the same time it will be purified and ennobled. Hence the characteristic and great achievement of this type of life is, above all, that it has brought together into the closest and most fruitful connection spirit and nature, form and matter, and has thus made the spiritual vividly near to us and raised the sensible to a higher level. Here all oppositions seem to be reconciled, all contradictions overcome; life is co-ordinated into a unified whole without detracting in any way from the diversity of things. Hence it can feel itself firmly established on its own basis and equal to dealing with all the complications of existence.

Such a type of life is seen among the Greeks

in its purest development in the sphere of plastic art. Nowhere else in the whole range of history is a world of spiritual objects and values brought so near to man in an immediate present; nowhere else are the visible and invisible worlds so closely interwoven. But philosophy also takes part in this movement, and does so in the first place, at least where it gives expression to the Greek mode of life in its purest form, by uniting the inner and outer world, under the control of the former, into a life which rests upon itself. It is Aristotle who gives the completest scientific expression to this view. But, apart from the particular contents of Greek philosophy, we find merely in the mode of its operation a unique reconciliation between the inner and the outer. For in it content and form are not separated, and thought is not left painfully struggling with a refractory matter, but the work of philosophy does not cease until it has overcome all contradiction and given a clear and exact representation of thought. Such

efforts on the part of philosophy have produced at all stages of the movement of history well-marked types of thought, which have indelibly impressed themselves on the consciousness of humanity.

A similar creative activity pervades the whole of Greek life. All the inner life that strives to find outward expression succeeds in gaining complete embodiment, and everything that is external has soul and shape put into it. It is this above all that gives rise to a coherent spiritual reality and lends the life which is here unfolded a wonderful power of attraction. Much that is temporal and particular may also come in, but the heart and core of the whole lies beyond all contingency and is capable of exercising a permanent influence. For here the primary phenomenon of the form makes itself clearly and strongly felt; the fact is convincing that, on a spiritual basis, the inner can mould itself on the outer and the outer can become an expression of the inner. This gives clear expression to a general experience of human

life, the experience that, in life, the inner is imperfect in many ways, and that it can pass from indefinite outline to definite shape only if it can find outward expression. In this connection the outer, far as it may fall short of being a factor with equal rights, yet seems indispensable in order to drive the inner to definite decision and complete organization; with its power of stimulation and reaction it is an important element in the process of life. All artistic creation proves the truth of this, and thereby furnishes, as Goethe said, the happiest assurance of the eternal harmony of existence. But the clearest proof of it is the indirect one from the experience of humanity. For wherever form has been despised and neglected, life has soon degenerated and finally sunk into barbarism. Form, with its close union of inner and outer, is indispensable in order to call forth spiritual life, bring it to full power, and make it penetrate the breadth of things. Hence it can be easily understood how it was possible that form should become

the central conception of a cult of immanent idealism.

But just as the creative efforts of the Greeks show us this at its highest, so their experience also proves the existence of many limitations and complications. These are bound to become objections and obstacles if the artistic order described above is taken as the final achievement and the whole of our life. In the first place, this solution contains presuppositions which are by no means self-evident. It can only form the highest achievement of life if the spiritual impulse is strong, and, with its superior powers, can subdue and shape the sensible world; if, in addition, the life of the senses is healthy, if its natural power to strive upwards is unspoilt, and if it willingly fits into the frame that is provided for it; and if, finally, the movements from the one to the other unite in ready and friendly fashion to form a common life. All together demand that life should attain a height which is only reached under special circumstances, and which deter-

mines the general character of existence only in rare periods, and then only for a spiritual aristocracy.

We also find complications in the fundamental nature of this artistic idealism, so far as it claims the direction of the whole of life. The unification of form and matter must not be a mere combination and arrangement of them. Their efforts to come together can only yield a spiritual content if form has a soul and can communicate it to the whole of its product. But whence is form thus endowed with soul? This leads to the further question, how are we to conceive in this connection of the position of spiritual life generally? If it possesses a superiority over the formative process, and if, in order to preserve the purity of the form, this superiority is vigorously emphasized, then there arise two worlds, as Plato clearly shows us. But this gives rise to enormous complications. If form, however, is to operate only within the process, as the tendency is, especially in the case of Aristotle,

then it threatens to lose in spiritual content and has difficulty in preserving its purity. Here we recognize the Achilles' heel of this artistic idealism. On one alternative it presupposes a large amount of inner life, which is self-contained and self-sufficing: in this case human life can hardly find complete satisfaction in mere systematization, mere art becomes too narrow for it. The second alternative is that the moulding and shaping are treated as complete ends in themselves: from this it is not far to the position that they are a mere embellishment of existence as it is given, a mere refinement of life, and thus they easily lose their significance. Thus the artistic solution points beyond itself to a further totality of life.

The later ages of antiquity place this problem before us in broad outline. The sensible and the spiritual, which were so closely united when creative effort was at its height, dissolve the union and diverge further and further. The spiritual tries more and more to acquire

a complete inwardness. The result of this tendency is that, with the vigorous co-operation of philosophy, first of all morality and then religion becomes independent. But, however much depth of soul is thereby won, and to however large an extent sense-existence finally sinks to a mere symbol, the spiritual life is able to give no effective content to the condition of inward isolation and self-sufficiency which it reaches. The main reason for this is that thought desires to produce a reality from itself, while as a matter of fact it only comes to forms and relations which strive to detach themselves from all perception, and float over reality like ill-defined shadows. In this way, to be sure, the spiritual wins a realm of its own, but its emptiness would be immediately perceived if religious feeling did not incessantly revivify and put warmth into the cold products of thought. But as culture becomes increasingly polished and subjective, the sensible element loses more and more the robustness of an earlier period and sinks into

feeble refinement, and indeed inward corruption. It is not to be wondered at that the spiritual life became hostile to the sensible, that men not only strove to repress the latter as far as possible, but that asceticism made this repression the main content of life. In spite of this change, the old ideal of the artistic shaping of life retains its influence in many directions, and form continues to rank as a conception of high value. But it only does so in opposition to the main stream of life, though the opposition passed unnoticed, and it cannot alter the fact that the classical harmony of the two worlds is transformed in the end into a sharp division. The whole course of Greek history presents us with the spectacle of the gradual retreat of the sensible world before the spiritual. In the beginning the sensible world took complete possession of man, but the craving after spiritual self-preservation drives him to the elaboration of a super-sensible world. It was not Christianity, and certainly not the modern period, which

first gave rise to the idea of a purely inward life: the Greeks won it for the general system of culture by painful work and experience, and thereby prepared the ground for new systematizations of life.

Christianity also turns away from the sensible world, but it succeeds in giving this self-centred and self-sufficing inner life a great work to do and a rich content. It accomplishes this when, in unmistakable connection with later Judaism, it transfers the centre of gravity of life from the intellectual and cosmic to what is ethical and personal. The result is a complete transformation, since the fundamental relation of human life is no longer the relation to a visible or invisible universe, but the relation to a perfect Spirit who is above the world. In this way new aims and standards are revealed which bring the whole of life face to face with tasks of great importance. The object to be aimed at is union with this perfect Spirit, a demand for which the existing condition of humanity

is not only inadequate, but with which it even appears to be in direct contradiction. To end this conflict, which involves the whole of the soul, now becomes the supreme necessity. This is impossible if we start from the existing condition of the soul; for this purpose a new and purer nature is needed, and hence the task is raised above all human capacity. Such a necessity for what is impossible must bring about a huge convulsion. But if the conflict grows more acute, Christianity shows a way of overcoming it; it confidently preaches a redeeming and sanctifying love, which frees man from all perplexity, enables him to share in the perfection of divine life, and vouchsafes him full blessedness.

On this scheme the inner life itself contains great contrasts, movements, and experiences. The utmost extremes of absolute despair and certain assurance are at work and intensify one another. The tension of the whole is increased by the conviction that the trans-

formation of human life is not a mere private concern of man, but that the refusal of it signifies a revolt against the divine will, a violation of a sacred world-order, and therefore involves the disintegration of man. Hence this life will necessarily feel that it is the heart and core of the whole of reality; it will regard all other life as a mere setting, and will grant it no independent significance. At the same time it must uphold its complete superiority over all nature. It not only understands nature around us as a work of spirit: it is more important that, within man, it puts on a lower level all activity which proceeds from merely natural powers, and stringently prohibits its entry into the sphere of moral action. Thus a thinker like Augustine, who throws the oppositions into sharp relief, could regard ancient morality not only as insufficient but as a perversion (*virtutes veterum splendida vitia*).

Hence the life which arises on this ethico-religious basis is of a strictly supernatural

character. Here the spiritual life has absolutely no need of being supplemented by nature, but it contains its task as well as its power within itself. But the sensible is not therefore declared to be bad and treated as an enemy. Where this has taken place within Christianity, it is in contradiction to its fundamental tendency. For on this point Christianity is clearly and consciously at variance with the later ages of antiquity: to it the decisive opposition is not that between the sensible and the supersensible, but that between good and evil. The root of evil is not a deficiency in spiritual capacity, but moral guilt. But the sensible remains a subordinate sphere, which has to be completely subservient to the ends of the spirit: it possesses value not in itself but through the part of the higher order to which it gives expression, or through what it accomplishes for the higher order. Hence it can never form the sole domain of human endeavours, but always points beyond itself, and, with all its palpability, as far as the soul

of man is concerned it remains an external world.

We shall see what dangers and complications are produced by the unfolding of this system of life in the sphere of humanity and under special historical conditions. At the same time we shall have to examine whether, from the very beginning, the whole is not burdened with difficult problems. But before we discuss these questions we must fully recognize the primary phenomenon of the spiritual life, which here unfolds itself. The spiritual life here discovers in itself immeasurable depths, sharp contrasts, mighty tasks. If it formerly ranked as of incontestable worth throughout its whole existence, there now arises in it an inner division, a cleavage, the overcoming of which becomes the task of tasks. Man's own nature thus becomes his chief problem, and this means that his life is withdrawn from external activities and principally occupied with itself. The purely inward life thus gains independence and a completely satisfying content. At the

same time a change takes place in the value put upon action in that it does not need any external results to make it complete, but finds that its main business lies in the purely inward life. Then only does the internal disposition cease to be a dead accompaniment and become an active process; thus men are freed from the bondage which may come not only from external relations but from the unalterableness of the nature of the soul. A life which is based upon freedom of action rises above all merely natural processes; a struggle commences between freedom and fate. The independence which is thus won not only seeks to make man master of his own nature, but it prevents him from accepting his sense-existence as an assigned destiny and from yielding to it without a struggle. It calls upon him to master the life of the senses, and insists on shaping it conformably to the ends of the spirit. The importance of this is shown in particular by the beginnings of Christianity. For in taking up with courage and confidence the struggle

against a weak sensuousness pervading all the relations of life, it strengthened and consolidated men against the disintegration which threatened to carry all before it, and, by increasing their self-confidence, prepared the way for a movement of ascent.

In the actual world of history these transformations, these deepening and liberating movements, have always produced only inadequate results: in the consciousness of mankind they are liable to be temporarily obscured and forgotten. But they cannot be simply cancelled; they have produced so much change in life on its inner side that any further movement of humanity must come to terms with them. It is impossible for man to resume without question the earlier naïve relations in which he stood to his environment and his own nature, and to find full satisfaction in their development. Where the working-out in detail of this ethico-religious system of life provokes to contradiction, it often happens that the fundamental thought of the deepen-

ing and ethical awakening of life maintains its position all the more strongly. Where the answers no longer receive assent the questions remain. They, too, are forces which drive life in a definite direction and give it a specific character. Hence the new systematization of life which we owe to Christianity not only cannot be erased from history but remains one of its leading features: in fact, as revealing a depth which controls all the rest of life, it is above all the changes of history. It continues to work openly or in secret throughout the ages, and this proves that it belongs to that timeless present which is the subject of our investigation.

But all the truth and greatness of Christianity have not prevented it from being a subject of constant strife. It is not only from outside that it has continually experienced the severest attacks, unless these have been suppressed with an iron hand, but it has been torn with internal dissensions which have extended beyond the domain of conceptions

to the shaping of life. Everything indicates that the main tendency, when it is worked out in detail, contains a complication; we shall see that it is just the relation between the inner and the outer worlds which is here in question. Christianity stands for a new world, as opposed to that which immediately surrounds men, and it cannot give up either of these worlds; a "monistic" Christianity is an absurdity which can only please a confused thinker. But to maintain the existence of two worlds still leaves it an open question how they are related in detail to each other: the particular point is, how the world, which is on the one hand transcendent and superior to man, can become his own, and come into close touch with his soul. It is certainly part of the fundamental conception of Christianity to make the supramundane order powerfully operative in our world as well, but the relations of one to the other are not completely adjusted. The supramundane order remains in the first place a Beyond, which exists alongside our

world and is bound to lead us away from it by drawing us to itself. But, at the same time, instead of creating a present which transcends time, it remains too much a matter of mere expectation, a hope to be realized in the future. This not only leads to the greatest confusion in particular directions, but it gives the whole of life a character which is bound to arouse doubt and opposition. Since the transcendent Spirituality affects us here chiefly as an order working upon us from the Beyond, our whole life receives a specifically religious character, and is thereby driven into a channel which may satisfy particular periods but which is too narrow to be permanent. Christianity was established in an age which was wanting in vigorous vitality, and was chiefly intent on gaining a safe harbour of refuge. But it seemed that this could be found only in opposition to the confused activity of the world, in a supernatural order. The sharper the division became, the more certain men felt of themselves and the stronger was the

position of the divine revelation, which came to us only by a miracle. It would be irrelevant to treat of the objections raised by later ages, when vitality was at a higher level, but it is of course important to consider how the relation between the inner and the outer worlds had to suffer through this tendency.

Above all, there arises a sharp opposition which runs through the whole history of Christianity, and finds expression particularly in the shaping of creeds: we allude to the opposition between an inwardness which withdraws from the visible world, and an adaptation to this world, with the accompanying danger of an intrusion of the sensible into the spiritual. Where the inner life springs from the relationship to a transcendent Deity, and finds its chief task in the development of this relationship, it is easy for anyone to be indifferent to his earthly environment, to face all injustice in silence, with patience and resignation, to make no attempt either to grapple with the irrationality in the world,

or to raise it to an essentially higher level. Can we deny that the modern period has intervened in the general relations of life much more powerfully and helpfully than Christianity, though the latter dominated for so long the souls of men? Who abolished slavery, who carried through a universal system of popular education, who has attacked the social problem on a grand scale? The inwardness which we have described, with all its delicacy of feeling, was too feeble and too aloof from the world to exercise any power of penetrating and organizing it. Where spiritual emotion does not somehow turn into activity it runs a great risk of becoming an inert brooding over things, a purely subjective feeling, an empty mood. It does so, of course, only where the seriousness of the religious life has faded away, a pre-eminent example of which is the purely intellectual Christianity of modern times. And even where men are willing, they are often very helpless in dealing with the world: nor can we deny the further fact that, in the

life which is ruled by Christianity, the depth of soul and the tenderness of the fundamental experience have often been unsuccessful in preventing great barbarity, and in fact brutality, of outward action. Or were not the Inquisition and trials for witchcraft carried on in the name of Christianity? There is thus a dualism of life, which cannot be permanently endured.

But in Christianity itself there was vigorous opposition to the movement towards an inwardness superior to the world. This movement would probably have made Christianity a religion of mere individuals, if from the beginning its efforts had not been directed towards establishing a kingdom of the new life, and helping the whole of mankind. Even on the ground of history nothing distinguishes it more from other religions than the formation of a church that is definitely marked off, and claims to embrace the whole of humanity. But this enterprise could not be carried out without taking into consideration the general

situation, and also the opinions and interests of men. If now this situation was accepted as essentially unalterable, it was naturally impossible to avoid accommodation to it in many ways, and the consequent intrusion of sensible elements into the world of religion. It is thus emphatically the case not so much that a new world is formed as that the old world and its modes of thought are transferred to the domain of religion. How sensuous are the ideas of a God who is provoked to anger by sin, and must be appeased by some sort of atonement! How sensuous are the ideas of reward and punishment, of purgatory, of heaven and hell, and the whole body of eschatological doctrine! In addition, the spiritual exhaustion at the beginning of Christianity, which has been often alluded to, was bound to strengthen the sensuous element. Men wished to be perfectly sure, at any cost and without any risk to themselves, of the full reality of the spiritual, and so they insisted on a sensuous embodiment in order to be absol-

utely certain of it. Hence they demanded facts which appealed to their senses, overpowering impressions, visible pledges, such as we find in the clearest form in the conception of the sacrament. For the sensible is here much more than a mere means and instrument; it belongs to the essence of the matter, and the communication of divine powers is so closely bound up with it that a man's own disposition in the matter may easily become a secondary consideration (*sacramenta non solum significant, sed causant gratiam*). There is the closest connection between this and the fact that, the more the consciousness of his own weakness makes man look for deliverance solely to supernatural grace, the more religious it may appear to deny him, as far as possible, all activity of his own, and to represent the new life merely as "streaming into" him as into a passive vessel. Hence the inclination spreads to make sure of spiritual processes by binding them to sensible forms, to give to outward and tangible performances

a value which is in direct contradiction to the efforts of Christianity after inwardness. The final result is a materialising of the spiritual life, which leads at the same time to a suppression of all free movement.

A similar problem also appears both in the conception of the Church and in its activity. This activity is in the interests of the kingdom of God; its object is to subordinate all external processes to the ends of the inner world. But it cannot meet with any success without coming to terms with the world as it is, and making use of the means which it provides. The result is that it falls under the influence of this world, and may be overborne by it to such an extent that the main aim is completely obscured.

We thus see the opposition in its fullest development: we have on the one side an inwardness withdrawn from the world, and, on the other, the inner overborne by the outer. Though there are constant endeavours within Christianity to effect some sort of reconcilia-

tion, the confusion lies too far back to permit of anything but a tolerable compromise being attained. Do we not see in Christianity, with particular clearness at the present day, the opposition between a freely ranging subjectivity and a sense-bound organization?

The main trend of modern life puts the problem of the outer and the inner worlds in a very different light. The stream of life is once more directed upon the world, but now the main point is not merely to contemplate it but to lay hold of it vigorously, to get full possession and enjoyment of it. The inwardness that has been won is not by any means given up in principle, but is now expected to communicate itself to the whole of reality, and in this communication to increase its own power and joyousness. We saw how the main task of modern times lies in the enhancement of life, and how this enhancement does not serve an end beyond itself, but itself becomes more and more its own completely satisfying goal. But as the carrying out of this process

makes it necessary that diversity should be reduced to unity and the oppositions should show a tendency towards reconciliation, the inner and the outer worlds cannot remain separate; the life of the whole continually directs them towards one another; the one can develop its power and reach its highest level only in contact with the other. Although they may thus form different starting-points, they approach one another and become more and more closely interwoven, and the advance of the process of life may here be regarded as a progressive overcoming of the opposition. The supersensible strives to unite with the sensible in order to win its full power in the movement of the latter. Thus we see that all the ideas and principles which have emerged in modern times are filled with a fiercer longing to master the sensible world and penetrate to its furthest ramifications. Only by doing so do they seem to step from the realm of shadows into clear and full reality, and at the same time demonstrate their truth. Hence

the time for a timid severance from the sensible is now past, nor can the latter any longer be despised. From the other side, modern life and work enable the sensible to appropriate in an increasing degree the features of the spiritual, and they bring it nearer and nearer to the spiritual. Nature renounces its old palpability; it no longer lies before us as a realm of impenetrable matter, but is transformed into a web of forces and relations, held together by a causal order accessible to thought. In this system of life, whose fundamental principles are the increase of power and constant progress, material goods also appear in a higher light than at earlier periods, when their pursuit was thought to be the outcome of a lower way of thinking. For now they become indispensable means to the development of human power and the overcoming of obstacles: it is not so much sensuous enjoyment as the increase of power, the mastery over things—and thus something supersensuous—which makes them valuable.

If one thus grows by means of the other, it seems that there is only a single world and a single life encompassing man, and the tendency towards union which we have described seems completely to reconcile idealism and naturalism. Thus the division which opened in front of Christianity seems to be happily overcome.

The systematization of activity into work, in which the modern period considerably surpasses earlier epochs, was of great significance for this result. For the modern period has made vigorous attempts to free human action from all subjectivity, and to connect it closely with its objects: it forms great complexes of work, recognizes in them their peculiar laws and motives, and lets these latter control human action. While man thus identifies himself with the special necessities of things, the latter come incomparably nearer to him and grow to be parts of his own nature. In the world of human work the inner and the outer unite, in the same way as force and its object, to form a single whole. Thus the

progress of work is at the same time the establishment of man in an undivided world: it means that the idea of unity has made a further advance.

This consciousness of belonging to a single world dominates the convictions of the modern man, and gives him an assured sense of life. But the greater the pride and joy which are manifested in the striving after unity, the greater must be the resultant confusion, if, in the details of the systematization within modern life itself, different, and indeed contrary, life-currents are formed, which that life cannot bring together with the means at its disposal; if work, though it strains its powers to the utmost, cannot fulfil a requirement which is emotionally of the utmost urgency. This comes about as follows. The chief instrument for carrying out this effort has been found by modern life in science, science of the analytical and exact character which has been developed precisely in modern times. It was of such scientific knowledge that it could first

be truly said, knowledge is power. But science could not clearly and distinctly grasp either psychical life or nature without giving them an independence of one another and recognizing that each possessed a unique nature of its own. This meant a complete breach with the former method, which found no difficulty in a mingling of both realms. Though from the ethical and religious point of view the inner was raised above the outer, the earlier scientific conception of the soul was overladen with many sensuous images. No difficulty was felt in representing sensuous operations, impressions, influences as entering immediately into the soul, nor, on the other hand, in representing volitions as extending into the outer world and altering its condition. In addition, the soul was defined not so much by any positive attribute as by its contrast with the sensible, and hence it easily came to be popularly conceived as something sensible, though of a refined and gaseous nature. On the other hand, nature seemed to be controlled

by psychical forces, guided by ends, moved by impulses and inclinations; it might be regarded as forming a living whole and exercising creative power from within. A confusion like this, which involved the constant interpenetration of the two series, hindered all precise explanation, and hence the desire for such explanation drove men to separate completely one realm from the other, and at the same time to demand a psychological explanation of everything psychical and a physical explanation of everything natural. This separation was ably and vigorously carried out by the leading spirits of the Enlightenment: as they conceived the essential characteristic of the soul to be consciousness and thought, and that of the material world to be extension in space, the two were regarded as irreconcilably disparate. Here a realm of souls with their indivisibility, there a realm of infinitely divisible masses with their motions. As regards their relations, the two realms could no longer be understood as

communicating with one another. According to the new conception, a stimulus comes from one side and releases on the other some sort of activity: in its working, however, each realm kept to itself and was closed against every interference from without.

But these movements did not by any means remain confined to the realm of mere theory: they broke forth and became mighty forces striving to dominate the whole of life, and thus inevitably came into the sharpest collision with one another. In thought the thinking subject begins to feel himself the creator of a world. For when thought, as a productive faculty, develops an inexhaustible diversity out of itself—mathematics affords the clearest example—it does not thereby lose itself in things; it preserves an unassailable superiority; from all its work of production it always returns again to itself, and thereby proves the complete independence of the human spirit. Just as the thinking subject seems to be the Archimedean point which

affords a fixed position in face of the chaos of phenomena, the next task is to include the whole of reality in the process which so arises. Thought now becomes both the motive force and the measure of all things: by vigorous self-concentration it discovers in itself an original endowment of eternal truths, then transforms these into postulates, and applies them to the existing condition of things. What contradicts these truths cannot stand; what corresponds to them will be illuminated and raised to a much higher level. An activity of this kind not only works on things from the outside, but penetrates into them and seeks to make out of them something quite different from what they appear to our immediate impressions. For everything sensible here becomes a mere appearance, an expression and instrument of a content of thought: all reality seems to be reduced to thought-elements, and we seem to promote its ultimate truth when we raise it to the realm of thoughts and ideas. On this view the

sensible can only be regarded as a residue on which the transforming work of thought has not yet been fully successful, but it is not granted an independent existence as opposed to thought.

The essential attributes of the work of thought thus become the ruling characteristics of the whole of civilized life. The universal and timeless truth ascertained by this work possesses an unassailable superiority both over what the sensible world exhibits and over what has been made of man by particular historical experiences. Man's greatness and worth do not lie in what he is as a natural being, nor in what he is as belonging to a particular nation or a particular religion, but in what he is as a reasonable being. The development of his rational nature produces a culture which is rational and universal as contrasted with a culture dependent on history; in particular it rejects all sensationalism and becomes an intellectual culture; and it shows vigour and tenacity in making

its way in all directions. Man now appears as, above all, a being whose essence is pure thought, as a personality and an individuality, and from this point of view he must make further claims on himself and on life. Accordingly an attempt is made, starting from the reason immanent in man, to shape the individual departments of life, such as religion and morality, politics and education, and these thus undergo a complete transformation. Finally, all variety tends towards an all-embracing realm of thought, and an inner life is developed which, with its incessant activity, is much better protected against an irruption of sensible elements than the more passive and emotional inwardness of the middle ages. The guidance of this intellectual culture belongs incontestably to philosophy. For centuries great thinkers have emphatically contested the existence of an independent sensible world, and have sought to transpose the whole of reality into a web of thought. This intellectualistic effort found its culminat-

ing point in the system of Hegel, which not only makes the laws of thought control the whole of reality, but makes the movement of thought, which advances by means of contradictions, its sole content.

But nature, too, exhibits a life of its own, which is no less intense, and which struggles for the possession of the world. Just as psychical life, after the removal of the traditional intermingling of psychical and physical, found in thought a world-forming creative activity, so, after the expulsion of the psychical elements, nature is co-ordinated into a stricter unity, and shows that, when it is understood in this way, it is capable of incomparably greater services. Modern investigation, using the exact methods of mechanics, probes nature to the smallest elements and forces, and thus reveals to us a new depth of reality. By the aid of these elements it illuminates the existing state of things in the most thorough-going manner, and not only discovers much more movement

in nature, and, by following it up, is able to recreate reality, but also finds a way to enlist the forces of nature in the service of man, and thereby enormously enhance his life. Modern natural science is the starting-point of modern technical processes, which have not only led to an enormous advance in details, but have in general put man in a different relation to reality. For his ability henceforth to grapple boldly with all the irrationality of existence, and to treat all limitations as only temporary, must give him a proud self-reliance and instil an inner joyousness into his life. But while the shaping of existence by the technical applications of science shows that the outer is everywhere capable of a strong influence on the inner, and while it is easy for the latter to appear as a mere appendage of the former, the progress of science produces effects tending in the same direction. The latter, especially when it assumes the form of a doctrine of evolution and makes even organic forms subject to change and growth, may look

upon all psychical life as a mere product of the process of nature, and may regard its task as consisting only in what it does for the advancement of this natural process. Psychical life loses more and more the independence which was formerly assigned to it; even in details its activity seems to be determined by physical processes. Another factor which increases the importance of the visible world is the emergence and predominance of economic problems in modern society. Not only much that was formerly in a state of disintegration thus gains coherence for the first time and increases its influence, but also the particular systematization of modern work produces many new problems, and gives them a leading position in human life. From this point of view the management of life on its material side seems to be the main thing in human existence, and the struggle connected with it is the heart of the work that has been done throughout history. The manner in which this problem has been solved seems

to give the different epochs their peculiar character. If intellectualism regarded ideas as the motive forces of social and historical solidarity, the pendulum has now swung to the opposite extreme, and the place of ideas has been taken by material interests.

A realistic culture, such as has never existed before, arises out of the combination of these different movements and their annexation of the whole of life. For although the idealistic schemes of life never failed to meet with contradiction and the counteracting influence of realistic modes of thought, it was always rather a matter confined to individual schemes, and did not extend beyond a critical and defensive attitude to a positive construction dealing with life as a whole. The occurrence of this in the modern period alters the situation in essential particulars. For now for the first time naturalism may hope to satisfy the spiritual as well as the material needs of humanity, and meet idealism on equal terms. The struggle thus enters on a new phase: it

goes more than ever from whole to whole, and, when clearly realized, is bound to throw the whole of life into frightful unrest and confusion. Philosophy has again played the largest part in raising the matter to the level at which it can deal with life as a whole and fundamental principles. Only philosophy will not now appear as untrammelled thought, prescribing to things the course they should pursue, but will mould itself upon the data of experience with the greatest possible fidelity, and will find its chief work in co-ordinating, or, to use Comte's expression, "systematizing" the co-existences of experience. Comte, with his Positivism, may in general be regarded as the realistic counterpart of Hegel: the opposition, and at the same time the close relationship between the two tendencies, comes out with particular clearness in the life-work of these two men.

There is no doubt that the elaboration and the collision of the two movements takes place within the sphere of a common effort.

Both in the one and in the other there is a struggle to conquer the world, a thirst for reality, an increased sense of power, a translation of the vital impulse into objective work, a denial of all separation between the two worlds, a depreciation of the ethical and religious inner life of the soul, which had been developed in Christianity, but which now appears too insipid and feeble. If, now, these demands are satisfied in two opposite ways; if, on the one hand, the inner world does not, and cannot, tolerate anything outward, nor the outer world anything inward, if the craving for unity drives each of the life-currents to insist on its own exclusiveness, then no agreement between them is possible, and the movement of modern times is bound to be transformed into an incessant struggle: this is what has actually occurred.

At first the intellectual culture had the better of the struggle, not only because of the greatness of its cosmic philosophy and the penetrating power of its work, but also

because it seemed more capable of coming to an understanding with the traditional forms of idealism, and of making use of their forces. But while idealism thus found a support in history, naturalism was favoured by the immediate impressions of the real world. These impressions have constantly increased in strength, and have tended more and more to produce the conviction that the shaping of life from within is an audacious and indeed unsuccessful venture. But what has been most in favour of naturalism is the progressive spread of culture: an increasing number of men take an interest in, and in fact help to decide, ultimate questions, who are little affected by history and know hardly anything of the experiences which it records, and who therefore decide the great problems well or ill according to the immediate impressions of the present. And who can deny that our own age shows no powerful and strongly marked movement of an idealistic character? In the older forms of idealism we feel that

much is obsolete, and yet we are unable to draw the boundary line between what is obsolete and what is of permanent validity. Our age is by no means wanting in idealistic movements, but they are not co-ordinated into a whole, and therefore cannot inspire mankind to enthusiasm and sacrifice. On the other side stands naturalism with its rounded-off system, its appeal to the senses, its easily understood aims: is it to be wondered at if the main tendency of the age regards its triumph as already settled? The question is whether the judgment of the age has come to a decision which is finally valid, and whether philosophy can be content to acquiesce in it.

That philosophy cannot be content to do so is sufficiently proved by our survey of history. For however large a part of our spiritual achievements history showed to be problematic and transitory, yet it revealed powers and depths of life which belong to its essence and which may, of course, be denied by human opinion and inclination, but cannot be abol-

ished. The essential nature which life thus revealed gives us something to take hold of, and contains demands which must be satisfied if life is to attain anything more than a superficial and momentary satisfaction. Here, however, lies the rock on which naturalism makes shipwreck, here is the basis for the assertion that it will not be able to retain a permanent hold on humanity. That naturalism is in many respects incomplete, that it sets aside many problems as insoluble, cannot in the least degree be reckoned to its disadvantage or reproach, for this is a defect from which all systematizations of life have to suffer. It is a greater drawback that its development involves it in many contradictions, but such contradictions may be quietly ignored or simply endured. But the fatal thing is that it does not meet the claims which life, in accordance with its nature as unfolded by the movement of history, is bound to make, and in fact puts itself in direct opposition to the main tendency of these claims. However

much fluctuation, and even at times retrogression, the movement of history may exhibit, there can be no doubt that it has elaborated inner life to a continually increasing extent as opposed to the outer world, and has made this inner life continually more independent. A kind of reversal has been continually in progress by the transference to an ever greater extent of the centre of gravity from the outer to the inner. Naturalism itself, as a system of thought and a totality of life, bears witness to this superiority of the inner, for without this superiority the diversity of things could never have been co-ordinated, worked up, and experienced as a whole. But this inwardness, which has become independent, now claims full employment and satisfaction; if this claim is refused, all the rich diversity of inflowing impressions cannot prevent an emptiness, and an emptiness which in the end is bound to be felt. Naturalism, however, with its building up from the outside, offers no shred of substitute for this inwardness, but transforms the

whole of life into a sum of outward achievements. It is thus inevitable that it should be opposed by the desire of man for happiness, a desire which does not proceed from petty selfishness but from the inner necessity of our nature, from the craving after some meaning in our life and efforts.

If this destructive action of naturalism is not fully realized, it is owing to the fact that it usually supplements its deficiencies secretly by means of a stock of thoughts which belong to the world of idealism. Thus it is accustomed to hold fast to an ethical estimate of action; in practical life it usually retains without hesitation its hold on such things as duty and honour, justice and humanity, though in the world built by its own conceptions there is not the smallest place for them, and though from this point of view they must appear no less incredible than the crassest legends and miracles. But the more the consequences of naturalism are developed, the more intolerable must it find this dualism, the more inclined

will it be to reject these supplements as impossible, and the more plainly must its limits be seen and likewise its inability to guide life. Thus its own outer victory must destroy it inwardly: it is wrecked not on its contradiction of any traditions and institutions—no system of thought need fear such contradiction—but on its conflict with the inmost essence of human life, which in the end will ever prevail in spite of all aberrations of individuals and epochs.

But in a question like this the negation of one possibility does not alone involve, as in logic or mathematics, the victory of the other, but life may quite well remain in suspense between the two possibilities. Although we may be ever so certain that to transform life into mere relations and achievements directed towards the outer world is to destroy it spiritually, although the inability of naturalism to give a meaning and value to our existence may be perfectly clear, yet a life in the sense

of idealism, an inner world which should co-ordinate our efforts and direct them along one main line, is not yet won. We feel, rather, that our position is insecure and unsteady as soon as we seek a path from the general idea to the precise systematization. The work of the past, to whose strong influence we are all wittingly or unwittingly subject, presents us with three different ways of shaping life from within: the artistic method of antiquity, the ethico-religious method of Christianity, and the dynamic-intellectual method of modern times. Each of these, in its day, offered itself as the only one, or at any rate the supreme one. Now we find them all pressing upon us at once, while our vision has been made much too acute by historical and critical modes of thought for us to be blind to their great differences and glaring contrasts. But if it is impossible simply to combine them, each one of them displays truths that must not be lost, and thus successfully resists its own absolute negation. Indeed, in the midst of their strife,

they seem incapable of dispensing with each other's help: each contradicts the other and at the same time demands it.

If we abandon the artistic idealism of antiquity, with its power of shaping and ennobling life, it will be easy for our life in the midst of all its zealous activity to sink into a state of formlessness, uncouthness, and barbarism; so we obviously must preserve here a fundamental phenomenon of life. But, at the same time, not only the deep obscurity of the world and the severe conflicts in human life revealed by Christianity, but also the immeasurable capacity for increase which the modern period has proved to belong to human powers, forbids us to recognize as final a scheme of life so circumscribed and so instinct with the harmony of existence as that presented by the highest efforts of Greek creative activity. The depth of soul and the inner movement of life, the pervading influence of a world-embracing love, and the great seriousness attaching to moral decisions, which are characteristic features of

Christianity, cannot be surrendered or even minimized without impoverishing and lowering the level of life. But at the same time the increased psychical activity of the individual, as well as the greater breadth and freedom of life which we owe to the modern period, not only make the historical form of Christianity too narrow and too anthropomorphic for us, but also give rise to the strongest doubts as to the rights of a specifically religious system of life, which directs man's thoughts and efforts predominantly to an existence yet to come, and makes him live more for a better future than for the present. The particular character of the modern period, with its breadth and universality, its rousing work of thought, its increase of human capacity, its liberation of men's minds, may be ever so highly estimated, but we must not overlook the fact that not only were these characteristics bound to necessitate a constant supplementing of the older schemes of life, but also that their own development, with its call upon all our powers

and its awakening of unlimited claims, has conjured up enormous complications. In particular its intellectualism, for all its restless external activity, remains inwardly confined within rigid limits. The faith in reason and progress, with which the modern period began, has more and more faded away under the influence of these experiences: it no longer controls men's deepest convictions even where it still persists as an outward confession.

Hence at first sight everything is here in a confused whirl, conflicting movements intersect, and fill man with opposite emotions. Here he is to think highly, and there lowly, of himself; here with defiant self-assurance he is to subject the world to himself, there he is humbly to subordinate himself to it; here his activities and aspirations are restlessly directed towards externals, there he takes refuge in the still depths of his inner consciousness. How can a life that is full of so many contradictions co-ordinate its activities into one main direction, how can it make its assertion of the

existence of an independent inner world convincing, and bring it home to the mind? As the powers of life wear one another down, the inner world will more and more fade into a realm of shadows, and there will remain only an unstable subjectivity which yields to every stimulus. Such a subjectivity may be strong enough to keep naturalism at a distance; but it is far too weak to unfold a world of its own, to bring man to a condition of inner unity and mankind to a condition of inner solidarity, to combine all the forces of life into one great stream and thus give them security. We all know how at the present day such a lawless and unreal subjectivity comes forward as a true inwardness and usurps its rights.

But how can we escape from this precarious and, in the end, intolerable position? Perhaps we shall be led, if not to the goal, at least some distance along the road we are seeking, by the perception that all the older kinds of idealism rest on a presupposition, for which they do not seek any further foundation, but which

is not so self-evident as it professes to be. Everywhere, that is to say, certain developments and activities of the spiritual life are in question: a moulding activity, or the overcoming of an inner contradiction, or the increase of power without limit. That spiritual life exists is everywhere assumed, and no one troubles any more about it. Must not this presupposition be transformed into a problem by all the confusions and doubts which we feel so strongly at the present day? and, if we start with this problem, should not new light be cast upon life? Science has been often advanced by the fact that what earlier times regarded as settled and self-evident has later become transformed into a difficult problem. Perhaps it is the same in life; perhaps if we start further back we may have a right to hope for a more fertile development in the later stages.

We have dealt at length with the problem of spiritual life in various publications, and especially in the *Grundlinien einer neuen*

Lebensanschauung, and we must refer to these works for all details. But it is clear, without going more closely into the question, that in spiritual life we have to do, not with a mere addition to a life already existent, but with an essentially new life. Psychical life, which otherwise is merely subservient to, or accompanies, the process of nature, gains, when human life is at its highest—not when it only reaches the average—an independence and content of its own. It is something so new and so peculiar that it can be understood only as a new stage of reality, as the emergence of a depth of the world which was formerly hidden. For although this new life may appear only in the human sphere, its claim to form a new domain of existence as opposed to nature, and to introduce new realities and goods and assert them in opposition to those which reign in the natural order, would be absurd and hopeless from the start if it were a life which belonged to mere man and were ultimately bound up with the con-

ditions of his existence. Its cosmic ambition would be an audacious folly were it not that it had a cosmic life behind it by whose power it is driven forward.

That with the upgrowth of spiritual life man is raised into a new world and participates in the totality of its life, is something of which we can gain no assurance by any flight of speculation: conviction can come only from the fact that a life is developed which accomplishes the deliverance of man from the merely human, and, in doing so, by no means falls into the void. But such a development does appear in point of fact; indeed, it exhibits itself as the height of spiritual work both in the macrocosm and in the microcosm. What is genuine and essential in religion is not a petting and pampering of the mere man with his craving for happiness; it is a removal of him into infinity, eternity, perfection; it is the winning of a new, wider, and purer existence from a new world. Real morality does not consist in man's obeying commandments im-

posed upon him and playing the part of the honest citizen, but it demands a new world, a kingdom of justice and love, a new starting-point for life. Real knowledge is not an adjustment and accumulation of impressions, starting from man and directed towards human ends, but it is a penetration into the real nature of things and an inner expansion through participation in a wider life. Nor is that genuine art which ministers to the enjoyment or the interests of mere man, but only that which brings him into an inner relation to his surroundings and at the same time makes something different out of him.

Anyone who takes a general survey of all these points will feel no doubt that in the human sphere a new kind of reality emerges, a movement of the universe is set in motion. However far this new element may in appearance retreat into the background, in it alone lies all the meaning and value of human life, and so far it has succeeded in making its influence sufficiently felt to render impossible

a quiet acquiescence in the existing condition of things. From the standpoint of the new life this condition must appear as a confused medley of nature and spirit; in fact, it will seem to be a difficult and intolerable contradiction in that the spiritual, with all the superiority of its nature, is accustomed in our sphere to play the part of a mere accessory to nature, and, so far as it is developed at all, is drawn into the service of the merely human. In reality, the average culture treats the spiritual as a secondary matter and a mere means towards human well-being, but in words it proclaims that the spiritual is the main thing and a complete end in itself. Hence this culture acquires a character of incompleteness and falsity, and it is impossible for it to carry the spiritual life beyond individual phenomena to a stable and coherent system, and from vague outlines to a strongly marked form. Life is here wanting in real independence, and thus does not get beyond a half-life or phantom life.

But if a desire for real and genuine life now awakens—and the spirituality indwelling in man will always impel him in spite of all contradiction to seek such a life—it becomes clear that a movement in this direction cannot come from the chaos we have described, but demands an elevation above this, the winning of an independent standpoint, the development of a spirituality superior to this average routine. Only after the movement is firmly established can the spirituality which is latent in this average be thrown into relief, purified, and turned to account for the further development of the whole.

Endeavours of this kind may give rise to an idealism which is universal in its nature, because it makes it its task to appropriate not this or that point in the spiritual, but the spiritual itself. But at the same time this idealism, in its insistence on the reality of the spiritual life and on liberation from the merely human, prescribes a specific aim, which is able to co-ordinate all the diversity of these endeavours

and set them in due proportions. From this point of view the whole condition of culture will have to be submitted to an examination to ascertain how much of it is essentially spiritual in its nature and what belongs to the bustle of merely human activities. The individual systems of life of an idealistic nature must be taken up into this movement, into this struggle for independence of life and for the opening-up of a basal depth of reality. This universal idealism has to prove its right above all by showing that it is able to appreciate all these developments of life, to separate their permanent content, with its primary features, from their historical form, to confirm them in their own truth and provide against their lapse into the pettily human.

This system of life, which rests on an independent and essential inwardness, has above all an ethical character. And this is principally because, with this conviction, life does not run its course in quiet development, but contains in itself the necessity of a con-

version from appearance to reality, and therefore of a complete reversal; and this reversal, with its demand for a rise to independence, cannot possibly be a mere process occurring in man but must be his own act and deliberate choice. But at the same time this system leaves no doubt that the act we have described does not depend on the will and pleasure of the mere man, but that the action of each unit reaches back into the totality of the world and thereby involves a great responsibility. It is only a morality on such a basis which will as a general rule introduce life to its own height and truth; it will not make it petty and constrained, but greater, freer, and more stable, for it is incomparably more than a mere regulation of social life, accompanied as this latter is by reciprocal pressure and the danger of a self-complacent Pharisaism.

Religion also belongs essentially to the life which it is here sought to attain. If the independent spiritual life with its essential inwardness stands in sharp contrast to the

average condition of humanity, and cannot possibly spring from this condition, then it must be understood and recognized as the revelation of a new world. Therefore, all work for the inner elevation of man, all genuine spiritual culture, contains, although in a latent form, and even in direct opposition to the consciousness of those concerned, an acknowledgment of such a superior world and of its living presence in the human sphere. But the religious character of life attains a clearly elaborated form whenever the constraint and the disfigurement, to which spiritual life is subject in the human sphere, are clearly realized, but at the same time the maintenance and further deepening of spiritual life is regarded as a fresh manifestation of this superior world. A religion which is thus grounded in the whole of the spiritual life cannot strengthen the merely human element in man, with its vulgar greed for happiness; it cannot drive his life into that which is petty and narrow, but, rather, with the revelation of infinite life

it will free him from all paltry punctiliousness, and by giving him a share in the cosmic battle will lend him dignity and superiority to the world. On this view, too, the divine need not come to man from without, since it manifests itself sufficiently in the very process of life by the opening up of a new depth. At the same time thought and feeling will be directed not so much towards the Beyond and the future as towards a present which transcends time. It is then possible to bring a counteracting influence to bear with good results upon the opposition between, on the one hand, an inwardness that is withdrawn from the world and is indifferent or even hostile to sensible existence, and, on the other, the defeat of a too passively conceived spiritual by a sensible that is surreptitiously introduced.

Further, without the creative activity of art there can be no successful construction of an independent spiritual world in the human sphere, for this construction involves the severance of the subject from the confused

initial situation and a creative effort in contradistinction to it. Would not a movement of this kind fall into the void unless imagination went on in advance, giving form to the invisible and keeping it constantly present with insistent, rousing, and stimulating force? The importance of this is most clearly shown by the historical religions with their impressive pictures of new worlds, their pictures of the Kingdom of God and the last judgment, of the future heaven and earth, or else of the endless succession of worlds—pictures which sometimes inspired men with deep longing and sometimes filled them with horror and dread. But in all the departments of life no essential progress is possible unless imagination thus opens up the way; and the life of the individual needs it as well, for it is only when an ideal picture of itself is constructed and kept in mind that this life can enter upon an inner movement of ascent, and thereby rise superior to the dull routine of every day. An activity of an artistic nature is also in-

dispensable for the organization of what this inner ascent has enabled us to acquire. Such an activity alone can extend what has been seen on the heights to the whole breadth of life, and make what was at the beginning distant and strange in the end near and familiar. An artistic activity of this kind, which is grounded in the connections of spiritual reality, cannot be isolated in spite of all its independence of other departments of life, and cannot lead man on the road towards a feeble and unnerving æstheticism.

Science and the civilization based on it encompass us so obviously with their beneficial influences that no doubts of any kind can be admitted as to their significance. But that science is indispensable can also be fully recognized in connection with the very question of gaining a new coherent system in life, a self-centred reality, in opposition both to the soullessness of a mechanical nature and to the dark confusion of human existence. For what force can be found more suitable than

this, with its objective necessities, to deliver man from the pettily human and to lead the struggle against it; what force more suitable to raise life from the contingency of the temporary situation to that which is universal and above time; or what force more suitable than this, with its constructive use of leading thoughts, to develop inner connections of a systematic character? The liberating, elevating, transforming influence of science, its capacity for building up a world of thought-elements in opposition to that of sense and for enforcing objective necessities in opposition to the caprice of individuals, has been exhibited by the modern period with particular clearness and effectiveness. We cannot dispense with these services where it is a question of rising to self-activity and independence. But at the same time we shall be safe from over-estimating the value of science if we regard it as a member of a wider system within life, if we are convinced in particular that it has to gain its strongest driving force as also its special

differentiations from the whole of life, and that, on the other hand, if it is severed from life, its fundamental nature renders it very liable to be transformed into a tissue of abstract formulæ. The dangers of an intellectualistic ordering of life are plainly visible to us at the present day, and there is no lack of vigorous opposition. But this opposition will hardly attain to complete victory without a return to the roots of science, and the demonstration of its close connection with the whole of life. By this close connection it may appear to lose, but in reality it gains.

The different sides of the life which it is sought to attain, and the different lines of approach to it, are very easily brought into isolation, and indeed into conflict with each other. Owing to the limitations of human nature, individuals and periods, according to their special impressions and experiences, may give the first place to one or other of these aspects, and apply all their powers and faculties to further it: thus the ways divide

and the violent strife which rages throughout history becomes quite comprehensible. This strife will hardly come to an end; the task of men can only be in some way or other to rise superior to it and to counteract the threatened disintegration of life. But this is impossible until the different movements allow themselves to be encompassed by a totality of life and take the form of endeavours after one and the same goal. For this end, however, it is essential that our existing spiritual assets should go through a process of sorting and sifting, of clarifying and heightening: at every point it is necessary to look from the standpoint of the whole and to separate the spiritual content from its human trimmings. But however much toil and labour, strife and uncertainty, this involves, the general result can only serve to convince us of the reality of an inner life and an inner world, of the fact that man does grow beyond the stage of merely sensuous life. Just as the individual becomes certain of an inner task and an

independent psychical life principally through contradictions in his own nature, which he cannot well tolerate, so too for humanity the strength and intensity of the struggles to shape the content of life are the surest witness that it is here in reality a question of seeking and winning something, that some important process is going on in us, that it is not a case of mere vain pretensions and empty fancies. The doubts and struggles themselves make us feel with compelling power that we cannot give up an inner world, and that it is with the shaping of this world that our spiritual contest is principally concerned.

This transference of the inner realities to their true place behind the superficialities of the merely human is, further, the surest and indeed the only means of giving full recognition to the element of truth in naturalism without accepting its guidance. Many men, no doubt, are still extremely reluctant to recognize fully the historical development of man from animal beginnings, the slow emer-

gence of the spiritual in him, the strict subjection of all life to material conditions. Such a close connection of the spiritual with the natural is repugnant to them, because they believe that the spontaneity and independence of the spiritual are thereby endangered. But this danger can threaten only so long as the fate of the whole spiritual life is held to be bound up with human experience. But if it is once clearly realized that, however the spiritual may have arisen in man, in its world-character it cannot possibly have been in the last resort produced by him, but that, rather, we must recognize in the spiritual the appearance of a new stage of the world, then all its insignificance and subjection in the human sphere can in no way imperil its independence. On the contrary, this subjection to conditions, and indeed this weakness of the spiritual in the human sphere, can but strengthen the conviction that its roots strike deeper into the ground of reality.

At the same time our action will not be

able to treat the sensible and natural side of our existence as a secondary matter. Where nature ranks as a stage of reality, which remains even when the spiritual is developed, the power which this stage contains must be enlisted in the service of the life-process, in order that it may not become too weak. Not by withdrawing from nature, but only by overcoming, appropriating, and penetrating it can the spiritual life attain its full height and strength; only thus can life be brought from mere outline to the finished product. That which has done idealism, with its defence of an independent inner world, more harm than any attack from outside is the fact that it has often been intent upon offering a picture of reality which should be as smooth and pleasant as possible, and upon representing reason as in immediate control of reality. In doing so it became untrue, and lost its rousing and deepening force. But if, on the contrary, we are certain of an independent spiritual life, we can fully recognize the large

amount of obstinate matter-of-fact and blind irrationality in our world without necessarily becoming doubtful in any way as to our goals, or relaxing our efforts to reach them. For then our world signifies only a particular kind of being, with which the ultimate decision does not lie.

Anyone who takes all this into consideration will feel no doubt that our age has been set a great task with reference to this cardinal interest of human life. Some inwardness is indispensable; life is in danger of losing its equilibrium unless there is a central reality and a lofty goal to aid us in our resistance to the overwhelming pressure of the external world. Tradition with all its fulness does not supply this want; hence it is important to gain a new standpoint, to look the problems straight in the face, and to venture on ways of our own. If the present crisis has been occasioned less by the increase in importance of the outer world than by the uncertainty in which the inner world has become involved,

we are impelled to go deeper into ourselves and to discover new inner co-ordinations. Only in this way can we become equal to dealing with the complications, and again come to realize the meaning and value of our life. But how can we even strive after such goals without the help of philosophy? It is all the more called upon to exert itself here, because the solution of this problem is decisive as to its own rights and its own development. For to surrender the independence of an inner world is to surrender philosophy as well, while the more specific nature and relations of the inner world dictate to philosophy also the path which it is to pursue.

CHAPTER IV

The Problem of Truth

Under human conditions truth and happiness often seem to be irreconcilably at variance. In his striving after truth man finds his immediate existence too narrow and too petty: he desires to escape from this narrowness, and, passing from the subjective to the objective, to participate in the life of things and the whole of infinity. It seems that here the greatest of all deliverances is beckoning to him, the deliverance from all the troubled passions of self-will and the contingency attaching to the particular. A purer, nobler, infinite life here emerges, a life which even so moderate a thinker as Aristotle could declare to be more divine than human.

When he is inspired by such high endeavours man seems obliged to put his own subjective condition entirely in the background, and indeed to sacrifice it willingly where the service of truth demands such a sacrifice. It is quite otherwise with regard to the desire for happiness. Here everything which concerns and affects man, which moves him and drives him to action, is brought into relation with a central point in which his own life is co-ordinated into a whole. All his experience is measured and valued in reference to this; from this source love and hate, fire and passion, stream out to all infinity. That which can accomplish nothing in these directions is counted as useless ballast and may well be left on one side: whatever, on the contrary, is left, must be strengthened from this source. Hence in the case of happiness the subject takes the first place, in the case of truth the object; there we have a vigorous concentration, here an unlimited expansion, there an expression, here a repression of vital

emotion. From the point of view of the desire for happiness the struggle for truth may easily appear cold and lifeless, while from the point of view of the latter the former may appear narrow and selfish.

It must not be thought that this opposition is entirely external to philosophy, which, however appealed to, decides the question in favour of truth and against happiness, but it extends into philosophy and produces two fundamentally different types of thought. There are two eminent examples which bring this contrast before us in a palpable form, those of Augustine and Spinoza. A fervent desire for happiness impels and animates both the striving and the thought of Augustine: it is only this desire, only an overpowering "I will" that leads him through all doubts and makes him equal to dealing with all obstacles. That which he apprehends he insists on mastering and transmuting into his own life, and even in what is apparently most distant he sees only the relation to the condition of

the subject, and therefore enfolds it with his emotions. Hence for him everything falls under an alternative, good or evil, day or night, salvation or perdition: here all attempt at mediation becomes an intolerable weakness. Spinoza, on the contrary, attacks the importation of human feelings and passions into the universe as a gross misrepresentation, indeed a complete falsification. He regards it as important to free the ordinary representation of the world from them, and to fill our thought and life entirely with the content of things. Contemplation unmixed with volition and desire here becomes the acme of life: it teaches us to look at things "under the form of eternity," to fit every unit into all-embracing connections, not to weep or laugh at events, but to understand them. All true greatness here consists not in wishing to be anything particular for oneself, but in seeking to be entirely absorbed in the infinite: "he who truly loves God cannot desire that God should love him in return."

Who is right, and whose ideal must rank as the higher? For both cannot well be co-ordinated without further trouble, considering that the directions in which they point are so sharply divergent; hence we cannot avoid deciding between them. But at the same time it seems impossible to renounce either of them entirely; rather, each apparently requires to be supplemented to a certain extent by the other side, the sharp divergence must admit somehow or other of being transformed into a convergence. For the truth from which we promise ourselves so much, and which requires so much work and zeal, must surely be somehow linked with our own nature, and must in some way or other be auxiliary to our self-preservation. Otherwise, how could it move and affect us so strongly? On the other hand a happiness which did not go beyond the condition of the mere subject, which did not in any way widen our sphere of life and make more out of us, could hardly satisfy a reasonable being; it would not be

worth the trouble which it cost. Thus it appears that in the struggle for truth a desire for happiness, though diminished in intensity, is at work, but that this desire itself cannot dispense with that inner purification which the struggle for truth promises. Hence we are impelled to inquire how far an approach is possible, and whether the two aims may not be taken as opposite poles of a single life. But for this purpose every movement will have to be examined for itself.

The conception of truth is among those which at first sight seem simple and indeed almost self-evident, but which become complicated in proportion as it is sought to gain a more exact idea of them. When we speak of truth in everyday life it is merely a question of comparing an image, an opinion, an assertion of ours with the facts of the case to which they relate. So far as these facts lie within the realm of experience such a comparison gives hardly any trouble; truth can

here be regarded without hesitation as the agreement of our ideas with objects (*adœquatio intellectus et rei*). But man is driven beyond this conception of truth by his spiritual nature, which implants in him a capacity to stand outside the connected series of phenomena, to reflect on the world and his relation to it. He develops a thought-world of his own, distinguishes it from the world of things, and cannot help asking how the one whole is related to the other, and how far, in what his thought makes out of things, their own being is present. In this connection it seems as if man were set a great task, as if it were a question of piercing through an initial mist and beholding things in their unclouded reality. At the same time life seems to rise superior to the varying opinions of individuals and to attain inner stability. But, however great the rewards which await the performance of this task, is it not in itself an impossible one to fulfil, does it not contain a contradiction? We cannot well keep things

at a distance from us and at the same time draw them back to us, and the conception of truth as a copy of reality, as an agreement of our ideas with a world of things that exists alongside them, needs only to be more exactly thought over to be proved to be untenable. For, assuming that man stands alongside things, and things make themselves known to him, would they not be compelled to adapt themselves to his nature and thereby become something different from what they are in themselves? The gap, and at the same time the impossibility of immediately bridging it over, must be all the more strongly felt the more independent the inner life is made by the progress of culture. But even if things could make themselves known to man in their true nature, how would it be possible to gain any certainty of it, since we cannot transfer ourselves to a third standpoint and from there compare our representation of things with the things themselves? But if, in spite of the obvious impossibility of this solution, a desire

for truth persists, if it impels man with overpowering force to seek a thought and life which proceed from the All, then an essential change in our relation to reality will become necessary; such a change alone can give us any hope that the apparently impossible may yet in some way or other become possible. Hence the work of philosophy has been from the beginning concerned with the discovery and development of a relation which should overcome the contradiction: each of the main epochs has dealt with this question in its own characteristic way, there has been no great thinker who has not attempted ways of his own in treating of the problem; in fact, it has been at this point more than anywhere else that both the possibility of a philosophy and its fundamental character have been decided. But the efforts which are made at the present day are strongly influenced by this past work; hence we shall be compelled to exhibit it in its main features in order to take the bearings of our own position.

In connection with this problem Greek antiquity followed its usual course and did not break away abruptly from the naïve view, but developed it and raised it to the spiritual level. That a universe is present and encompasses man with its sure operations is universally presupposed, and, however much opinion may change in other respects, this presupposition is not called in question. Hence spiritual work finds its main task in developing to full clearness the relation of man to the world: here the goal of the struggle for truth is the philosophical knowledge, the spiritual appropriation of the world. The chief epochs have endeavoured to effect this purpose in different ways, and the course of these attempts displays a typical character, so that it tends to repeat itself in later times. First of all, the predominant thought is that of a community of nature between the universe on the one hand and man and his thinking on the other; then the two fall apart and the subject must concern himself with finding definite

marks of truth in himself; finally, thought is assigned the capacity of shaping itself into the world and comprehending the opposition of subject and object.

In the classical period of Plato and Aristotle the influence is still felt of the personification of the environment which belongs to the naïve way of thinking and which pictures man's relation to the world as an intercourse with his like. For in spite of the decay of that anthropomorphism which treats things as big or little men, they retain an inner life and capacity for effort, and the same forces which move our life seem also to govern the universe. They do not seem to be imported by man into the universe, but rather to be communicated to him from the universe which encompasses him. It is only because of this inner affinity, or rather relatedness, that man can hope to grasp the universe in his thought. The process of knowledge is the bringing into contact of two correlatives which are from the beginning destined for each other, but must come

to terms before they can attain complete union. This union is attained in intuition, which is here closely related to love. It is to this stage above all that the words of the poet apply :—

> "Were not the eye itself a sun,
> No sun for it could ever shine :
> By nothing godlike could the heart be won,
> Were not the heart itself divine." [1]

No doubt on this view truth is still an agreement of the subject with the object, of thought with being ; but since philosophical knowledge is nothing but the development of the community of nature between the spirit and the universe, no complication arises from this conception. It is not inconsistent with the most joyous confidence of ability to grasp the complete truth of things, and to participate in the true life of the universe. Men may hope to appropriate the whole depth of things since no cleft has yet opened between the activity and the being of things, but, rather, their

[1] Goethe, *Zahme Xenien* : *cf.* Plotinus, *Enneads*, i. 6.

whole being is present in their activity. On this conception thought is clearly enough separated from all merely sensuous perception, but it takes up into itself a certain objectivity, a plastic form, and thus acquires a certain affinity to such perception. Scientific work is itself a kind of artistic moulding, an appropriation and inner revivifying of things, a co-ordination in thought of the manifold into a unity, a transformation of the chaos of sensuous impressions into a well-ordered cosmos: it is at the same time a joyous raising of the whole of human nature to a higher level.

Just as in the case of Plato all this stands in immediate connection with the whole of the personality, so here the artistic and plastic character of thought is still more strongly marked. When scientific investigation becomes independent in the hands of Aristotle this artistic character tends to fade out of sight, but it by no means entirely disappears. There remains a close connection of human life with the universe, and unwearying

efforts are directed towards transforming the world into a web of inner unities, ends, and forces, and thereby bringing it closer to the spirit of man and making it transparent to his intellect. Innumerable threads are spun between man and his environment, in fact a vigorous articulation, a systematic organization of the whole of reality is attained. But as the system settled down into greater clearness there is no longer any possibility of concealing that anthropomorphism which the whole, with all its greatness of achievement, involved. It was bound to seem especially dangerous just because it was hidden, and men could not permanently fail to notice that a great deal of what was here offered as explanation was nothing more than an image and similitude. At the same time the whole was bound to be rejected because felt as an intolerable mingling of fact and image, as well as a transference to objects of what is merely subjective. This in particular was the case at the beginning of the modern period with

Scholasticism, and all the more because the latter held fast to the forms of Aristotle without being able to retain his spirit and the inner connections of his thought. But already in antiquity the increasing severance of man from the world drove the struggle for truth beyond the classical solution and compelled it to seek new paths.

One of these new paths was attempted by the Stoa. Even the Stoics do not doubt that the world exists and that man belongs to it, but for them the close connection between the two has been loosened. They make the subject their starting-point and thence seek to gain enlightenment as to what may be regarded as real and true. Much zeal is expended in ascertaining definite marks which teach men to distinguish genuine knowledge of things from mere imagination. Investigation does not here so much enter into the life and activity of things as sketch certain fundamental features of the whole and make men believe in them. At the same time the

close alliance between philosophy and the individual sciences, which distinguishes the work of Aristotle, comes to an end, and the different sciences go their own ways. But to make up for this, life in the human sphere is investigated more closely and made deeper; in particular, it is when his ethical task is clearly thrown into relief that man believes he is winning an inner connection with reality and an assured truth. The truth that appears in this ethical sphere is confirmed by importing the whole personality into it: the maintenance of knowledge becomes itself a valiant action. But the attempt to reconcile this knowledge completely with the whole of the universe does not succeed: the world which stands alongside man is predominantly of a physical and logical character; if a doubt should arise the sphere of ethical life may easily be isolated and appear uncertain: but this also shakes man's faith in truth. The problems and contradictions which are involved in the Stoic doctrine have been very clearly emphasized

by Scepticism, whose achievements have been far too little appreciated by the moderns. When the Sceptics saw that there was a rigid division between subject and object, doubt was bound to extend further and further until every avenue to truth seemed barred to man.

But the modern period was not the first to oppose this division; the Greek world had already done so, principally in the cosmic speculation of Plotinus. It is here held as a truth beyond doubt that a knowledge of things existing outside thought is an absolute contradiction; and thus, if all knowledge which deserves the name of knowledge is not to disappear, things must be compelled to take their place within the world of thought. But this cannot be done unless thought makes itself the object of knowledge and thereby overcomes the division, in the sense that knowledge is nothing but a self-cognition of thought. Then investigation had only to bring into emphatic prominence this activity of thought

and to express in terms of it all the data of experience. Plotinus having set about doing this with vigorous boldness and on the grand scale, discovered in thought the essential independence of life and made this into the soul of all reality. There is here unfolded a vision of things from within outwards, from the whole to the part; all reality is set in flux, its different realms become stages in an all-embracing movement. Since it is an essential unity which underlies all diversity, the apprehension of unity is the principal task of knowledge, unity is what it strives to see before all else at every step. In this connection the thought of infinity arises, a thought which embraces all oppositions and indeed reduces them to harmony. Thus the world is co-ordinated in a magnificent way and filled with inner life; the dependence of one thing on another, the permeating stream of life, the necessity and importance of the thought of unity, are enforced with peculiar power. But this is accomplished by sacrificing all the vivid-

ness of the concrete and the particular, by transforming reality into a realm of logical relations, which would have constituted a tissue of mere forms and formulæ were it not that a strong impulse of an emotional nature had given the whole a deeply religious tone and thus infused life into it. But when this tendency prevails, knowledge, just when it reaches its greatest height, must exchange its character of scientific insight for that of obscure feeling, of a freely ranging emotional mood. Although it may still retain some truth, this species of knowledge has given up the attempt to ascertain the detailed content of the world and has renounced the form of science.

We thus find a wealth of movement even within antiquity, and we recognize that it is a gross error to extend the particular characteristics of the classical period to the whole of antiquity. But still throughout all its phases it did retain one common feature, viz., that belief in the world's existence was not shaken,

and the relation of man to it was regarded as the main problem; it was in close connection with this that thought maintained its position as the guide of life. When Christianity made the heart and core of life to consist in the relationship to God, and indeed to a God who is not so much indwelling in the world as superior to it, this was bound to produce essential changes both in the aim and in the character of the struggle for truth. The main concern of knowledge was now to work out the relations between God and man; but this was a question on which the work of science, and indeed the human faculties at large, were unable to give definite information: for this purpose it needed a communication on the part of the deity, a divine revelation, "about God it is possible to learn only from God" (Athenagoras). From man, however, a docile acceptance of this revelation, an unconditional faith, is demanded: hence faith and not knowledge is regarded as the way to the truth that decides the salvation

of man. Faith is represented as having the advantage over knowledge not only in its greater certainty but also in its greater intelligibility; even the simplest working-man may have his share in faith while those who attain to knowledge are never very many. The truth, however, which is attained by this path has for its content great world-events of a moral nature; in particular, everything centres round the problem of man's revolt and deliverance, everything else becomes a mere setting; according to Augustine it is only of God and the soul that it is necessary to know anything. While the sphere of human thought is thus confined within the narrowest limits, there arises at the same time a far-reaching change in the general outlook on reality, since the totality of the world is now regarded as resting upon a free personal Being, and as being governed by ethical tasks. Hence man with his ethical strivings may know himself to be bound up with the deepest foundations of reality; he stands at the centre

of the world and may be absolutely convinced of the truth of the content of faith. Indeed, for the participators in this ethico-religious movement the whole world is opened up. Things seem to express their deepest being in what they accomplish for the ethico-religious task. Where they cannot work directly in its service, they do so in image and similitude, and thus even the figures and processes of nature become symbols of what is contained in sacred history.

But the conception of faith, which is here the foundation of all certainty, contains difficulties which first give rise to many complications within the sphere of Christian thought, and finally even threaten to convulse it. It cannot well be denied that there is a department of knowledge additional to that of faith; then the question becomes, how are the two related to one another? It is a question which can receive, and has received, different answers. In particular there comes into view a pervading opposition between a

universalistic and a positivistic mode of thought: the one seeks to bring faith and knowledge into friendly alliance, the other to keep them as sharply apart as possible. According to which conception is adopted, each of the two departments will take on a different form. One means of seeking a combination of the two is to maintain that knowledge is a preparation for, and a lower stage in, what comes to its highest perfection in faith. But, in spite of this subordination, owing to its close connection with divine truth knowledge is directed towards essential problems; it acquires a speculative character. But the content of faith, however superior it may be, is seized upon, worked over, and illuminated by thought; faith appears as another and higher kind of knowledge, which is only possible by communication from God, but it still remains a kind of knowledge. It is this mode of thought which finally gained the ascendancy in the Roman Catholic Church, in which at the present day it retains an unas-

sailable supremacy. In the middle ages, however, it had to wage a hard struggle with the other type, which has predominantly gained the adherence of ecclesiastical Protestantism. To the latter type the above-described mode of reconciliation seems to endanger the characteristic nature of faith, the specific character of the facts, and the immediateness of the conviction. For the preservation of these it seems that the sharpest possible separation is necessary, an "either . . . . or" takes the place of the "both . . . . and." Faith thus loses its intermixture with speculation: but the less it is regarded as capable of proof, the more it becomes a matter of free decision; it is regarded as an act of the will and is declared to be a "practical attitude" (*habitus practicus*). The facts on which it is based present themselves as pre-eminently historical in character and insist on being received as such. Knowledge, however, is kept at a distance from these fundamental questions so far as possible, and is

directed towards the world of nature; it becomes thereby much more closely connected and concerned with experience. This opposition between a universalistic and a positivistic, an intellectualistic and a voluntaristic, mode of thought, divides men to the present day, and we do not see how it can be resolved within this range of ideas. Its deepest root lies in the fact that Christianity insists at the same time on being an historical fact and on having a universal validity; and according as one or other of these claims comes into prominence, the mode of thought will assume this or that form.

Still more difficult than this problem of the relation between faith and knowledge is the complication in the conception of faith itself. From the beginning faith strove to be something more than knowledge—a claim which it could justify only if it proved that it sprang from a greater depth of the soul; it carried out, or at any rate attempted to carry out, this justification by putting itself forward as

a manifestation and expression of the whole nature, as a purely inward matter entirely dependent on free decision. But the willingness to receive a divinely revealed truth, and the resolution not to be led astray from allegiance to it by any misgivings of reason, have a necessary presupposition; the divine origin of the doctrine in question must be exempt from all doubt, infallible testimony must assure us of it. But only science can examine whether such testimony is really available, and hence it seems that an act of knowledge must precede faith. The misgiving which results from this would be more easily removed if it were a question of something which arose in the life of the individual and could prove itself immediately by its elevating influence: but it is here a question of facts in the history of the world, which lie beyond the life of the individual and have first to be imparted to him. How can faith in such facts prove that it has an unassailable right? Roman Catholicism has supposed this difficulty overcome by its

assertion that the Church has a teaching office entrusted to it by God; but this assertion has first to be proved, and the study of history shows that there are very weighty objections to it. In any case the decision of the question lies with science; and this shows that the foundation of faith is dependent on the very thing above which it strove to raise man. At the average level of life faith is thus nothing more than a docile acceptance of what the Church brings forward as truth, which is here guaranteed by tradition and authority. If, in opposition to this, Protestantism represented faith as arising immediately in the individual, the presupposition was that the facts which form its basis are accessible to every individual and must be immediately self-evident to him. We cannot doubt to-day that the matter is by no means so simple. According to the form which the question has recently taken, it is sought to attain certainty of faith principally by a combination of psychical experiences and historical facts; psychology and history are to

work together towards the same goal. But each of these has had its credibility seriously shaken by modern investigation; and the combination of two uncertain quantities can never by any possibility produce a certainty. Thus at the present day faith, which was to relieve man of all doubts, has itself become an object of doubt; its power of conviction is limited to a sphere within which man feels himself encompassed by a clearly defined religious world, certain and self-evident, which makes both the existence and the proximity of the Deity as obvious to him as his own existence. If this world falls into discredit, indeed if it loses in any degree the naïve certainty which it possessed for the men of the middle ages, faith ceases to be a sure foundation for truth and itself becomes a difficult problem.

The more the modern period has developed an independent character the more has the specifically religious conduct of life retreated into the background and had its presuppositions shaken. The first result is a great

uncertainty as regards the problem of truth. Christianity has torn man away from the coherences of the world which encompassed him in antiquity, and the increased independence of the soul forbids a simple return. But he is no longer certain even of the Deity; in any case his relation to the Deity no longer controls the whole of life. In this situation where can he now turn to find truth, and what meaning can this conception still retain? In accordance with the experiences which we have described man can seek truth nowhere else but in himself; his own life must possess a depth which even for himself at first lies in a dim and distant background; with the full appropriation of this depth, however, he may hope to discover a world in himself, or rather he may himself grow into a world. The object then to be aimed at is a transference of life, not into something which exists outside us or above us, but into something which belongs to us, but which can become completely our own life only by a vigorous trans-

formation, and indeed revolution. Reality is not here found already existing, but it has to be built up from within: truth is thus a striving of life towards itself, a seeking for its own being. Hence it cannot be the agreement with a given reality: it becomes an agreement with itself, a self-co-ordination of a life which becomes independent and raises itself to a higher level, instead of remaining disintegrated and constrained. Its verification can only lie in the fact that, by embracing it, the whole of existence is transformed into spontaneous life, raised to an essentially higher level, and at the same time united into a whole of creative effort which moulds reality.

Here the main problem is to find the point where a spontaneous and creative life springs up in man as the deepest thing in his own nature. According to the form which this life takes, different forms will be assumed by reality and truth; but that such a life is attainable in some way or other is the common presupposition of that faith in reason which

pervades the creative efforts of the modern period and is enunciated with particular clearness in the works of its leading thinkers. The reason which is immanent in the human race must now take the place of the universe and the Deity. This, too, is common to all attempts, viz., that the movement does not proceed from a pre-existing world towards man, but from man towards a world which has first to be constructed. This movement draws everything into itself which at the beginning lies outside it; it tolerates nothing which does not conform to the necessities indwelling in it; everything previously existing must fit in with and accommodate itself to these necessities, or it can no longer maintain its position. It is evident how great a change comes over human activity as compared with the older way, how much it gains in independence, how much more active and productive it becomes, but at the same time how much more restless and critical. In moulding the world it will insist on developing things from

their first beginnings and at the same time on gaining control over them: this it is which principally determines the character of modern science, and it is also the impelling force towards a complete renewal of human existence.

The question as to where such a life emerges in man is now closely connected with the attempt, which has been previously discussed, to find in thought the persistent power that is able to hold together existence, which otherwise strives to diverge, and to gain a spiritual mastery over it. The predominant tendency is first of all to declare that thought is that spontaneous creative effort which raises man by himself above the pettily human and leads him to truth by enabling him to participate in the life of the world. It was thought in particular which, throughout the centuries, undertook and carried through the working out of objective necessities and wide complexes in opposition to the narrowness and constraint of the pettily human. In this movement it raised itself more and more

freely above the immediate existence of man, co-ordinated itself more firmly on its own basis, and took up into itself to a continually increasing extent whatever confronted it as an independent world. In this advance of thought three chief stages can be distinguished; the Enlightenment (Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz), the critical philosophy (Kant), and constructive speculation (Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel).

When the Enlightenment took the thinking subject as the starting-point of the struggle for truth, it would have gained very little by doing so if it had not discovered in this subject a definite content and a moving force. It found these in the "innate ideas," the "eternal truths," which seemed to form an absolutely certain original endowment of the human spirit. When these truths unfold themselves, seize upon the surrounding world and shape it conformably to their own demands, a realm of reason arises and vouchsafes man an apparently universally valid and

unassailable truth. But neither the representation of nature nor the sphere of man can reach the state of truth except by toilsome labour of an intellectual nature. The object to be aimed at is a thorough purgation and sifting, which must get rid of everything that refuses to be illuminated by thought, while everything that stands the test is more effectively revivified, and more firmly co-ordinated. This gives rise to natural science, with the exactitude of its mathematical methods, and also to a culture based on reason, which makes a problem out of everything handed down by historical tradition, and lets nothing pass which cannot clearly and distinctly prove its rights at the bar of reason. This attempt, however, derives its self-confidence and its power chiefly from the conviction that reason is not a matter of mere man, but controls the universe; hence what man recognizes as truth can have a limitless validity beyond him; he himself, however, gains a high life-task and a com-

pletely satisfying happiness by participating in this universally valid truth and in the building up of a kingdom of reason. Thus Leibniz is of opinion that the whole earth "cannot serve our true perfection unless it gives us opportunity of finding eternal and universal truths, which must be valid in all worlds, indeed in all periods, and, in a word, with God Himself, from whom they continually proceed." Both with Leibniz and in the Enlightenment generally, faith in the possession of universally valid truth rests on the conviction that the human reason is grounded in a divine world-encompassing reason. It was sought first of all to find a basis for this conviction in close connection with the traditional transcendent conception of God; faith in the veracity of God may then enable us to trust our own reason with complete confidence if it conscientiously observes the rules prescribed to it. Spinoza, however, with his philosophy of immanence, goes so far as to conceive that a cosmic

thought is immediately present in us, that it is not so much we who think as it which thinks in us; the only important point, therefore, is to make sure of such a cosmic thought, and we can do so, according to Spinoza, if we free our intellectual work from the influence of human conditions and aims, and allow it to be determined purely by the inner necessities of thought itself. For what makes the usual representation of the world inadequate and erroneous is that man is treated as the centre and goal of all reality, that in particular the oppositions which belong merely to human modes of feeling, such as the antithesis of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, etc., are imported into the universe, and have grossly distorted its image. The first condition of truth is, therefore, a modest self-repression on the part of man, a willing submission to the necessities of things as thought reveals them; man must remove the centre of gravity of his own being from the confused whirl of the passions into a passion-

less thought, into a contemplation of things which is unmixed with volition and desire. Pure thought of this nature can place man in the stream of a cosmic life, deliver him from everything that is pettily human, and by the opening up of an eternal and infinite life, vouchsafe him complete rest and blessedness.

But, however high may be the position which Spinoza thus assigns to thought, and however strongly he represents it as self-moving and progressing in accordance with its own necessities, he does not deprive it of all relation to objects existing outside itself; he holds fast to the position that, while thought unfolds its own nature and necessities, it corresponds at the same time to a being which exists alongside it; in place of agreement we have here a parallelism of thought and being, and it seems thus to become possible that one and the same fundamental process of the universe should embrace both series and come to expression in them. But, on this solution, not only is the above

presupposition of an all-embracing world-basis open to attack, but also the relation between the two series leads to the gravest complication. It must at once arouse misgivings that Spinoza nowhere puts the two series on the same level but always subordinates one to the other; either thought becomes a mere mirroring of nature, whose laws thus widen till they become laws of the universe, or thought forms the core of reality and nature is nothing more than its manifestation and environment. But doubt cannot be suppressed on the further question as to whether, if the two sides are incommensurable, the idea of a parallelism is not an absolutely unthinkable thought, whether it is not essentially self-contradictory. But whatever doubts of this description may arise, they cannot obscure the greatness and inevitability of Spinoza's endeavour to discover a cosmic nature in man himself, to distinguish in him the merely human from the cosmic; at least we do not see how the modern man could find his way to truth by any other path.

But was Spinoza right in placing this cosmic nature solely and entirely in intellectual activity, and in imagining that every other kind of life ought necessarily to be degraded to a lower stage? In this way he reached only a reality of logical forms and formulæ, whose emptiness and soullessness must have been immediately evident, were it not that a mystic and religious intuition, entirely different in its nature, had infused life and warmth into the whole. In spite of the vigorous energy of his thought in certain directions, there is no other philosopher who, in the fundamental texture of his system, is so compound of contradictions as the thinker who is praised by many as the supreme example of the quest for unity.

The struggle for truth reaches a new stage with Kant. He is the first to recognize clearly that truth, in the sense of the agreement of thought with an existence external to it, is an absolute absurdity. But since at the same time the existence of some truth or other is

insisted upon with the utmost vigour, the conception of truth must undergo essential modifications; in reality a complete revolution is brought about in the relation between thought and being. It is now taught, not that thought has to conform to being but that being has to conform to thought, that is, we are acquainted with reality only so far as things enter into the forms of our intellectual organization; truth thus ceases to be for us the knowledge of things, and becomes the self-knowledge of the human spirit, which prepares for itself a world of its own—acting, it must be admitted, on an impulse independent of itself. This self-knowledge, however, surpasses everything which earlier epochs possessed of a like kind, and gains an incomparably richer content through the coming to light of an inner structure, a comprehensive web of spiritual life, in the course of that construction of a world. In the gaining of this knowledge there arises a new kind of investigation, the transcendental, which is concerned with the

inner possibility of knowledge, as opposed to the empirico-psychological method, which treats of its origin and growth in the individual man. Our view of reality is thereby fundamentally transformed, for henceforth all the coherence which it presents, in particular all the assertions which it includes about ultimate grounds, have to be regarded not as belonging to reality itself but as imported into it by man. Thus man in his struggle for truth does not transcend himself, he does not reach in knowledge a point where a universal life springs up in him, but remains always confined to his own circle of thought, the contents of which cannot be universally valid, since they have arisen under special conditions and have not proceeded from an original creation. For Kant regards it as beyond question that human thought is non-creative.

But if the Kantian movement from the object to the subject thus puts human knowledge on a much lower level and threatens to make truth merely relative, it brings us into

an incomparably happier position in the domain of the practical reason, in morality. For here, according to Kant, the subject can rise to creative activity, eliminate everything specifically human, and thereby press forward to an absolute truth. Hence the thinker has no doubt that the ultimate meaning of the world is moral, and that man, by participation in it, attains a universally valid truth, a superhuman life, and at the same time an incomparable greatness and dignity. He reaches these heights, indeed, only in this special direction, and not so much by scientific knowledge as by an inner appropriation which is of the nature of faith, and which cannot be forced on anyone, but requires a free recognition, an inward up-striving of life. Hence this philosophy does not by any means fail to transform pre-existing reality and to grasp a cosmic nature in man, and thus possesses a metaphysics, but of a kind completely different from all earlier systems.

The Kantian philosophy forms the beginning

of a new epoch in the struggle for truth both in negation and in affirmation. The impossibility of the old conception of truth is clearly and cogently demonstrated, and at the same time the philosophical is finally distinguished from the naïve treatment of the problem. All immediate connection of thought with things disappears, and there is a simultaneous disappearance of the capacity of thought to reveal to man by freely ranging speculation a realm of universally valid truth; at the same time the view of the world is freed from the deeply rooted confusion of subjective and objective which had hitherto prevailed. But if man thus loses the connection with a surrounding world, he gains in exchange a new world in his own being, and the very limitation of knowledge seems to make it possible, this ethical turn having been given to philosophy, to put the struggle for truth on a new basis, which is simpler, surer, and more fruitful than any of its earlier forms. The struggle for truth is here thoroughly purged from all mere intel-

lectualism, and indeed the conception of truth is itself deepened.

But the obstinate strife over the interpretation of Kant soon proved that these changes did not provide any final solution but gave rise to new problems; this is also proved by the fact that the movement of philosophy so quickly went beyond Kant. Can the subject be raised, as is here the case, so as to become a texture of inner life, and yet at the same time be bound in knowledge to an unfathomable world? Is it possible to lift the special domain of morality above the rest of life to a condition of complete independence, creative activity, and absolute truth? Will not this new life either draw the other up to itself or else sink down to the level of the rest, with its subjection and its merely human character? Will the cleavage between the theoretical and the practical reason, with the conflicting emotions to which it exposes man, be permanently endurable? So much is certain; from the standpoint of history it is clear that Kant did

not provide a final solution, which brought peace and union, but that he gave rise to a powerful movement and an enormous amount of contention.

We know that it was in the first place the craving for a more effective unity in the world of thought which drove effort into new channels. Thought, which with Kant was so sharply separated from the world, now becomes the workshop in which the whole of reality is created; it is vigorously thrown into relief against merely human conditions, and thus grows to be a world-process which drives forward all being by its own movement, fashions all that is apparently alien to it into its own possession, and proves its rights not by any sort of external verification but by its inner mastery of the whole. This movement which commences in Fichte with directive force and fervid zeal, reaches its consummation and its ripest development in Hegel. Thought is here raised entirely above the mere subject, it has for its vehicle the work

of society throughout history, which work is itself thereby co-ordinated and spiritualized. The motive power of the process is contained in the fact that thought produces contradictions out of itself and overcomes them, and that it is thereby driven further and further until it has finally assimilated the whole range of existence and at the same time admitted it to its own truth. Since man can identify himself completely with this movement, this self-unfolding of spiritual life, if he vigorously rejects all his narrow opinions and self-willed striving, he seems here to participate in the full and complete truth: nowhere else in the whole course of history do we meet with so joyous and proud a feeling of the possession of truth. Our world of thought, however, undergoes a radical change of condition when it is attempted to carry out this undertaking, in such wise that all the diversity of things is united to form a single structure, everything which is apparently isolated is brought into relation with everything else, everything that

is at rest is set in active motion, all mere matter-of-fact is illuminated by logic and rationalized.

This achievement as a whole has resulted in a vast increase of spiritual capacity, which cannot simply disappear. But as a definitive solution of the problem of truth it was bound before long to meet with opposition. It involved the assumption that the spiritual life of humanity is spiritual life pure and simple, absolute spiritual life, and it thus exaggerated human capacity in a way that became intolerable, especially to the nineteenth century, with its growing recognition of the subjection of man to wider systems. Further, it could not accomplish this transformation of reality into a process of thought without either transforming it into a realm of mere shadows and categories, or else essentially supplementing it from a richer world of thought and so leaving the path upon which it had entered. We know how suddenly the whole structure collapsed, and this precisely because the pro-

cess of thought was unable to maintain its superiority over the subject, because the subject violently appropriated the increased mobility of thought, and consequently gave rise to an unlimited subjectivism, which contains no trace of any higher truth common to all men.

Thus with regard to the problem of truth we now find ourselves in an extremely uncertain and confused position. The movement of history has made an irreparable breach with the naïve conception of truth: it has raised claims to which our capacities do not seem equal, but which we cannot renounce. It is true that the modern period shows no lack of attempts to minimize these claims and to find some sort of truth without metaphysics. Thus Positivism transforms knowledge into a mere determination and description of the relations of things, which in their own nature are absolutely inaccessible to us; thus Pragmatism transforms knowledge into a mere means and instrument of human well-

being. But we are impelled beyond such limitations not merely by the persistence of theory, which seeks to invent some "metaphysics" or other for any given existence, but also by the irresistible power of man's innate spirituality. That we are not a mere constituent in a web of relations of things is sufficiently proved by the very fact that we are able to consider our relationship to our environment, apprehend it as a whole, and recognize the relations as relations. But as soon as we convince ourselves that behind the sphere of our knowledge there still lies an unattainable world, we cannot help feeling that what we have attained is unsatisfying as belonging to the mere surface of things. And what would be fairly tolerable as a limitation of thought becomes absolutely unendurable as an ultimate limitation of life. For here, where it is a question of arousing and co-ordinating all our powers, it is impossible to renounce ultimate goals, and therefore the consciousness that, with all our toil and labour,

we can never penetrate beyond the surface of things to their fundamental nature, is bound to produce an unspeakable emptiness in which no nature of any force can finally acquiesce. Was it by chance that Comte himself in the end set to work with heart and soul to create new ideals? Was it by chance that both Mill and Spencer, at the end of their laborious days, felt painfully the limitations of the solution which they had offered, that thus all the leaders of Positivism were impelled by their own natures to transcend their own philosophy? Man may treat nature as something external, although this too has its limits, but he cannot permanently maintain this attitude towards other men, and especially towards himself. But this does away with Positivism, which knows only external relations.

But as regards Pragmatism, which ought to have more attention paid to it in Germany, let us accord full recognition to its efforts to deliver the problem of truth from its customary isolation and to bring it into closer connection

with the whole of life. It is only such a connection which will give truth a firm foundation and enable it to assume a fruitful form. But the question is, what is understood by this whole of life? If it means nothing more than the complex of actual society, as it displays itself in the wide field of experience, the struggle for truth would be subject to all the dissipation and collision of forces, the selfish striving after happiness of the mere man, the spiritual sluggishness of mere average humanity, and thus truth would be sacrificed to utility, de-spiritualized, and thereby destroyed. But after all the movements and experiences of world-history we cannot help feeling keenly so unfortunate a result: we have grown beyond both mere nature and merely social existence, we cannot help measuring this existence by the necessities of our spiritual life, we cannot turn round and make the latter depend on the former. The average condition must be very highly idealized if it is to be accommodated to the endeavour

after truth without serious harm. Or else we must recognize another life besides that of the social sphere. But where this assumption is made explicitly and worked out consistently, a fundamental transformation of the earlier situation becomes necessary; men resume the quest for a metaphysical system, and once more the struggle for truth, in the old sense of the deliverance of man from the merely human and the winning of a new and more essential life, must come into prominence. Thus we find ourselves in the end agreeing with Hegel that a highly educated people without a metaphysics resembles a temple without a holy of holies. Only let us not understand by metaphysics something gratuitously added by thought to a rounded-off world, but something which, by a vigorous reversal of existence, forms the very first step to a stable and essential reality.

Hence a final renunciation of metaphysics is impossible without producing such a marked degradation of life as to be intolerable; we

shall have to resume the struggle for truth in this higher sense of the word. However certain it is that we cannot do so simply by returning to the achievements of an earlier period, yet the experience of history shows us the direction in which we have to seek our goal. And this experience leaves us in no doubt that, when we take up the struggle, we cannot start from the world nor from a transcendent Deity, but only from the process of human life. And it is just as certain that the struggle cannot start from the immediate condition of psychical life, as empirical psychology determines it, but that it requires a reversal, a transference to a spontaneous, self-active, creative life. It is only thus that man can participate in a cosmic life that forms the essence of things, and so gain possession of truth.

Such a reversal has been undertaken with great energy by the leaders of modern philosophy: the form taken by the attempt was that a special kind of activity was exalted

above all the rest, and a new life of an independent character developed from it. Some demanded for this purpose a knowledge rooted in itself, others a creative moral activity. But we have seen what complications resulted from this limitation to a special faculty. This subordination not only drives life into a channel that is too narrow for it, but such a faculty does not seem to be in a position to produce a new reality from itself, and at the same time to effect a reversal of previous existence. Besides, a shaping process of which the transforming power does not extend over the whole range of life will hardly acquire the stability and certainty which are necessary for this movement; in that case doubts and contradictions will continually arise from other sides of life. Consequently the next requirement will be that this reversal should extend over the whole of life, that in particular it should rise superior to the intolerable cleavage into a theoretical and a practical reason. Life must get behind this cleavage, it must be possible

to reach beyond the individual faculties a total activity, which by its own movement develops into an independent reality and at the same time comprehends the opposition of subject and object, subjectivity and objectivity. But this is much what we have in mind in the conception of spiritual life. It is not that a primary thought or even a creative moral activity operates in us, but that a new totality of life, a self-existent and self-sufficing being, a primary creative power which fashions the world and expresses itself in complete acts, makes its presence felt in us — this is the cardinal principle on the attainment and vivid realization of which all truth of thought and life depends for us. Hence it is not a question of the appropriation and strengthening of particular sides, but of making independent and co-ordinating all the inner life that is active in us, and thus reaching a new starting-point for the whole of life.

This new life has to confirm its truth by an enhancement of the whole range of our exist-

ence. It will be seen that it is only from this standpoint that the contents and values unfolded by our life can be understood, and, further, that the latter is raised to an infinitely higher level when it is summoned to independence and co-ordinated into a self-existing and self-sufficing world. Just as the new life, as the totality of a new being, is raised still further above the mere man and the immediate situation, so also it will make greater demands than the older kinds of reform; in face of the given condition of things it demands at each separate point a disturbance and transformation of old conditions; everywhere the object to be aimed at is to work out an independent spirituality, to oppose it in the first place to the average life, and then to refer it back to this life. The whole of existence is thereby transformed into a general problem which can be solved only very gradually. For this independent spirituality cannot be suddenly transformed into reality by a bold fiat, but the work and experience of

world-history are necessary for this purpose; it is only by convulsions and negations that it is possible to compel life to open up its depths. But since in the end the truth of thought depends on the essential content of life, thought must get rid of the idea that at a given moment it can reach conclusions which are final for all periods. Though it must necessarily insist on a truth which transcends time and possesses absolute stability, the stability of this truth does not lie in man but in the spiritual life, and if man, as grounded in the spiritual life, must in some way or other participate in this truth, to work it out to a self-active possession is a high goal to which we can only slowly approach. If truth, if a life which fashions the world and partakes of the essence of things, are not in the first place incontestable facts for us, then all our trouble about them is wasted; but that they likewise form difficult problems which are continually recurring, is shown with peculiar force by the struggles and confusions of the present. It

is an urgent necessity for our spiritual self-preservation that life should be deepened and renewed; but this cannot be accomplished without a bold advance, a successful search for new connections, a further development of our world of thought. Can we expect to advance in these endeavours without the help of philosophy? Is it not an indispensable ally in the struggle for a richer content of life and more truth of conviction? And does not the idea of an independent spiritual life open up new outlooks and tasks, the possibility of a revolution? Humanity has indeed not yet exhausted the possibilities of life.

If the struggle for truth thus rests on the craving after a life which partakes of the essence of things, it cannot possibly divest itself of all strong emotions and become an affair of quiet contemplation and selfless resignation. For the above conception shows clearly that its motive force lies in the impulse towards spiritual self-preservation: without the elemental force of this impulse it would

never succeed in overcoming the pressure of the actual world and in building up a new world of self-activity in opposition to it. Resignation is justified only so far as this spiritual self-preservation requires much negation and renunciation just because it is fundamentally different from self-preservation on the natural level. This negation, however, must be the reverse side of an affirmation if it is not to remain lifeless and unfruitful. It would be easy to show that even in Spinoza's philosophy there is no lack of positive and joyous vital emotion in the depths of existence. But if this is so, then the irreconcilable hostility between truth and happiness disappears, the struggle for truth will help to purify and ennoble the desire for happiness and will not tend to suppress it; it will be able to aid the latter in overcoming the complications to which it gives rise.

CHAPTER V

The Problem of Happiness

Our age has particularly urgent cause to occupy itself with the problem of happiness, for we are confronted by a remarkable contrast between the greatness of the outward achievements of the age and the insecurity of its sense of happiness. In successful devotion to the work of civilization we surpass all other periods; how far are we in advance of them in the knowledge of nature, in the mastery and utilization of its forces, in the humane ordering of society! But it cannot be denied that all these achievements do not help us to attain a joyous and assured sense of life, that a pessimistic tone has become very widespread and continually extends further. How is it

that with us work and happiness refuse to associate?

When such a dislocation compels us to consider the nature and conditions of happiness, we immediately encounter a grave misgiving. May man as a general rule make happiness the goal of his efforts, is it not a sign of a narrow and petty character that in every effort man should think principally of what gain he is to receive in happiness? Experience, too, seems to show plainly that not only individual men but whole nations and religions have been able to renounce happiness: we know, further, that thinkers of the very first rank have called for something higher than the struggle for happiness. But if we look more closely we find that their opposition has been directed not so much against happiness as against lower conceptions of happiness: even in the substitutes which have been offered in its place a craving after happiness can always finally be recognized. Men have wanted something different from the majority, but they have always opposed to

the existing condition of life another which was higher and better, and have sought to enlist human feelings and faculties in the task of attaining it: but is this not a craving after happiness? Thus even the Indian sage strives for happiness when he tries as far as possible to negate life, to bring it into a condition of absolute repose and indeed indifference. For then absorption in the universe or even complete annihilation appears to him a better state than his previous life with its labours and cares, its excitements and disappointments. And the struggle for happiness need by no means remain bound to the narrowness and poverty of the natural ego, but rather the very aim of the struggle may be to find a new, purer, nobler being, a life which is freed from this ego and yet remains active and vigorous. Thus we see that the conception of happiness is itself by no means simple, and that the opposition does not apply to happiness so much as to lower and inadequate conceptions of happiness. Indeed, it is a thing to be insisted

upon that man should let the thought of happiness control his efforts, for it is only by doing so that he can put all the vigour of his life and the strength of his emotions into his action: he cannot devote all his energy to the struggle after anything in which he does not expect to find satisfaction for his own nature. Fundamentally different conceptions are included in the term happiness, but it is only dulness of thought which can agree to a general renunciation of happiness: all real life is strictly individual life, and to this happiness is indispensable.

But this survey has already shown that happiness is not something simple, that the understanding of it is only to be reached by labour and struggle. This lends value to a survey of world-history in the present connection. Let us then make a hasty journey through the ages keeping this problem in view, not in order to consider the whole array of individual solutions but only to show the leading types which human life

has elaborated, and which cannot cease to occupy us.

We begin once more with the highest achievements of ancient culture. Here the answer to the inquiry after happiness rests on a peculiar attitude towards life and the world which pervades the whole course of Hellenism. Effort is supported by the conviction that the joy of life lies principally in activity, that it is therefore the chief object of endeavour to enter upon a state of activity, to assume an active and not a passive attitude towards things. In the course of Greek development, activity, on the high level of the spiritual life, has continually retreated further and further from contact with the immediate environment, and has taken refuge in the inner nature of man, and indeed finally in the relation to a being superior to the world; but yet faith in activity and joy in activity have always remained. In the struggle which Plotinus finally waged against Christianity it was a leading consideration that this religion makes man hope and wait too

much for help from an outside source, while the good cannot gain the victory unless every individual himself takes up arms and fights. On the Greek view, activity needs no reward in order to gain the allegiance of man; it is its own joy and reward: as Aristotle says, all life possesses a "natural sweetness."

But now the question arises, in what, then, does the activity consist which is able to control and fill life? With regard to this question thinkers were naturally bound to go their own ways. They seek what leads to the highest form of activity in that which distinguishes man from other beings, and exalts him above them: this is reason, which is here defined more exactly as thought. In virtue of his thought man can overcome the distraction of sensible impressions and the transience of external stimulations; he can grasp permanent values and aims; in fact, he can leave behind him the whole domain of civil life with all its petty interests, and in the contemplation of the universe, with its eternal

order and wonderful beauty, he can attain a true and lasting happiness. He can return hence to man and his soul, and here also strive to attain a condition essentially higher than the average.

To this effort Plato was the first to give an individual character and a vigorous elaboration. His conception of happiness involves an energetic negation and rejection of the usual human existence: all the happiness which is there offered and commended seems to him fleeting, external, and illusory. But science reveals to the thinker the possibility of contemplating an eternal order of things which, in accordance with his characteristic tendency towards grandeur and vividness of conception, becomes co-ordinated into a whole, the world of ideas. This ideal world, with all its superiority, is not intrinsically alien to us, but he who strives with all his might to attain it can gain complete possession of it and make it his own life and being. In this appropriation of a real and perfect world

the thinker finds a happiness which is beyond comparison with anything else that life offers. But even the individual life of man takes another course when a higher world is thus revealed to him: it is in particular the combination of scientific thought with the formative activity of art which everywhere reveals great tasks and leads to genuine happiness. The work of science is to destroy all mere appearance and everywhere to throw into relief something essential: it also frees its disciple from all external dependence and places him entirely on his own basis. Art as formative effort, however, finds a high goal set before it by the fact that human life contains a wealth of potentialities and powers which must somehow be reconciled with one another. No one of all these different potentialities ought to be rejected or stunted, but all ought to be associated in carrying out their common task in such a way that higher and lower are clearly separated, the former gaining a secure ascendancy while the latter willingly subordinates

itself. When this is successfully accomplished, when all the diversity of things is clearly marked off and graded, human life in itself is fashioned into a perfect work of art. It is the vigorous realization of this work of art, the self-contemplation of man, from which true happiness proceeds. In the possession of such happiness, which is grounded in his own nature, man may feel himself superior to all fate, for this inner harmony cannot be destroyed or even diminished by anything that comes from outside. Thus Plato sketches that magnificent picture of the suffering just man, who is misjudged and persecuted even unto death, but who through all the attacks upon him actually gains in inward happiness. On this view, further, action needs no external reward, for this contemplation of inner harmony contains complete happiness in itself. The only presupposition is that the inner condition, while differentiating itself into harmony and disharmony, should enter into feeling and life in its pure and undisguised character, that the

reflection in our consciousness should be absolutely faithful. The chief distinction of this doctrine of happiness lies in the fact that it brings the internal disposition and its manifestation, the good and the beautiful, into the closest connection, but represents the whole as finding its joy and motive force immediately in itself. Here all petty calculation of private advantage, all thoughts of reward and punishment, have sunk out of sight.

Aristotle shares this conviction in all essential particulars, but he puts a peculiar complexion on it by another mode of marking it off from the ordinary conceptions of happiness. The usual struggle for happiness is, according to him, only a pursuit of external goods; the devotion of all one's life and efforts to this pursuit involves an inner contradiction, and indeed the deep degradation of man. For these external goods are after all only means to life; an endeavour which is directed towards them never reaches rest and satisfaction; it is driven onwards to infinity and yet always

remains dependent on external things; with its pursuit of outward results it robs man of all inward independence. True satisfaction can come only from an activity which finds its task in itself and does not strive after anything beyond itself. Such an activity is reached when all powers unite and acquire a great depth of purpose under the guidance of reason, when a strong and earnest man consciously expresses himself and his character in his actions. But as the feeling of happiness generally corresponds to the content of life, man will gain all the greater happiness the more successful he is in filling his life with significance: there is no full happiness without greatness of soul. Joy in activity, however, will on its side contribute towards raising activity to a higher level, and thus life itself will be enhanced by happiness. In this connection Aristotle has weighed and measured with circumspection and sureness of touch the relation of human action to Fate. The activity which decides our happiness undoubtedly

postulates the fulfilment of many conditions and the co-operation of many auxiliaries; a maimed and crippled man cannot exercise any full activity, and, generally, we must to a certain extent be favoured by circumstances if we are to unfold what is latent in us. But however strongly Aristotle recognizes this, he does not believe that man becomes on this account a plaything of Fate. For the main thing in all activity is always the inner power and capacity. Though for its consummation it may need to be brought on the stage of life, even without this it is as little lost as the dramatic poet's work of art which is never acted. Spiritual power is equal to dealing with the average amount of suffering and constraint which life presents. Excessive afflictions may of course destroy the happiness of life, but in any case they are of rare occurrence, and even they are unable to make a noble man really miserable: for his beauty of character shines through all unhappiness.

Thus the great classical thinkers have

sketched an ideal of happiness which has always claimed the attention of humanity as the type of a vigorous, joyous, and noble scheme of life. But the further movement of history soon made it evident that the ideal rests upon definite presuppositions and does not overcome certain limitations. It demands a pre-eminent power of spiritual creation; it assumes not only that the soul is directed towards the good but also that the spiritual faculty is a match for every obstacle; it needs, further, the conviction that man can grasp the complete truth with his thought and make it the setting of his life. But the beginning of Hellenism involved a great revolution which modified the relation of man to reality. With the traditional order of life shaken to its foundation, it became the supreme necessity to win for him an inner self-sufficiency, a complete independence of and superiority over everything which lies without him. But this can only be accomplished if his interest is dissociated from externals, if his relation to

all experiences of external happiness or unhappiness ceases to be that of feeling or suffering and becomes one of complete indifference, so that he takes refuge entirely in his thought, in the realization of a cosmic reason and the consciousness of an inner greatness. A man who thus gains by thought a living realization of the totality of the universe cannot be moved or agitated by anything which happens in the world of experience; even if this world were shattered he would not be dismayed. The development of this spiritual superiority has greatly strengthened the inner life and has led man deeper into his own soul: it has supported him in troubled times by rousing the heroic elements in his character, but the many problems which as a whole it contains cannot well remain hidden. The fundamental thought which here forms the basis of life is more of a negative than of an affirmative nature; it exalts character above the world, but it does not lead to the permeation and moulding of the latter; hence, how-

ever powerful may be the stimulus, it is easy for a feeling of emptiness to arise. Further, this ideal of life needs great and powerful souls, it requires heroic energy to maintain the fundamental conviction when the whole environment contradicts it. Hence, as soon as doubts about the spiritual power of man arose and spread, faith in this ideal was bound to wane.

Doubts of this kind, moreover, continually gained ground as the ancient world ran its course: man continually developed a deeper sense of the obscurity of the world, and felt himself continually less equal to dealing with its sharp oppositions. In particular, it was the opposition between spirituality and sensuousness which occupied and agitated men's minds to an ever-increasing extent. The old harmony between the spiritual and the sensible was replaced by its opposite as spiritual power became deadened and the life of the senses more refined; in the end, this was intensified to an antipathy against all sensuousness and

a passionate longing somehow to gain deliverance from it and to participate in a purer life. But man felt himself much too weak to bring about this change from his own resources: thus a longing arose for supernatural help, and the Deity was invoked to raise man to a higher life. These changes destroy the old rest and security; life is tossed hither and thither between conflicting moods; longings, hopes, and dreams take the place of a secure possession; the fixed forms are dissolved and a journey begins towards the distant, the formless, the unlimited. The whole is thrown into enormous agitation by the fact that human existence is thought to be encompassed by influences proceeding not merely from good but also from evil spirits, destroying demons, and that thus a consciousness of responsibility, indeed a torturing fear of eternal punishment, makes itself felt. In such a situation deliverance and happiness can be hoped for only from the assistance of a supramundane Deity; such a Deity must come to the rescue

in a miraculous manner and give man a share in his perfection. In order to reach this it is necessary for man to come out of himself, and a condition of ecstasy becomes the highest level of life. As regards the sensuous, however, the object to be aimed at is the highest possible degree of renunciation, a strict asceticism. In the whole scheme the position of humanity is wrapped in deep gloom, but it is precisely from this sense of darkness that there proceeds the strongest impulse towards liberation from all misery, towards the attainment of full and vigorous happiness. In the wide field of existence this endeavour gives rise to a remarkable situation, in which the most various elements, higher and lower, superstition and the scientific impulse, greed for happiness and willingness for self-sacrifice, meet in a confused medley. It needs a great personality to wrest from this chaos a pure ideal of life and happiness: such a personality appeared in Plotinus.

In the change of direction which was due

to Plotinus the essential point is that here religion is no longer, as it had been to the average man, a mere means to subjective happiness, but that it promises to make something essentially new out of man and to get rid of all the pettiness of a separate existence. What is new is that the whole universe appears as a single life, which always remains self-contained even when it unfolds into multiplicity, and that at the same time it seems possible by means of thought to transport oneself into this unity of the All and thence to regulate the whole of one's life. The winning of such an inner unity with the All promises an incomparably higher life and incomparably higher happiness. For union with the ultimate basis of the All enables man to gain the whole of infinity and eternity for his own possession, and to comprehend all oppositions. At the same time he attains thereby a purely inward life, since here all the value of action lies in its relation to this cosmic unity; all external achievements, on

the other hand, become completely indifferent. A further result is complete independence of fate, since all experiences of joy and suffering fail to reach this height of life. It is true that such a life involves a constant movement in virtue of its relation to eternal being, but in contrast to the rush and bustle of the world it appears as perfect rest, as profound peace. Participation in such an inner life, which rises superior to the world, must further the essential development of psychic life. As this primary unity lies above all special differentiation, man cannot attain to it unless he is able to rise above all diversity of psychical activities and co-ordinate himself into a unity superior to all differentiation. The pursuit of this path leads to the development of a life purely of the soul and feeling, a freely soaring disposition, untrammelled by material ties. Life seems here lightened of all weight and entirely transported into the pure ether of infinity. Hence it may well be conceived that in the development of such a life Plotinus experi-

ences a rapturous bliss, and that this bliss carries him far above every other happiness which life can offer. It is equally intelligible that he does not believe in the possibility of winning and forcing this life by personal toil and labour, but that he regards any beginning on the part of man as necessarily preceded by a revelation of the absolute life, which has to be quietly waited for. "Men must remain in quietude until it appears, and must look for it as the eye awaits the rising of the sun." Thus Plotinus by this appropriation of a universal life carries out a transference both of being and of happiness into the purely inward life: it is here first clearly seen what power the thought of union with the All is able to gain over the human soul. But it cannot be denied that there is no path leading from this inwardness back to the wide field of life; the spiritual rapture cannot transform itself into fruitful work and permeate the whole of life. Hence in the end there remains a cleavage between the height of the inner

life and the rest of existence; there are only particular moments when the thought of the All takes complete possession of man, fills him with ecstatic rapture, and enables him both to participate in a bliss beyond description and to forget everything else.

The further limitations in the work of Plotinus we can best estimate if we keep in mind his connection with the whole ancient world. For although with him philosophy takes a turn towards religion and pure inwardness, he does not forsake the connections of ancient life. This life regards man and all his efforts as an item in a given world which is complete in itself and rounded off: the cardinal task for man is to master this world and find his place in it. Thought, which connects him with the All, thus becomes the guiding force in spiritual life; but just as this thought arises in the soul of every individual, it is likewise the concern of every individual to carve his own way to happiness. Man is not dependent on others, neither does he work for

others ; there is here no inner solidarity between men, no assimilation of another or of the whole into one's own inner being ; the destiny of mankind is not lived out at each individual point, nor is any activity entered upon for the elevation of the general condition, but as the individual here stands entirely on his own basis, so he lives only for himself and even in his happiness is inwardly lonely ; there is here no inner world encompassing men and forming a bond of union between them. Hence it is not to be wondered at if the great differences between individuals, which human life undeniably shows, are accepted as final and completely control the system of values. An aristocracy of the spirit is sharply distinguished from the rest of humanity : it alone, with its spiritual power and greatness of character, has any share in true happiness ; such happiness is refused to the others, and this refusal causes no pain to those on the higher level. The rigidity and hardness of the whole also becomes apparent in its estimate and treatment

of pain. Greek thinkers have by no means treated pain lightly, as seems to have been thought in former times, but they have displayed the greatest reluctance to admit it among the fundamental constituents of life. As thought was here concerned as a general rule to prove that the world, in spite of all the pain obviously existing in it, is a kingdom of reason, so the highest task in life seemed to be to prohibit all approach of pain to oneself, to put on against it armour of proof through which it cannot possibly pierce. Thus immense complication was bound to arise when, after all, the sense of pain grew continually stronger and refused to be treated as a mere appearance, or to be kept at a wide distance from the inmost part of life. That joyous doctrine was then in some risk of being transformed into its exact opposite. The Greek ideal of happiness, with all its seriousness, is not on the whole free from an audacious optimism. To find perfect happiness in activity is something not to be hoped

for apart from the conviction that such activity has been from the first exerted within the sphere of truth, and that, provided all powers be strained to the utmost, it reaches its goal with absolute certainty. Thus, as a matter of fact, the opinion of the ancient world is that a well-directed and vigorous struggle for truth must undoubtedly reach truth, and that all spiritual power is certainly working towards the good. There are as yet no shattering doubts and inner dissensions in the spiritual life itself, or, where they appear, they are thrust into the background and attention is averted from them. The struggle for truth of the old thinkers presupposes the rationality of the universe: they neither appreciate the irrationality of human existence at its full value nor fight against it with all their powers.

It is this irrationality of existence which affords the starting-point for the Christian pursuit of happiness; it is here for the first time that it gains full recognition. For it is not this or that item in the world which here

seems wrong, but the whole condition is full of confusion and disorder; the perversion, however, reaches its highest point in the ethical alienation of man from God, and it is here that the transformation too must begin. But where the mischief goes right down to the root, and where a renewal of the whole of existence is requisite, the new departure cannot proceed from the private resources of man but only from divine love and grace; it is the fundamental conviction of Christianity, however, that such a love has really been made manifest and that it promises deliverance to every individual. As all evil arose out of the separation from God, so the highest good can consist in nothing else but re-union with God: but this affords a bliss incomparably superior to every other form of happiness. For here man obtains a share in the whole wealth of divine life; here he is entirely transported into a kingdom of love, of childlike trust, of saving grace. Moreover his soul acquires a peculiar state of tension, since the

initial situation, above which he is raised, does not simply disappear but persists within the new life, which thus runs its course amid sharp contrasts. An undertone of pain accompanies the bliss, and may even seem to be enhanced by the presence of the higher elements; but, on the other hand, happiness gains by the contrast both in intimacy and stability. Placed amid such contrasts the soul remains in constant inner movement: happiness cannot here be thought of as a possession acquired once for all, and the condition of man as a state of perfection, but it is only an inner superiority to the whole realm of conflict which is offered, and it is in the inmost ground of his being that man is absorbed into divine life. The point of superiority of this new life and the corresponding happiness over everything which could be attained in Hellenism, even by the path of religion, is that here a true inner world arises. What makes this possible is that here the divine is not conceived in the first place as the unchangeable unity, the

essential being, but as the ideal of personality, as moral perfection, as almighty love. The relation to such a Being may rise to the highest power and warmth, the inwardness of thought may be heightened to the intimacy of the full personality: man in general, and each man in particular, may know that he is supported and guarded by eternal love. In this realm all differences of spiritual capacity disappear and everything depends on the force and faithfulness of the character, on the ethical direction of the nature, which everyone is able to display.

The particular character of the whole is especially prominent in the treatment of pain, which is in flat contradiction to the Greek method. Here, where man cannot find his way to the heights until his nature has undergone a mighty convulsion, and where the most difficult problems concern the soul itself, it is impossible to follow the Greek thinkers in expelling pain and keeping it wholly at a distance from the inner life.

On the contrary, pain here becomes indispensable for the deepening of life and as a preparation for the good: indeed, the assertion is actually made that in pain itself there is a blessedness, so that those who suffer pain are praised as blessed. In this connection those who take an external view might think chiefly of the joy of a future life, to which pain forms a mere passage, but the more spiritually minded have sought to show that the transformation of soul which proceeds from suffering contains in itself a deepening and strengthening of life. According to Gregory of Nyssa a good becomes manifest in pain itself; the absence of the good could not move us to such strong and passionate grief if it were not something pertaining to our being; hence it is precisely distress of such a kind which gives us assurance of a depth of our nature. In pursuance of this line of thought a special unhappiness may be ascribed to the man who now feels himself happy, for it is just this which circumscribes his life and

prevents it from reaching further depths. In the same way the strong feeling of the immeasurable pain of existence is for Augustine a sure sign that the present is not the final and complete existence, that, rather, we belong in the ultimate basis of our being to another and higher world. In a similar way from the agitating and shattering power of doubt he infers that truth does subsist and has a close connection with our being; non-possession accompanied by a painful feeling of want everywhere attests for him the impossibility of renunciation, the active operation of a higher life. Thus Christianity in its struggle for happiness has taken up negation into the heart of life, and thereby for the first time made life truly superior to it. If there is a consequent danger that life may tend too much towards softness, mildness, and gentleness, this one-sidedness is counteracted by a strong impulse towards activity proceeding from the innermost being of Christianity: did it not come to renew the world, to put

humanity on its feet again, to build up a kingdom of God even on earth? It promises, therefore, not merely deliverance from pain and guilt but also the revelation of a new and higher life. But it cannot be denied that historical circumstances have permitted this affirmative side of Christianity to develop to a much smaller extent than the negative: once more it was the influence, so often described, of that weary and languid period which gave the one side an unwarrantable predominance. Complete deliverance from suffering and all the confused bustle of the world, rest and peace of mind—these became the highest of aims.

However convinced we may be that this development of Christianity which holds aloof from the world does not extend to its inmost essence, and that it leaves open the possibility of other developments, it at first gained the victory over them and ruled for long ages. The difficulty about this kind of Christianity, which has met us under many different forms,

can be clearly seen also in connection with the problem of happiness. For it seeks happiness too much in separation from the world; it is in danger of sinking into weakness by not grappling with things courageously but only rising superior to them in the mind. Since feeling is not sufficiently transformed into action, it is impossible for happiness to inform and animate the whole of life. Another drawback arises from the fact that the emphasis on suffering easily leads to a lingering over mere suffering, indeed to a sentimental revelling in pain, such as we see especially in religious poetry and often in an unedifying form. A further consideration is that a happiness which is thus divorced from the rest of life must become insecure as soon as the whole of this religious systematization of life begins in any way to be doubted: but we all know that such doubts did arise and have spread. The history of Christianity shows, it is true, much diversity on all these points: the medieval

system of Catholicism appears in very different hues; still there is no mistaking the wide divergence between the predominantly passive character of the middle ages and the greater activity which proceeded from the Reformation and which has reacted even on Catholicism. For the Reformation, in imposing the strong contrasts of the Christian life on the soul of every individual, in rousing in it a greater stir of emotion and summoning it to more vigorous activity, could not but effect an inner transformation of happiness as well. But in spite of everything here also happiness remained a matter of the inner consciousness superior to the world; it rested too much on a hopeful faith in a new order for it to ally itself with any valiant and vigorous attempt to grapple with and transform the surrounding world. Hence it always retained a certain weakness and tenderness; it is easy to understand how a period filled with a more vigorous vitality and pleasure in activity pressed beyond such a conception.

This is what happened to a large extent in the modern period. In this period man seeks happiness not so much by retreating into the sanctuary of the soul as by coming out of himself, unfolding and utilizing his powers: a great deal here depends on the conviction that man is not assigned a limited capacity by nature and fate, but can grow without limit, continually develop new powers, and set himself higher and higher aims. Nothing seems to give a clearer proof of man's greatness, and indeed of his relationship with the Deity, than this capacity for progress to infinity. On the very threshold of the modern period it is absolutely clear that this faith in progress brings with it an essentially different sense of happiness, a more vigorous and joyous condition of soul than was known to the middle ages. Thus we read in Nicolaus of Cusa, the first modern thinker: "To be able to know ever more and more without end, this is our likeness to the eternal wisdom. Man always desires to know better what he knows and to

love more what he loves, and the whole world is not sufficient for him because it does not satisfy his craving for knowledge." With such a growth of endeavour the spirit also must grow in itself: "Like a fire which is kindled from the flint-stone, the spirit can grow without limit through the light which streams from it." This feeling is also expressed in the succeeding centuries with particular clearness in the thinkers who are the principal representatives of the modern movement. Thus Leibniz is filled with a vigorous faith in progress and derives from it a sense of happiness and joy. Thus even Hegel is carried safely over all the oppositions and vexations of existence by the consciousness of the constant progress of the whole.

But this faith in progress gains in weight and content principally because the movement does not merely increase the powers of the individual subject but develops the general situation and makes reality more and more rational. A central position is here obtained

by work. In work an activity is recognized which brings us into the closest connection with things, since it can take up their nature and necessity into itself and conform to them. While man thus binds himself more closely to his cosmic environment by means of work, he has a right to hope that by his efforts the condition of reality may be raised and all the more so because modern work has tended to form extensive complexes, has united the powers of individuals more closely, and by uniting them has made them capable of achieving incomparably higher results. But if man has thus gained in work a means to advance the condition of the world, it has given him at the same time stability in his own nature, it has given his life a broader foundation and a secure position in face of the world. Hence for the modern man happiness is closely bound up with work; here for the first time work, which was put in the background by the earlier systems of life, comes to be fully appreciated, and by combination with

it happiness becomes stronger, calmer, and richer: it is now able to penetrate the whole range of life.

This modification of work and of happiness can be followed out in different directions. We see it, above all, in the building up of civilization, that is, a condition of life peculiar to man as opposed to mere nature. By valiant struggle with the apparently alien world man extends the boundaries of his domain and constructs for himself his own sphere of life. It is science especially which takes the lead in this movement and thus proves its power over things. It is especially clear in connection with science how the individual in the modern period has to fit himself into a whole and to carry out his work in the ranks. But if definite limits are thus assigned to every individual, he may cherish the consciousness that in his place he is indispensable, and by his activity is furthering the construction of the whole: "Many shall run to and fro and knowledge shall be increased" (Bacon, with refer-

ence to a passage in Daniel).[1] In a still bolder flight of thought Leibniz declared that we men, like little gods, in virtue of our reason, are able to imitate the architect of the world and promote the welfare of the whole. Man is "not a part but an image of the Deity, a representation of the universe, a citizen of the divine city." If activity here seems to be principally directed towards serving the progress of the universe, at the same time there shows itself in modern society an eager and active endeavour to raise the condition of humanity, to eliminate as far as possible all irrationality from human relations, and to give more and more strength to reason. For here the conviction no longer prevails that the condition of human affairs has been established once for all by the will of God and must be accepted by us as an unchangeable fate, but here also everything appears to be in flux and capable of enhancement. Thus activity here

[1] Bacon, *De Aug. Scient.*, II., x.: "Plurimi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia." Cf. Dan. xii. 4.

finds high tasks to perform, all the more since "everything in human form" becomes an object of sympathy, indeed a growing feeling of solidarity makes every individual seem responsible for all the distress and injustice around him. Much darkness and suffering is now really felt for the first time, but it is unable to overwhelm man because his power to cope with the misery can increase indefinitely. The feeling of power and happiness must grow to an immeasurable extent if man can thus take up the battle with circumstances and bring about a new condition of the world.

In this movement as a whole the first thing which attracts our notice is its larger and broader effects, but the movement is no less significant in its relation to what is small and individual. For it is an essential feature of modern life that every individual is recognized as furnishing a specific problem: at every point his dormant power must be awakened, the different elements whose previous state is a confused medley must be adjusted to one

another and subordinated to a unity which is able to raise everything to a higher level. In the development of this effort the individual finds an exalted happiness in spite of all the toil and labour. For he here becomes a world of his own which possesses a value for the whole just because it is unique. This individualizing process extends to all human relations, a uniform development is everywhere avoided, and by the cultivation of individuality a specific task and joy is revealed.

In the whole there is apparent a powerful vital impulse which is occasionally heightened to fierce passion. To be sure, an objective compulsion and law is also at work and prevents a lapse into merely subjective excitement: resignation, too, is not wanting, since at a given moment every achievement has definite limits, and since, further, the individual cannot accomplish anything by himself but only together with the others and in subordination to a common aim. But all the limitations and restrictions at the individual

point and the particular moment are outweighed by the faith in a better future and in the infinitely increasing power of the human race. This faith is as indispensable to the modern period as that in the harmony of the universe was to antiquity and that in a benevolent Deity to the middle ages. Such faith in progress enables the modern man to bear all his labours cheerfully and to preserve a vigorous sense of happiness in the midst of all his work and care. It seems to give life an absolutely positive content and human happiness a sure foundation.

We know to what a magnificent development of life this movement has led, but we also know what complications have arisen from it and how these complications are placed in the foreground by the consciousness of the present. The faith in progress which we have described has been able to fill the whole of life and make it happy only in virtue of the conviction that human activity could pene-

trate things to their foundations and enable man to appropriate them completely; but whether this really takes place became open to stronger and stronger doubt. Such doubts first affect science, the leading force in modern culture. While the height of the Enlightenment was absolutely convinced of its ability to fathom things to the very bottom, Kant has demonstrated to us with irresistible force the limitations of our knowledge. Far beyond the domain of philosophy, however, the conviction has become established in the nineteenth century that behind the work of our thought there lies a world of things which remains inaccessible, and that the mutual relations of things are all that we can hope to ascertain. We cannot explain and understand but only determine and describe. Hence we are cut off from truth in the sense in which it admits us to the essence of things and frees us from the narrowness of a merely human conceptual world. But what applies to truth applies also to the whole of culture. It has

been brought home to us more and more that, however much we are able to alter and improve in the external relations of things, we do not thereby attain an essentially new life and a higher kind of being: all the progress of civilization has resulted in little genuine culture and little development of the condition of the soul. We cannot avoid asking the question whether such an activity on the mere surface of things is worth the enormous toil and labour which it costs.

Similar misgivings are also aroused by our relation to man. The modern movement rested on a firm belief in man's efficiency and natural goodness: it seemed that, if only ample room were provided for the full development of his powers, everything would shape itself for the best and a kingdom of reason would be established in the sphere of humanity. Now, in fact, deliverance from all kinds of constraint has been secured and human powers have been unfolded as never before; but can we shut our eyes to all the

complications, struggles, and aberrations which have proceeded from this deliverance? At the beginning of the modern period the conception of humanity included an emphatic judgment of value: to develop the human element in man still seemed to be at our classical period to raise life to a proud height, but now we are more conscious of what is petty and mean in man; we perceive sharp conflicts in his being, we find him not merely inadequate for the tasks which his own nature sets him, but we see his liberated spiritual powers to a large extent enlisted in the service of selfishness and, in general, of pettily human interests, and thereby diverted from their true ends. Hence it is not to be wondered at if there is aroused a longing for deliverance from the pettiness of man, a craving for greatness; but it must be confessed that as a rule these ambitions quickly succumb again to the influence of pettiness and vanity. In such a situation how could it fill us with assured confidence and pure happiness to work for the improvement

of the human situation? The contradictions which are here involved fail to be fully realized at the present day simply because estimates of man which belong to older schemes of life still retain their influence although they have no foundation in our period. The religious estimate of man as a "seed-corn of eternity" and the object of infinite love still retains its influence; from the point of view of the faith in reason which was characteristic of the Enlightenment, man appears as belonging to a kingdom of reason, and in virtue of his freedom incomparably superior to all mere nature; but religion has been shaken and faith in reason has waned, and hence in the end this estimate cannot possibly be maintained. But if it is seriously meant to transform man into a mere item in a rounded-off natural world, this does away with all possibility of bringing any counteracting influence to bear on this state of immediate existence, all possibility of inner elevation, and we do not see how the most distant future can produce any change in this respect.

These complications extend also into the sphere of individual existence, the full recognition of which was a leading feature in the modern movement of culture. Certainly much stimulus and pleasure still arise from the activity of individuals, but the foundation has been overthrown which gave these endeavours a significant content and an assured direction. Formerly the individual seemed to be valuable and the work expended on his education profitable because in him infinite life strove to express itself in a unique way, because, therefore, every individual might hope that the development of his own nature advanced the condition of the universe. But since life is now more and more exclusively concentrated in the visible sphere, we have become continually more uncertain of this foundation; but, if the individual is completely tied to the sphere of immediate existence, his unlimited development must lead both to severe collisions with other individuals and mutual hostility, and also to crude sel-

fishness or even complacent vanity. Once thought has embraced all these points in a single survey, the emptiness and unedifying character of the whole cannot possibly escape notice; and then the solution of the problem of happiness can no longer be expected from the fullest possible development and recognition of all individuals.

These misgivings are further increased by the modern development of work and the urgency with which its problems are thrust into the foreground. At the beginning work still stood in close connection with the soul of man: the individual could take a pride and joy in its progress because he saw his own product in it; at the same time it still possessed a restful character, it set life in motion but the motion as yet was not feverish or violent; it still afforded periods of leisure which permitted men to review the whole and to transform it into a joyous possession. And now what a change! By forming gigantic complexes work has severed itself

more and more from the soul of the individual and goes its way unconcerned for his weal or woe; owing to its being at the same time more and more specialized and differentiated, the part which the individual has in his field of vision and under his own control becomes smaller and smaller. Hence his psychical power also is developed only in a certain direction while the rest remains unemployed and undeveloped. To this must be added the speeding-up process by which modern work has been more and more invaded; it forces man to be always on his guard and to hold his powers in constant readiness for fresh efforts; this life must bind man hand and foot to the temporary situation, keep him in a state of breathless tension and transform him more and more into a mere struggler for existence. It cannot be denied that the whole has led to prodigious results, but it becomes clearer and clearer that the man as a whole can find no happiness in such a life. But if this work thus strains him to

the utmost without leading him through all his toil and agitation to any genuine happiness, and if at the same time it becomes clearer and clearer that, in spite of the pre-eminent cultivation of skill in particular directions, man is sinking to a lower level in the whole of his being, is becoming insignificant and in the end empty, the question necessarily arises whether all this work of civilization, which renders man neither happy nor noble nor great, is not a self-deception on the part of humanity; whether it is not a huge contradiction to set all one's power in motion with such passionate earnestness, and, as regards the whole of one's being, to lose rather than to gain. What is then the real object for which man works if he thus becomes a mere means and instrument in a soulless process of civilization? We have just seen that he does not attain happiness for himself in the process. For whom, then, does he work? For a future which is wholly veiled from him and which will perhaps in all its progress only be involved

in increasing confusion? Or for the whole of humanity, which yet from the point of view of immediate existence is a pale and empty abstraction, and which, as such, will never be able to overcome the interests and passions of the individual? Everything contributes to raise doubts as to whether the path pursued by the modern period, especially if it be pursued exclusively, is able to lead man to happiness. It is coming more and more to be believed that, as every individual man is more than his work, so also the whole of humanity must be more than the civilization based on work. It is the craving after independence of life and true happiness which drives us beyond the civilization based on mere work and compels us to seek further widths and depths of life. But where are they to be found?

The craving after a more spiritual civilization as opposed to that based on mere work has become stronger and stronger and brings to the front many counteracting influences.

Perhaps the most significant of these influences is the development of an æsthetic culture which runs through the period in broad waves. We cannot deny that this movement of culture has furnished a valuable stimulus and indeed has led to an advance: it has again laid a stronger emphasis on the independence of individuality, it has given life more immediacy and more free movement, more suppleness and more joyousness, and it may in consequence seem to restore genuine happiness. But in reality, as a closer examination is bound to show, when confined to its own resources it does not afford a happiness which penetrates to the inmost heart of life and gives it warmth and elevation, but only a rich diversity of individual agreeable moments, of pleasant stimulations which are not combined into a whole. What is here offered is only a selfish though refined enjoyment on the part of the educated, and often over-educated individual: there is an absence as well of a high goal as of an

essential content of life. But without these, what has happened in the end to all forms of Epicureanism will also happen here in the midst of all the enjoyments, however refined they may be—a feeling of inner emptiness will break forth irresistibly and reject all the proffered happiness as shallow and artificial. Thus, although the individual, and indeed whole circles of society, may seek in this manner to escape the complications and troubles of the period, the way to overcome them is not revealed by a superficial life of this character.

In another direction it is sought to win true happiness by demanding more personality and a more personal shaping of existence: the ethical task is here given precedence over artistic activity. This view certainly contains an incontestable truth, only we must recognize that a high and distant goal is here in question, the attainment of which should not be anticipated so lightly and easily as it often is. We do not by any means become

personalities by pronouncing the word with affection and emphasis, for subjective emotion is not enough to start our life on a new path. The thought of personality possesses value only so far as the word is backed by action, and indeed action which involves nothing less than the complete transformation of the old, and the building up of a new reality. How much this thought demands is shown with particular clearness by the life-work of Kant. He saw clearly that there is no personality unless life is raised to freedom, independence, and spontaneity, but he saw just as clearly that for such freedom and spontaneity the world of natural existence does not afford the smallest room: hence a complete reversal of the former world-picture became necessary, and Kant employed all his mighty powers in its accomplishment. But to-day it often looks as if life could be raised to an essentially higher level within the world of natural existence without much trouble if only it were brought into more vigorous and direct

relation with the individual units. This, however, is a dangerous error. If we do not bring the living units into connection with a new kind of being and thereby give them an essentially new content, this movement, by awakening their self-consciousness and self-complacency, may easily do more harm than good, and, with all its subjective stimulation, provide little genuine happiness; it is also dangerous in so far as it veils the difficult problem with which we are here concerned. The modern period, like all others, is especially eloquent and enthusiastic about that in which it is most lacking: we are in painful want of vigorous and strongly marked personalities of original force, and we talk incessantly about personality, its value and greatness.

If, then, the conclusion of the matter is that we cannot overcome the complications and gain a share of happiness from the immediate situation, but can do so only by an energetic transformation of the whole, it is our obvious

course to turn our gaze upon the whole of history in order to gain thereby a wider perspective and perhaps a point of support. Thus viewed, however, the problem really seems to be greater rather than smaller. For our own examination showed that wherever the desire for happiness found satisfaction on the high level of the spiritual life it involved definite convictions, but that these convictions in the changing course of the ages came to lose their immediacy and their force. With the Greeks the struggle for happiness rested on faith in the rationality and beauty of the universe, the vigorous realization of which would raise man above all the constraints of existence; in Christianity it was the steadfast faith in the loving care of an almighty Deity which supported man in all the trials of life; the modern period relied on the reason indwelling in the human race and on the unlimited capacity for increase possessed by human faculties; here it was faith in a better future which raised man

above all the limitations of the moment. For us moderns, however, the thought of the beauty of the universe has faded away before the dark actuality and the severe struggle for existence which modern science displays to us; and we all know how religious faith has been most severely shaken in the life of culture. But least of all can a closer examination fail to recognize how seriously faith in man and his spiritual greatness has been impaired; for here the test of experience lay nearest to hand, and experience, wherever it has given a candid verdict, has decided in the negative.

Hence that which afforded earlier periods a firm foundation for happiness and an aid to its development offers us at the present day no sufficient point of support. In face of the influences of the world which press so strongly upon us we lack a rounded-off world of thought to mitigate, transform, and turn to account the doubts and difficulties of life: in particular we lack a single supreme truth,

and hence we stand defenceless in face of an all-powerful Fate. Is it to be wondered at if in these circumstances pessimism boldly raises its head and ever advances further? We now see clearly that the very thing which exalts man above nature involves him in vast problems, with which he seems unable to cope. It cannot fail to be recognized that a new kind of life arises in him and separates him from other beings. This life, however, seems to find no support and help in the great world; it sees itself bound to unintelligible conditions and treated by the process of nature as if it were a thing of no importance. Since at the same time in man himself it is generally languid and burdened with sharp contradictions, it seems unable to prevail against all that alien world upon which it supervenes. But with all its weakness and constraint, this new life yet maintains its standards and forces man to apply them to all his doings and dealings. After this movement the mere comfort of natural existence

can no longer be felt as satisfying: man's awakened power demands a goal and an intrinsic value, but it does not find what it seeks and renunciation is impossible. Man's thought carries in itself the idea of infinity and eternity, and thereby destroys all the satisfaction which can be found in the temporal and the finite. Viewed in relation to infinity man and all his doings must seem unspeakably small; the individual, too, as a thinking being cannot help feeling the cramping limits, the nullity, even, of his particular sphere; the thought of eternity contracts into a fleeting span the whole duration of our life and threatens to take from it all its zest and heart. But the course of history heightens rather than diminishes these complications. For the more man develops his specific characteristics, and the further his thought carries him beyond the sphere of immediate existence, giving him at the same time a feeling of freedom, the greater appears the resistance of an alien world which does not

partake in his advance, and the heavier the pressure of a rigid order of things. Human experience, too, teaches us plainly the moment we consult it that the progress of civilization rather leads man into increasing complications than bestows upon him pure and complete happiness.

Thus the problem of happiness runs through the whole movement of history, and that which is in question is not merely the paths which lead to the goals but the goals themselves. It follows that beyond all doubt philosophy has here a great task to perform, and indeed that it is here indispensable to humanity. For if a natural instinct does not infallibly show us the way, and if at the same time all our efforts after genuine happiness need to be founded on definite convictions about the Whole, humanity cannot dispense with a vigorous effort of introspection. Here, too, we encounter the problem of truth; no amount of subjective wishing and willing can lead us on the path to happiness unless the

possibility of happiness is guaranteed by the reality of things. But to give information on this head is pre-eminently the task of philosophy.

But, as all our previous discussion shows, it will make no progress unless a successful attempt is made to extract from the experiences of human life an all-embracing fact or supreme truth which shall help us to concentrate and strengthen our powers and render them superior to obstacles. The experiences and changes of the ages show that we have to seek a fact of this nature primarily not outside but within ourselves, that is, not in the mere circumstances of the individual but in a vital process superior to him. The peculiarly human attributes have been the source of all complications; these complications, therefore, will in all probability be insoluble unless the specifically human element is further deepened, brought into wider connections, and thereby made a match for the indifferent or hostile world. With this

we return to the problem of an independent spiritual life superior to the mere man. If the spiritual process which takes place in us is a mere product of man, this involves the disappearance of all hope of building up a specific world from it as a centre, and of winning at the same time significance, value, and happiness for human existence: on this conclusion all our labour and toil is lost, and victory rests finally with negation. Hence only one way is left, viz., to understand and treat the spiritual life as an independent world; only thus can we hope to win a content for our life and to save it from the nothingness into which otherwise it irretrievably sinks. With the appropriation of these connections our existence is by no means transformed into vain pleasure and harmony, but rather the contrasts and conflicts of existence may at first appear only greater and more intolerable, and the battle may become fiercer than ever. But if human endeavour is provided with a firm point of support in the

movement of the universe and allowed to draw upon its resources, it can confidently begin the battle; it is then at least certain that our life is not in vain, but that something of moment is accomplished in it, however far we may be from having a clear view of the whole. But if philosophy has in general been found indispensable to the battle for happiness, it must become still more so when we see that what is needed is a radical deepening and a vigorous unification of life. For what is there more qualified than philosophy for the task first of destroying the illusory hopes which the modern world holds out to man, and secondly, of pushing on the work of positive construction and searching out new paths?

Conclusion

A variety of pictures has passed before us, a variety of movements has come within our view in connection with the different fundamental problems. Nowhere, however, have we seen the movement advancing in a straight line, but the historical aspect is complicated by a series of reactions and revulsions. But at the same time it has become clear that the problems of the past reach into the present and that our work is conditioned by the strong influences of history. Now the goal appears as the overcoming of traditional oppositions, now as the more vigorous following up of a course successfully begun, but in almost every case a glance backwards will make our own task clearer: we cannot doubt that our work, to be successful, must meet the demands of a

situation conditioned by its antecedents. But it has become just as apparent that we cannot simply accept a particular stimulus and allow ourselves to be carried on without trouble by the stream of history. For we have seen everywhere that the earlier achievements can no longer satisfy us in their more detailed development, that the movement itself has produced a new situation with peculiar demands. Not only an abundance of problems encompasses us on all sides but our spiritual condition as a whole has become insecure; we feel with particular distinctness at the present day that the life of humanity is not being built up in peace and security on a fixed foundation, but that we have continually to renew the struggle for its continuance and its main principles. Everything tends to show that our period is full of tension and occupied with high tasks; it is obvious that we have come to a point where it is a question of recurring to the fundamental problems, to the elementary conditions of our spiritual existence; we are

urgently called to the search for new paths, to independent creative effort.

But the average attainment of the period by no means corresponds to the demands of the spiritual situation; we feel, perhaps to a greater extent than other epochs, how far human conduct can diverge from the inner necessities of the spiritual life. The spiritual situation of the present urgently calls for a synthesis of life, for an overcoming of oppositions, for a systematization which should deal with the whole, and also for a concentration of men on the search for common paths. In place of this we find a high degree of isolation, a complete separation into different parties and groups, a treatment of problems from the standpoint of mere party. This division into different circles and sharp oppositions hinders all mutual understanding; to each it seems to admit of no doubt that his own way of thinking is the best and constitutes the certain cure for all ills; it is never doubted that the other party is entirely in the wrong. Self-complacency

and dogmatism thus flourish luxuriantly, the constant criticism of others stifles all self-criticism. Thus the different movements are bound to intersect and hinder one another, and in the end a confused chaos must arise, from which it is impossible for successful creative efforts to proceed.

In addition, the spiritual situation demands a vigorous deepening of thought and life, for otherwise how should we be equal to dealing with the difficult problems which the age lays upon our shoulders, or how could we wrest from this confused medley goals and paths of our own? In place of this the average man clings to the surface of things and is content to do so: we surrender ourselves to the first impression and do not perceive into what complexity it may lead us; hence everything seems easy and smooth and all difficulties appear to exist only in the imagination of those who are involved in old prejudices. This mode of thought further leads us into sharp contradictions in our own being by bidding us follow

first one and then another impression; and hence in particular we often seek to retain as an effect and consequence what we have definitely rejected as a cause and ground. In this way alone has it become possible for the thought and the action of the period to employ as a general rule fundamentally different standards of value. Our thought is occupied chiefly with the visible world and shuns as "metaphysics" everything which transcends its limits; but in action there prevails a vague idealism, which treats conceptions such as reason and personality, humanity and human greatness, as incontestable values, without realizing that with them a new world is introduced. But in the end our spiritual creative efforts are oppressed by a desire for negation, an inclination to expect great benefit from the destruction of traditional systems, from the rejection of old solutions. Now the age certainly contains much that is obsolete and rotten, which urgently needs to be removed, but negation cannot produce any true advance

unless behind it there lies the impelling force of an affirmation, which gives effort a fixed direction. But this is usually lacking; it is the negation as negation which satisfies many and is thought to be something great. But since there is usually nothing narrower and more impatient than negation, it produces to-day a dogmatism, and indeed a despotism, which is bound to impair to the most serious extent spiritual creative efforts and the true knowledge of the present situation.

But if the surface of things offers the most obstinate resistance to the necessary renewal of culture and strengthening of inner life, and if no essential progress of life is possible from this starting-point, but only in opposition to it, we may welcome as evidence of an increasing reaction the fact that this obstacle is coming to be more and more felt, and that the necessity of deliverance from isolation, shallowness, and negation is becoming more and more clearly recognized. The more, however, spiritual work strives to gain indepen-

dence of the superficiality of the period, and the more the desire emerges for greater depths and more essential contents of life, the more valuable must the work of philosophy appear, and the less doubt can there be felt that it is indispensable for overcoming the present crisis of spiritual life.

But at the same time it will also be clearly seen that philosophy must have a special nature in order to be able to discharge these tasks. It must not be an affair of mere learning, nor can it remain a mere blending of reflection and subjective acuteness, but it must become an energetic pressing forward and a spiritual creation, it must work out depths of our life, awaken dormant powers, co-ordinate isolated efforts, indeed it must reveal a new reality if it is to help humanity to deal with these leading questions and at the same time to preserve the independence of its own position. For such progressive creation it has to seek a new and peculiar standpoint, and in this sense it must assume the

form of a metaphysics. But it cannot avoid the errors of the old metaphysics unless it starts from the process of life, as we see it not in the isolated individual but in the whole of humanity, and unless it succeeds in the attempt to discover and develop in mankind a general tendency opposed to the initial situation.

This is much what we had in mind when we spoke of a philosophy of spiritual life and desired the elaboration of such a philosophy. It is only such a philosophy which can co-ordinate and make use of all the experience accumulated in the history of the world without surrendering the rights of the living present; only such can place us under the constraint of an inner necessity and at the same time summon us to fresh and joyous activity; it alone can do justice to the diversity of the relations of life and at the same time strive after a straightforward simplicity; it alone can in the end serve to promote the advancement of life without

sinking to a matter of mere utility. A philosophy of this nature is especially congenial to the peculiar characteristics of the German people and the traditions of German life: a nation which has produced men like Eckhardt and Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, and so many other thinkers spiritually akin to these, will never be able to give up the desire for a philosophy which seeks to regard reality from the inside and from the point of view of the whole, and which, in the midst of earnest and laborious investigation, strives to raise the whole of human life to a higher level.

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